February 24, 2010, on the eve of the 10th anniversary of the death of 84 paratroopers of the 6th company of the 104th regiment of the 76th airborne division near Ulus-Kert February 29 - March 1, 2000, the article "From the height" was published in the "Pskov province" , which caused a significant public outcry. In the process of preparing the material, the author re-read dozens of texts on forums and blogs, with completely different ratings. Messages in them still appear. Meanwhile, there were no intelligible official answers to the obvious questions that appeared immediately after the tragic battle.
Sergey Melentiev is a graduate of the Omsk Higher Combined Arms Command Twice Red Banner School named after M.V. Frunze (1983).
The editorial staff of Pskov province sent a request to the president in 2003, in response they received a formal reply from the Security Council: all the heroes, the investigation continues, they are looking for militants, there is no crime in the actions of the command of the grouping of Russian troops. And - not a word about Sergei Melentyev, commander of the 104th regiment. By that time - already deceased.
In 2010, all these memories, re-read bleeding discussions (only a few were included in the large-format article), new meetings with parents and widows, the reaction of relatives and veterans of the regiment to the article, an empty meeting of the Airborne Forces commander in terms of the main issues Vladimir Shamanov with the relatives of those killed in the 76th division club led the author to the idea that the official request should be repeated.
Just because it is necessary. Formally, the country has a different president, a different attorney general.
There are things that need to be reminded until they become clear.
In the current situation of hushing up the tragedy that is leaving in history, we came to the conclusion that the request should be of a political nature.
March 2 Chairman of the Russian United Democratic Party "YABLOKO" Sergey Mitrokhin sent a letter to the President of the Russian Federation and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev and the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation Yuri Chaika.
The letter stated the need to reopen the criminal case on the death of servicemen of the 6th company and conduct a full and comprehensive investigation within its framework.
The appeal, in particular, said: “The death of an entire military unit, which fought for two days, being just a few kilometers from other military units of the United Group of Forces in the North Caucasus, to this day continues to remain an unhealed wound for the relatives, friends and relatives of the fallen soldiers and officers, for the whole country.
The relatives of the victims and the entire Russian society have not yet received answers about the reasons and circumstances of the tragic battle with especially grave consequences.
This investigation is necessary for the Russian Armed Forces, for the entire Russian society, it must provide answers that still do not exist.
Such an investigation is a moral duty of the state to the memory of the fallen soldiers. It must find out the extent of responsibility of all officials of the command staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation who made decisions and were involved in making decisions in the North Caucasus that led to the tragic events of February 29 - March 1, 2000.
Without such an investigation, the memory of the fallen heroes will not be complete ".
In early May, we received an official reply (which is indicative - from the Main Military Prosecutor's Office, not from the addressees of the letter), which is difficult to comment on, but necessary.
For the first time, it was officially announced that the only person who was found guilty of the deaths of 84 Russian servicemen was the former commander of the 104th regiment, Colonel Sergei Melentiev, who was later transferred from Pskov to Ulyanovsk and died in June 2002. It turned out that it was Melent'ev alone and only Melentyev who was at fault, who categorically objected to the throw to a height of 776.0, six times (according to the testimony of people who personally knew him) asked permission to withdraw the company immediately after the start of the battle, but in the first case he obeyed the order, and in the second - did not receive permission.
The time has not yet come to tell the truth about the death of the 6th company at the state level in Russia. This is the main point of the answer we received.
This means that in essence nothing has changed in our country.
But in the process of another attempt to achieve the truth, details have come to light that need to be discussed.
"Violations of the requirements of the Combat Regulations of the Ground Forces"
The official response was executed on the letterhead of the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation and signed on April 16 by the Assistant to the Chief Military Prosecutor of Russia S. V. Bokov.
The article "From a height", published in the "Pskov province" on February 24, 2010, caused a lot of responses.
The answer to the essence of the appeal was given as follows (we quote its text almost in full, except for the introduction):
“In the period from February 29 to March 1, 2000, when carrying out the task of blocking members of illegal armed groups in the area of n. the village of Ulus-Kert of the Chechen Republic as a result of a military clash at an altitude of elevation 776.0 killed 84 and wounded 6 soldiers.
On March 2, 2000, the military prosecutor's office - military unit 20102 (n. Khankala) opened a criminal case No. 14/33 / 0108-00 against members of illegal armed groups on the grounds of crimes provided for in paragraphs. "B", "g", "h" h. 2 tbsp. 105 (murder), part 2 of Art. 208 (participation in an armed formation) of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, which on April 29, 2000 was sent under investigation to the Main Directorate of the General Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation for Supervision of the Execution of Laws in the North Caucasus (now the Directorate of the General Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation in the Southern Federal District).
At present, this criminal case is being investigated by the Investigation Department of the Investigative Committee under the Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation for the Chechen Republic and has not made a final procedural decision on it.
On May 2, 2000, in the military prosecutor's office - military unit 20102, based on materials isolated from the specified criminal case, a criminal case No. 14/33 / 0185-00 was opened against the regiment commander, Colonel Melentyev S. ... 293 (negligence, negligently entailed grave consequences) of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.
During the preliminary investigation of the case, it was established that as a result of improper performance of his duties by Colonel S. Yu. Melentyev, violations of the requirements of the Combat Regulations of the Ground Forces were committed, expressed in ineffective reconnaissance to locate members of illegal armed formations in the areas of operations of subordinate units, making incorrect decisions about changing the time of occupying height 776.0, determining the firing positions of the artillery battalion and the deployment of the regiment's reserves.
The above violations led to the command of a battle with significantly superior enemy forces in unprepared engineering positions in a circular defense, the ineffective use of artillery weapons from established firing positions in the absence of air support due to unfavorable weather conditions and the impossibility of operational unblocking of units by the forces of the regimental reserve, which led to serious consequences in the form of unjustifiably high losses of personnel. The authorities of the preliminary investigation of the actions of Colonel Melentyev S.Yu. reasonably qualified under Part 2 of Art. 293 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.
At the same time, an act of amnesty was subject to application in relation to the said serviceman - Resolution of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation dated May 26, 00 No. 398-III GD "On the declaration of amnesty in connection with the 55th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45".
In view of the above, on May 30, 2000 the criminal case with the consent of S. Yu. Melent'ev was reasonably terminated on the basis of paragraph 4 of part 1 of Art. 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR due to the act of amnesty.
This procedural decision was made by the assistant to the military prosecutor - military unit 20102 and is not rehabilitating for persons who have committed a criminal offense.
Taking a different decision, taking into account the established factual circumstances of the case, would be contrary to the requirements of the legislation on criminal proceedings.
In the course of the investigation, a legal assessment was also given to the actions of other military officials, incl. the command of the United Group, in respect of which the initiation of a criminal case was refused on the basis of paragraph 2 of part 1 of Art. 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR - in the absence of corpus delicti.
Currently, there are no grounds for revising the above procedural decisions ".
Thus, translating the official procedural language of the answer into a more intelligible one, the Main Military Prosecutor's Office of Russia reported that:
1) the criminal case opened on the death of the paratroopers has not been completed and is being investigated by the Investigative Department of the Investigative Committee under the Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation for the Chechen Republic, there is still no procedural decision in the case;
2) at the same time, the actions of the command of the United Group of Forces in the North Caucasus were legally assessed by the investigation, and it was refused to initiate a criminal case against these persons "for lack of corpus delicti";
3) for the first time it was announced publicly that the only person whose guilt was established by the investigation is the former commander of the 104th regiment, Colonel Sergei Melentiev, who was found guilty and pardoned in 2000.
But in the answer of the SHG it is not mentioned in any way that in June 2002 Sergey Melentyev died.
"There were many criminal oddities"
In the article "From the Heights" we mentioned, with reference to the famous memoirs of the Colonel, published in March 2008 in the anthology "The Art of War" Sergey Baran*, in 2000 with the rank of major in command of the 1st company of the 1st battalion of the 104th paratrooper regiment, that S. Yu. Melentyev died on June 22, 2002. This date from S. Baran's memoirs has migrated into hundreds of publications.
Tamara Georgievna Melentieva lost her husband first, and then her son. Photo: "Chelyabinsk worker"
It was said like this: “I remember well: when Melentyev was given the task of transferring the 6th company to the left bank of the Abazulgol River, he tried for a long time to explain that the regiment was not capable of the task, that all strong points, blocks remained on the right bank, all units were involved, and in case emergence of a critical situation, he will not have a reserve for timely assistance. Melentiev then said: “You cannot stand with two feet on different banks of the river,” but then they did not listen to his opinion.
Sergey Yuryevich Melentyev died of a heart attack on June 22, 2002. We buried him in the village of Kromny, Oryol region. At the funeral were all his colleagues in the Pskov division, officers of the command of the Airborne Forces, the command of the 31st airborne brigade, and many famous people. Melentiev was a highly qualified military man, a literate and deeply decent person, and was very upset by the death of the 6th company.
All accusations about illiteracy and inaction against Melentiev, which come from some "knowledgeable" gentlemen, I consider populist, stupid and absolutely groundless! "
Sergei Baran, due to his position and experience (at the time of the interview, he commanded the 108th airborne regiment of the 7th Airborne Assault Division with the rank of colonel) could not but know about the results of the investigation in the Main Military Prosecutor's Office. But he did not mention a word about him in plain text.
In the memoirs themselves, which are one of the most cited sources about the death of the 6th company, there are remorse, not particularly hidden by the author: they could not save their comrades. But the structure of the presentation is such that, indirectly, responsibility is also assigned to the victims: first of all, to the major Mark Evtyukhin, the commander of the 6th company, and all the same, by that time already deceased, Sergei Melentiev.
Recall that, according to the memoirs of S.I.Baran, the decisive episodes of communication within the 104th regiment, after the 6th company was actually blocked at an altitude of 776.0, look as follows: “… Having reached the Abazulgol river, we immediately wade through it. The river was cold, dirty, but shallow, waist-deep.
Starting up the slope towards the height of 776.0, at the reconnaissance frequency I got in touch with Vorobyov, clarified the situation with him. To coordinate future joint actions, I asked Alexey to connect me with Evtyukhin. He connected. I asked Mark Nikolaevich: “How and where is the best way to approach you? What to do? "
Evtyukhin thought about it, and then answered:
- Seryoga, you do not meddle here, you will only interfere with me, I will figure it out myself. Everything is under control, we can handle it ourselves. Now you can neither come here nor help in any way. Don't go. If I need help, I'll call you myself.
These are his words, Mark. Evtyukhin talked to me in a normal, sane voice, did not panic, was collected and decisive.
Up to the 6th company, there was no more than 40 minutes to go. The clock was 23.45.
Night frosts hampered our movements. Sweaty and drenched after crossing and crossing the soldiers began to freeze. I reported the situation to Melentiev, conveyed Evtyukhin's words, asked for instructions. Melentiev ordered to retreat back to Mount Dembayirzy to the KNP of the 1st battalion and rest there until dawn. We have moved away. "
The next morning there was no one to help.
In the famous article by the now deceased journalist of Izvestia Edwin Polyanovsky"Suvorik" about Sergei Melentyev says literally the following: “There were many criminal oddities. Of the 90 paratroopers of the company, 84 were killed.
The switchman was punished: the commander of the regiment Sergei Melentyev was transferred to Ulyanovsk by the chief of staff of the brigade(he died soon after. — Auth.)... The commander of the eastern group, General Makarov (six times Melentyev asked him to give the company the opportunity to move away, not to destroy the guys), and another general, Lentsov, who headed the airborne task force, remained on the sidelines. ".
"Under circumstances not fully clarified, he passed away"
In the process of searching for information about the fate of Sergei Melentyev after transfer from Pskov and before his death, we went to the site of search and meetings of graduates of the now defunct Omsk Higher Combined Arms Command Twice Red Banner School named after MV Frunze. And there, on a more than modest name page, they found the following entry: “Melentyev Sergey Yurievich, 1979-1983. (4th battalion, 11th company, 2nd platoon). Died June 13, 2002 ".
There, on the site, there are a few comments:
“Colonel of the Airborne Forces, member of the Chechen company. On June 13, under unclear circumstances, he passed away. He was a wonderful man and an officer from God. He did everything in his power to prevent the death of the 6th company of the Pskov paratroopers. / Sergei Egorov / May 19, 2007 ".
"Melentiev, my company commander (sorry, the man was correct, everyone respected!"
“I am sending a photo of Sergei Melentyev to be posted on the site (1983, 4th battalion, 11th company). Respectfully yours, Y. Aksenenko (10th company, 4th battalion, 1983).
How few photos are left. This one, whether from a graduation album, or from an officer's certificate, is one of the few.
Further searches led us to the sites of two regional editions: the newspaper "Simbirskiy Kurier" and the newspaper "Chelyabinskiy Rabochy".
"Simbirsky Courier" in issue 12-13 on January 25, 2003, in the preface "What are they dying for?" to the reprint of one of the articles of Edwin Polyanovsky wrote: “In 2000, Sergei Melentyev was transferred to the Ulyanovsk 31st Airborne Brigade from the Caucasus to the post of chief of staff. In the war, he commanded the Pskov parachute regiment, whose company was almost entirely killed in early March of that year in a skirmish with the two thousand-strong Khattab gang. Melentiev turned out to be a switchman, although he was least to blame for the deaths of his subordinates. In Ulyanovsk, the officer soon died. "
But the most significant information was found in "Chelyabinsk Rabochiy", where on August 21, 2007 an article was published Marina Kline under the secondary (it should be noted that this was the name of one of Edwin Polyanovsky's publications dedicated to the 6th company, and in general M. Kline has many references to E. Polyanovsky) heading "Your son and brother" with the subtitle "Trinity School No. 10 at the initiative of classmates will be named after the colonel of the Russian army Sergei Melentyev. "
God bless him, with the title. The publication is based on a conversation with Sergei's mother, Tamara Georgievna Melentieva... From the article it was possible to learn a lot about the last milestones of the fate of Sergei Melentiev.
We cannot do without significant quotes.
The fate of the Melentiev family at the beginning of the 21st century turned out to be extremely tragic on the whole:
“The trouble came to the Melentievs' house unexpectedly. Tamara Georgievna's husband was ill for a very long time, and then he fell down altogether. Doctors made a disappointing diagnosis: diabetes mellitus, amputated a leg: He was fading away before our eyes, but Tamara Georgievna did everything she could to relieve her husband's suffering. She was with him every minute, and here she also had to look after her mother-in-law. So the son and mother lay in the same room. And Tamara now to one, now to another. It cannot be described in words how much she experienced and where the strength came from.
But, as you know, trouble does not come alone. The disease also confined the elderly mother to the bed. Tamara took mom to her place. And again the medicine by the hour, sleepless nights. First, my mother-in-law died, then my mother, then Yura died. Sergei at that time was transferred to serve in the Caucasus. At 38, he became a colonel. "
Note here that in civilized countries, soldiers and officers with domestic tragedies "behind their backs" are not sent into the combat zone. Forbidden.
Perhaps my mother was almost the only person with whom Sergei Melentyev shared his feelings at least a little after what happened to his 6th company: “He was so worried about everything that had happened and when he came home to Troitsk, he shared with his mother, but the conversation was difficult, and the mother did not ask questions:
- You know, I thought that my heart would be torn to pieces when the mothers came up to me and, with eyes clouded with tears and grief, said: “Bring back our sons, bring them back!”
Recalling that last meeting with her son, Tamara Georgievna regrets that she did not ask him about everything, and he, knowing that it was already hard for her, did not resent his soul once again, and only said at parting: “Nothing, everything will be settled ".
Sergei was then at home with his mother on vacation, but it did not work out completely, another misfortune came: “… In Ulyanovsk in a military unit in his absence, a new emergency occurred. Two officers deserted, taking their weapons with them, shooting 11 people. And again the innocent Colonel Melentyev was punished, and again transferred to another unit, to Tula ... "
“On June 16, 2002, he did not call his wife, who temporarily lived with her father near Orel. She, sensing something was wrong, sounded the alarm. Sergei was so attentive and always congratulated her on the Day of the Medical Worker. She called the unit, but they told her that Sergei was not there, most likely, he left again for Ulyanovsk on some business. But she, not believing this, urgently arrived in Tula, began to search, calling the police stations and hospitals. As it turned out, it was not in vain. Sergei's body had already been in the morgue for two days. He died early in the morning while jogging, not far from the unit. He was found by a bystander and called an ambulance. The doctors were already unable to help. Since Sergei was in a tracksuit and without documents, he was considered an unknown person. "
Such was the death of the former commander of the 104th regiment of the 76th airborne assault division, Sergei Melentyev.
Tamara Georgievna Melentieva told the journalist: “It is amazing that the unit where he arrived at the new duty station a few days ago did not miss a man. After all, his belongings and personal documents remained in the medical battalion. True, the transfer documents and the order were supposed to arrive later, but this is always the case. He's not invisible, they talked to him. And then he disappeared, and for several days no one remembered about him. Doctors then diagnosed that he had died of a heart attack. Although I am inclined to think that they helped him die because of those events in Argun, he was an eyewitness to them. Of course, they buried him with all the honors that are due to a colonel. ".
It was at this funeral "with all the honors" in the Oryol Region that high-ranking Russian airborne forces were present, including Sergei Baran, who for some reason prolonged his comrade's life in his memoirs until June 22 and did not tell anything about the sad and alarming circumstances of his death.
+ + +
All the officers of the 104th Regiment, who took the battle at the height of 776.0, were killed.
Answers to the questions of the relatives of the victims, of the entire Russian society: how and under what circumstances the Russian Army suffered such significant losses, who is responsible for these losses at the level of the high command, are not given.
Judging by the letter from the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office, the current authorities of the Russian Federation do not intend to give these answers.
The fallen in Russia are again responsible for the survivors.
The survivors apparently hope that they will not be brought before the Other Court.
God knows.
But I would like to disappoint them in this life.
* See: Farukshin Ryan. Interview with Sergei Baran: "Company 6" // Almanac "The Art of War", No. 2 (7), March 2008
February 24, 2010, on the eve of the 10th anniversary of the death of 84 paratroopers of the 6th company of the 104th regiment of the 76th airborne division near Ulus-Kert February 29 - March 1, 2000, the article "From the height" was published in the "Pskov province" , which caused a significant public outcry. In the process of preparing the material, the author re-read dozens of texts on forums and blogs, with completely different ratings. Messages in them still appear. Meanwhile, there were no intelligible official answers to the obvious questions that appeared immediately after the tragic battle.
Sergey Melentiev is a graduate of the Omsk Higher Combined Arms Command Twice Red Banner School named after M.V. Frunze (1983).
The editorial staff of Pskov province sent a request to the president in 2003, in response they received a formal reply from the Security Council: all the heroes, the investigation continues, they are looking for militants, there is no crime in the actions of the command of the grouping of Russian troops. And - not a word about Sergei Melentyev, commander of the 104th regiment. By that time - already deceased.
In 2010, all these memories, re-read bleeding discussions (only a few were included in the large-format article), new meetings with parents and widows, the reaction of relatives and veterans of the regiment to the article, an empty meeting of the Airborne Forces commander in terms of the main issues Vladimir Shamanov with the relatives of those killed in the 76th division club led the author to the idea that the official request should be repeated.
Just because it is necessary. Formally, the country has a different president, a different attorney general.
There are things that need to be reminded until they become clear.
In the current situation of hushing up the tragedy that is leaving in history, we came to the conclusion that the request should be of a political nature.
March 2 Chairman of the Russian United Democratic Party "YABLOKO" Sergey Mitrokhin sent a letter to the President of the Russian Federation and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev and the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation Yuri Chaika.
The letter stated the need to reopen the criminal case on the death of servicemen of the 6th company and conduct a full and comprehensive investigation within its framework.
The appeal, in particular, said: “The death of an entire military unit, which fought for two days, being just a few kilometers from other military units of the United Group of Forces in the North Caucasus, to this day continues to remain an unhealed wound for the relatives, friends and relatives of the fallen soldiers and officers, for the whole country.
The relatives of the victims and the entire Russian society have not yet received answers about the reasons and circumstances of the tragic battle with especially grave consequences.
This investigation is necessary for the Russian Armed Forces, for the entire Russian society, it must provide answers that still do not exist.
Such an investigation is a moral duty of the state to the memory of the fallen soldiers. It must find out the extent of responsibility of all officials of the command staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation who made decisions and were involved in making decisions in the North Caucasus that led to the tragic events of February 29 - March 1, 2000.
Without such an investigation, the memory of the fallen heroes will not be complete ".
In early May, we received an official reply (which is indicative - from the Main Military Prosecutor's Office, not from the addressees of the letter), which is difficult to comment on, but necessary.
For the first time, it was officially announced that the only person who was found guilty of the deaths of 84 Russian servicemen was the former commander of the 104th regiment, Colonel Sergei Melentiev, who was later transferred from Pskov to Ulyanovsk and died in June 2002. It turned out that it was Melent'ev alone and only Melentyev who was at fault, who categorically objected to the throw to a height of 776.0, six times (according to the testimony of people who personally knew him) asked permission to withdraw the company immediately after the start of the battle, but in the first case he obeyed the order, and in the second - did not receive permission.
The time has not yet come to tell the truth about the death of the 6th company at the state level in Russia. This is the main point of the answer we received.
This means that in essence nothing has changed in our country.
But in the process of another attempt to achieve the truth, details have come to light that need to be discussed.
"Violations of the requirements of the Combat Regulations of the Ground Forces"
The official response was executed on the letterhead of the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation and signed on April 16 by the Assistant to the Chief Military Prosecutor of Russia S. V. Bokov.
The article "From a height", published in the "Pskov province" on February 24, 2010, caused a lot of responses.
The answer to the essence of the appeal was given as follows (we quote its text almost in full, except for the introduction):
“In the period from February 29 to March 1, 2000, when carrying out the task of blocking members of illegal armed groups in the area of n. the village of Ulus-Kert of the Chechen Republic as a result of a military clash at an altitude of elevation 776.0 killed 84 and wounded 6 soldiers.
On March 2, 2000, the military prosecutor's office - military unit 20102 (n. Khankala) opened a criminal case No. 14/33 / 0108-00 against members of illegal armed groups on the grounds of crimes provided for in paragraphs. "B", "g", "h" h. 2 tbsp. 105 (murder), part 2 of Art. 208 (participation in an armed formation) of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, which on April 29, 2000 was sent under investigation to the Main Directorate of the General Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation for Supervision of the Execution of Laws in the North Caucasus (now the Directorate of the General Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation in the Southern Federal District).
At present, this criminal case is being investigated by the Investigation Department of the Investigative Committee under the Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation for the Chechen Republic and has not made a final procedural decision on it.
On May 2, 2000, in the military prosecutor's office - military unit 20102, based on materials isolated from the specified criminal case, a criminal case No. 14/33 / 0185-00 was opened against the regiment commander, Colonel Melentyev S. ... 293 (negligence, negligently entailed grave consequences) of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.
During the preliminary investigation of the case, it was established that as a result of improper performance of his duties by Colonel S. Yu. Melentyev, violations of the requirements of the Combat Regulations of the Ground Forces were committed, expressed in ineffective reconnaissance to locate members of illegal armed formations in the areas of operations of subordinate units, making incorrect decisions about changing the time of occupying height 776.0, determining the firing positions of the artillery battalion and the deployment of the regiment's reserves.
The above violations led to the command of a battle with significantly superior enemy forces in unprepared engineering positions in a circular defense, the ineffective use of artillery weapons from established firing positions in the absence of air support due to unfavorable weather conditions and the impossibility of operational unblocking of units by the forces of the regimental reserve, which led to serious consequences in the form of unjustifiably high losses of personnel. The authorities of the preliminary investigation of the actions of Colonel Melentyev S.Yu. reasonably qualified under Part 2 of Art. 293 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.
At the same time, an act of amnesty was subject to application in relation to the said serviceman - Resolution of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation dated May 26, 00 No. 398-III GD "On the declaration of amnesty in connection with the 55th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45".
In view of the above, on May 30, 2000 the criminal case with the consent of S. Yu. Melent'ev was reasonably terminated on the basis of paragraph 4 of part 1 of Art. 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR due to the act of amnesty.
This procedural decision was made by the assistant to the military prosecutor - military unit 20102 and is not rehabilitating for persons who have committed a criminal offense.
Taking a different decision, taking into account the established factual circumstances of the case, would be contrary to the requirements of the legislation on criminal proceedings.
In the course of the investigation, a legal assessment was also given to the actions of other military officials, incl. the command of the United Group, in respect of which the initiation of a criminal case was refused on the basis of paragraph 2 of part 1 of Art. 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR - in the absence of corpus delicti.
Currently, there are no grounds for revising the above procedural decisions ".
Thus, translating the official procedural language of the answer into a more intelligible one, the Main Military Prosecutor's Office of Russia reported that:
1) the criminal case opened on the death of the paratroopers has not been completed and is being investigated by the Investigative Department of the Investigative Committee under the Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation for the Chechen Republic, there is still no procedural decision in the case;
2) at the same time, the actions of the command of the United Group of Forces in the North Caucasus were legally assessed by the investigation, and it was refused to initiate a criminal case against these persons "for lack of corpus delicti";
3) for the first time it was announced publicly that the only person whose guilt was established by the investigation is the former commander of the 104th regiment, Colonel Sergei Melentiev, who was found guilty and pardoned in 2000.
But in the answer of the SHG it is not mentioned in any way that in June 2002 Sergey Melentyev died.
"There were many criminal oddities"
In the article "From the Heights" we mentioned, with reference to the famous memoirs of the Colonel, published in March 2008 in the anthology "The Art of War" Sergey Baran*, in 2000 with the rank of major in command of the 1st company of the 1st battalion of the 104th paratrooper regiment, that S. Yu. Melentyev died on June 22, 2002. This date from S. Baran's memoirs has migrated into hundreds of publications.
Tamara Georgievna Melentieva lost her husband first, and then her son. Photo: "Chelyabinsk worker"
It was said like this: “I remember well: when Melentyev was given the task of transferring the 6th company to the left bank of the Abazulgol River, he tried for a long time to explain that the regiment was not capable of the task, that all strong points, blocks remained on the right bank, all units were involved, and in case emergence of a critical situation, he will not have a reserve for timely assistance. Melentiev then said: “You cannot stand with two feet on different banks of the river,” but then they did not listen to his opinion.
Sergey Yuryevich Melentyev died of a heart attack on June 22, 2002. We buried him in the village of Kromny, Oryol region. At the funeral were all his colleagues in the Pskov division, officers of the command of the Airborne Forces, the command of the 31st airborne brigade, and many famous people. Melentiev was a highly qualified military man, a literate and deeply decent person, and was very upset by the death of the 6th company.
All accusations about illiteracy and inaction against Melentiev, which come from some "knowledgeable" gentlemen, I consider populist, stupid and absolutely groundless! "
Sergei Baran, due to his position and experience (at the time of the interview, he commanded the 108th airborne regiment of the 7th Airborne Assault Division with the rank of colonel) could not but know about the results of the investigation in the Main Military Prosecutor's Office. But he did not mention a word about him in plain text.
In the memoirs themselves, which are one of the most cited sources about the death of the 6th company, there are remorse, not particularly hidden by the author: they could not save their comrades. But the structure of the presentation is such that, indirectly, responsibility is also assigned to the victims: first of all, to the major Mark Evtyukhin, the commander of the 6th company, and all the same, by that time already deceased, Sergei Melentiev.
Recall that, according to the memoirs of S.I.Baran, the decisive episodes of communication within the 104th regiment, after the 6th company was actually blocked at an altitude of 776.0, look as follows: “… Having reached the Abazulgol river, we immediately wade through it. The river was cold, dirty, but shallow, waist-deep.
Starting up the slope towards the height of 776.0, at the reconnaissance frequency I got in touch with Vorobyov, clarified the situation with him. To coordinate future joint actions, I asked Alexey to connect me with Evtyukhin. He connected. I asked Mark Nikolaevich: “How and where is the best way to approach you? What to do? "
Evtyukhin thought about it, and then answered:
- Seryoga, you do not meddle here, you will only interfere with me, I will figure it out myself. Everything is under control, we can handle it ourselves. Now you can neither come here nor help in any way. Don't go. If I need help, I'll call you myself.
These are his words, Mark. Evtyukhin talked to me in a normal, sane voice, did not panic, was collected and decisive.
Up to the 6th company, there was no more than 40 minutes to go. The clock was 23.45.
Night frosts hampered our movements. Sweaty and drenched after crossing and crossing the soldiers began to freeze. I reported the situation to Melentiev, conveyed Evtyukhin's words, asked for instructions. Melentiev ordered to retreat back to Mount Dembayirzy to the KNP of the 1st battalion and rest there until dawn. We have moved away. "
The next morning there was no one to help.
In the famous article by the now deceased journalist of Izvestia Edwin Polyanovsky"Suvorik" about Sergei Melentyev says literally the following: “There were many criminal oddities. Of the 90 paratroopers of the company, 84 were killed.
The switchman was punished: the commander of the regiment Sergei Melentyev was transferred to Ulyanovsk by the chief of staff of the brigade(he died soon after. — Auth.)... The commander of the eastern group, General Makarov (six times Melentyev asked him to give the company the opportunity to move away, not to destroy the guys), and another general, Lentsov, who headed the airborne task force, remained on the sidelines. ".
"Under circumstances not fully clarified, he passed away"
In the process of searching for information about the fate of Sergei Melentyev after transfer from Pskov and before his death, we went to the site of search and meetings of graduates of the now defunct Omsk Higher Combined Arms Command Twice Red Banner School named after MV Frunze. And there, on a more than modest name page, they found the following entry: “Melentyev Sergey Yurievich, 1979-1983. (4th battalion, 11th company, 2nd platoon). Died June 13, 2002 ".
There, on the site, there are a few comments:
“Colonel of the Airborne Forces, member of the Chechen company. On June 13, under unclear circumstances, he passed away. He was a wonderful man and an officer from God. He did everything in his power to prevent the death of the 6th company of the Pskov paratroopers. / Sergei Egorov / May 19, 2007 ".
"Melentiev, my company commander (sorry, the man was correct, everyone respected!"
“I am sending a photo of Sergei Melentyev to be posted on the site (1983, 4th battalion, 11th company). Respectfully yours, Y. Aksenenko (10th company, 4th battalion, 1983).
How few photos are left. This one, whether from a graduation album, or from an officer's certificate, is one of the few.
Further searches led us to the sites of two regional editions: the newspaper "Simbirskiy Kurier" and the newspaper "Chelyabinskiy Rabochy".
"Simbirsky Courier" in issue 12-13 on January 25, 2003, in the preface "What are they dying for?" to the reprint of one of the articles of Edwin Polyanovsky wrote: “In 2000, Sergei Melentyev was transferred to the Ulyanovsk 31st Airborne Brigade from the Caucasus to the post of chief of staff. In the war, he commanded the Pskov parachute regiment, whose company was almost entirely killed in early March of that year in a skirmish with the two thousand-strong Khattab gang. Melentiev turned out to be a switchman, although he was least to blame for the deaths of his subordinates. In Ulyanovsk, the officer soon died. "
But the most significant information was found in "Chelyabinsk Rabochiy", where on August 21, 2007 an article was published Marina Kline under the secondary (it should be noted that this was the name of one of Edwin Polyanovsky's publications dedicated to the 6th company, and in general M. Kline has many references to E. Polyanovsky) heading "Your son and brother" with the subtitle "Trinity School No. 10 at the initiative of classmates will be named after the colonel of the Russian army Sergei Melentyev. "
God bless him, with the title. The publication is based on a conversation with Sergei's mother, Tamara Georgievna Melentieva... From the article it was possible to learn a lot about the last milestones of the fate of Sergei Melentiev.
We cannot do without significant quotes.
The fate of the Melentiev family at the beginning of the 21st century turned out to be extremely tragic on the whole:
“The trouble came to the Melentievs' house unexpectedly. Tamara Georgievna's husband was ill for a very long time, and then he fell down altogether. Doctors made a disappointing diagnosis: diabetes mellitus, amputated a leg: He was fading away before our eyes, but Tamara Georgievna did everything she could to relieve her husband's suffering. She was with him every minute, and here she also had to look after her mother-in-law. So the son and mother lay in the same room. And Tamara now to one, now to another. It cannot be described in words how much she experienced and where the strength came from.
But, as you know, trouble does not come alone. The disease also confined the elderly mother to the bed. Tamara took mom to her place. And again the medicine by the hour, sleepless nights. First, my mother-in-law died, then my mother, then Yura died. Sergei at that time was transferred to serve in the Caucasus. At 38, he became a colonel. "
Note here that in civilized countries, soldiers and officers with domestic tragedies "behind their backs" are not sent into the combat zone. Forbidden.
Perhaps my mother was almost the only person with whom Sergei Melentyev shared his feelings at least a little after what happened to his 6th company: “He was so worried about everything that had happened and when he came home to Troitsk, he shared with his mother, but the conversation was difficult, and the mother did not ask questions:
- You know, I thought that my heart would be torn to pieces when the mothers came up to me and, with eyes clouded with tears and grief, said: “Bring back our sons, bring them back!”
Recalling that last meeting with her son, Tamara Georgievna regrets that she did not ask him about everything, and he, knowing that it was already hard for her, did not resent his soul once again, and only said at parting: “Nothing, everything will be settled ".
Sergei was then at home with his mother on vacation, but it did not work out completely, another misfortune came: “… In Ulyanovsk in a military unit in his absence, a new emergency occurred. Two officers deserted, taking their weapons with them, shooting 11 people. And again the innocent Colonel Melentyev was punished, and again transferred to another unit, to Tula ... "
“On June 16, 2002, he did not call his wife, who temporarily lived with her father near Orel. She, sensing something was wrong, sounded the alarm. Sergei was so attentive and always congratulated her on the Day of the Medical Worker. She called the unit, but they told her that Sergei was not there, most likely, he left again for Ulyanovsk on some business. But she, not believing this, urgently arrived in Tula, began to search, calling the police stations and hospitals. As it turned out, it was not in vain. Sergei's body had already been in the morgue for two days. He died early in the morning while jogging, not far from the unit. He was found by a bystander and called an ambulance. The doctors were already unable to help. Since Sergei was in a tracksuit and without documents, he was considered an unknown person. "
Such was the death of the former commander of the 104th regiment of the 76th airborne assault division, Sergei Melentyev.
Tamara Georgievna Melentieva told the journalist: “It is amazing that the unit where he arrived at the new duty station a few days ago did not miss a man. After all, his belongings and personal documents remained in the medical battalion. True, the transfer documents and the order were supposed to arrive later, but this is always the case. He's not invisible, they talked to him. And then he disappeared, and for several days no one remembered about him. Doctors then diagnosed that he had died of a heart attack. Although I am inclined to think that they helped him die because of those events in Argun, he was an eyewitness to them. Of course, they buried him with all the honors that are due to a colonel. ".
It was at this funeral "with all the honors" in the Oryol Region that high-ranking Russian airborne forces were present, including Sergei Baran, who for some reason prolonged his comrade's life in his memoirs until June 22 and did not tell anything about the sad and alarming circumstances of his death.
+ + +
All the officers of the 104th Regiment, who took the battle at the height of 776.0, were killed.
Answers to the questions of the relatives of the victims, of the entire Russian society: how and under what circumstances the Russian Army suffered such significant losses, who is responsible for these losses at the level of the high command, are not given.
Judging by the letter from the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office, the current authorities of the Russian Federation do not intend to give these answers.
The fallen in Russia are again responsible for the survivors.
The survivors apparently hope that they will not be brought before the Other Court.
God knows.
But I would like to disappoint them in this life.
* See: Farukshin Ryan. Interview with Sergei Baran: "Company 6" // Almanac "The Art of War", No. 2 (7), March 2008
On February 28, 2013, Pskov hosted events dedicated to the Day of Remembrance of the paratroopers of the 6th company, who died 13 years ago in an unequal battle with Khattab militants, as well as servicemen who died in the line of duty in peacetime.For the first time, General Shamanov announced in his speech the reasons that led to the death of the company.
« Speaking responsibly and professionally, then, of course, it could have been done (to avoid the death of almost all the paratroopers of the 6th company). The analysis, which was carried out in hot pursuit and years later, shows that in difficult weather conditions, in the absence of the ability to support the units from the air, it was necessary to indicate to the paratroopers the area beyond which they could not advance, "Shamanov said, RIA Novosti writes.
He added that 13 years ago, the paratroopers of the 6th company, without having such instructions, left the zone of support with artillery fire.
“As a result, when a battle broke out on different lines, when there was a complete numerical superiority of the bandit formations, the paratroopers were moving on the march, in fact, unified, scattered subunits and were deprived of many conditions for conducting an organized confrontation. Plus, to some extent, the rules of command and control of troops were violated, ”the general noted.
Three years earlier, on March 1, 2010, the chairman of the Russian United Democratic Party "YABLOKO" Sergei Mitrokhin sent to the President of the Russian Federation, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev and the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation Yuri Chaikarequest to reopen a criminal case on the death of the Pskov paratroopers.
On May 4, 2010, the central office of the RODP "YABLOKO" in Moscow receivedofficial answer , executed on the letterhead of the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation and signed on April 16 by S.V.Bokov, Assistant to the Chief Military Prosecutor of Russia.
I will cite it in full.
“In the period from February 29 to March 1, 2000, when carrying out the task of blocking members of illegal armed groups in the area of n. the village of Ulus-Kert of the Chechen Republic as a result of a military clash at an altitude of elevation 776.0 killed 84 and wounded 6 soldiers.
On March 2, 2000, the military prosecutor's office - military unit 20102 (n. Khankala) opened a criminal case No. 14/33 / 0108-00 against members of illegal armed groups on the grounds of crimes provided for in paragraphs. "B", "g", "h" h. 2 tbsp. 105 (murder), part 2 of Art. 208 (participation in an armed formation) of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, which on April 29, 2000 was sent under investigation to the Main Directorate of the General Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation for Supervision of the Execution of Laws in the North Caucasus (now the Directorate of the General Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation in the Southern Federal District).
At present, this criminal case is being investigated by the Investigation Department of the Investigative Committee under the Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation for the Chechen Republic and has not made a final procedural decision on it.
On May 2, 2000, in the military prosecutor's office - military unit 20102, based on materials isolated from the specified criminal case, a criminal case No. 14/33 / 0185-00 was opened against the regiment commander, Colonel Melentyev S. ... 293 (negligence, negligently entailed grave consequences) of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.
During the preliminary investigation of the case, it was established that as a result of improper performance of his duties by Colonel S. Yu. Melentyev, violations of the requirements of the Combat Regulations of the Ground Forces were committed, expressed in ineffective reconnaissance to locate members of illegal armed formations in the areas of operations of subordinate units, making incorrect decisions about changing the time of occupying height 776.0, determining the firing positions of the artillery battalion and the deployment of the regiment's reserves.
The above violations led to the command of a battle with significantly superior enemy forces in unprepared engineering positions in a circular defense, the ineffective use of artillery weapons from established firing positions in the absence of air support due to unfavorable weather conditions and the impossibility of operational unblocking of units by the forces of the regimental reserve, which led to serious consequences in the form of unjustifiably high losses of personnel. The authorities of the preliminary investigation of the actions of Colonel Melentyev S.Yu. reasonably qualified under Part 2 of Art. 293 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.
At the same time, an act of amnesty - Resolution of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation dated May 26, 00 No. 398-III GD “On the declaration of amnesty in connection with the 55th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45” was subject to application of the said serviceman.
In view of the above, on May 30, 2000 the criminal case with the consent of S. Yu. Melent'ev was reasonably terminated on the basis of paragraph 4 of part 1 of Art. 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR due to the act of amnesty.
This procedural decision was made by the assistant to the military prosecutor - military unit 20102 and is not rehabilitating for persons who have committed a criminal offense.
Taking a different decision, taking into account the established factual circumstances of the case, would be contrary to the requirements of the legislation on criminal proceedings.
In the course of the investigation, a legal assessment was also given to the actions of other military officials, incl. the command of the United Group, in respect of which the initiation of a criminal case was refused on the basis of paragraph 2 of part 1 of Art. 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR - in the absence of corpus delicti.
Currently, there are no grounds for revising the above procedural decisions ”.
For the first time it was announced publicly that the only person whose guilt was established by the investigation was the former commander of the 104th regiment, Colonel Sergei Melentiev, who was found guilty and pardoned in 2000.
So what is the fault of Colonel S. Melentiev?
I will cite again the conclusion of the prosecutor's office: « During the preliminary investigation of the case, it was established that as a result of improper performance of his duties by Colonel S. Yu. Melentyev, violations of the requirements of the Combat Regulations of the Ground Forces were committed, expressed in ineffective reconnaissance to locate members of illegal armed formations in the areas of operations of subordinate units, making incorrect decisions about changing the time of occupying height 776.0, determining the firing positions of the artillery battalion and the deployment of the regiment's reserves. "
For the uninitiated, I explain that the investigators of the military prosecutor's office are investigating many violations of the law in various areas of the army. And they are not carriers of encyclopedic knowledge on any issue of the life of the troops. To issue an indictment, they need a reasoned opinion drawn up by experts on a particular issue, supported by various documents.
As far as I know, on this fact, the conclusion should have been prepared by the Department of Tactics of the Combined Arms Academy. Frunze. They also did this in the first Chechen conflict. And strictly on the basis of guidance documents on the combat use of the branches and arms of the troops.
I do not know who prepared the conclusion for the prosecutor's office. There are no references in the response of the prosecutor's office.
And now, in order:
1. “… Violations of the requirements of the Combat Regulations of the Ground Forces were admitted…”.
The question immediately arises: "What does the Combat Regulations of the Ground Forces and 104 RAP have to do with it?" Was the regiment at that time part of the Ground Forces? No, I didn't. 104 PDP was part of the Airborne Forces, where their Combat Manuals operate. Yes, at the time of the hostilities, the regiment was performing tasks under the leadership of the OGV (s), but the commanders of various ranks of the regiment were trained according to the Regulations of the Airborne Forces, and not the Ground Forces. The regulations of the type and type of troops have common points on some issues, but since this is the official conclusion of the investigation, then you need to be accurate in everything.
It should also be added that in 2000 there was not a word about the tactics of using troops in the counter-terrorist operation (CTO) in the combat manuals. This section appeared much later. There were developments in academies and schools, and in the headquarters of the UGV (s), but they practically did not reach the troops. The troops were guided by the classical provisions of the Charters, taking into account the recommendation on the first page on the creative application of the Articles of the Charter, as well as the requirements of the UGV (s) headquarters.
Therefore, the officers' recollections of those events do not mention the conduct of defensive actions, but only there is a "hybrid" of the terms of defense in special conditions with the terms of the counter-terrorist operation, introduced much later (checkpoints, base area, etc.).
2. For further analysis, a map is required. If I am not mistaken, it was drawn up by the deputy commander of the division for educational work, and it lacks a lot of important information about the actions of the regiment (more on that below). The impression is that this was done on purpose.
"... expressed in the ineffective conduct of intelligence to establish the whereabouts of members of illegal armed formations in the areas of operations of subordinate units ..."
“According to some reports, the intelligence of other units of the UGV never crossed Abazulgol, and the third company under the command of Captain Vasilyev went there first, and then, a day later, the 6th company. When asked why the company moved across the river without preliminary reconnaissance, I will answer as follows: during the counter-terrorist operation, according to the order of the OGV, our regimental reconnaissance acted only to remove visual communication (500 meters), that is, it conducted reconnaissance directly ahead of the units going out on the mission …. Also, in that area, several reconnaissance groups of special forces of various law enforcement agencies were conducting reconnaissance, but no one not there was information about such a large concentration of militants. "
Further it is possible not to comment. I confirm that there was such an order, and the requirements for the commanders were tough with regard to intelligence. This was due to the unjustified losses of intelligence units after the entry of troops into Chechnya. It is necessary to recall the footage taken by the militants after the destruction of the reconnaissance group at the end of 1999, shown by the central television channels.
But it must be clarified that the intelligence agencies were sent not to remove visual communication, but to remove, providing support with artillery.
And the command of the eastern group had much more intelligence capabilities. After all, on February 26, Commander S. Makarov set the task of blocking (or taking up defense ???) to the commander of the 104th Airborne Regiment. And in the first paragraph of the combat order, information about the enemy was to be indicated. It turns out that nothing was specified specifically, everything in general.
« We then it seemed that the active phase of hostilities ends. Nobody thought that one of the most important battles of the Chechen war was still ahead, and that we would take the most direct part in this battle. "
These words of the regiment's intelligence chief, who interacted with the group's intelligence chief, speak volumes. From my own experience, I will say that obtaining information about the enemy in the course of hostilities from a higher authority has always been a headache, and the capabilities of our units are extremely limited. Therefore, we were forced to send the intelligence chief several times a month to the grouping to get at least some information.
The detailed composition and tasks of reconnaissance units and units in the area of operations of the 104th RAP can be found on the blog about the 6th company: http://6-rota.livejournal.com/.
And where did the figure of 2500 thousand militants come from after the battle of 6 PDR? Before the start of the battle there was no data, but after the battle did you see the light? My opinion is only to justify the death of the company. Even after the battle, the group did not know how many militants there were. But the prosecutor's office does not find corpus delicti in the actions of the command of the group. One-sided truth, isn't it?
And we should also pay attention to the term "blocking militants". Part is destroyed. And where do the rest "dissolve"? The answer to this question is almost impossible to find. So it was in the Kadar zone, Grozny. And there are many examples. These are all consequences of the notorious tactics of "squeezing out" the militants. The concept introduced by the generals. It is very convenient, there is no one to ask why they were not destroyed.
I do not consider in this article the actions of the 6th company. But I was interested in one moment. The time of the release of the militants to the 3rd rifle division on the blog about the 6th company is indicated: in one place at 10.30, in another at 11.30. The reconnaissance patrol of the 6th company detects the militants at 12.30, according to S. Baran's recollections, 11.10. This is important data. If the militants engaged in a battle with the 3rd company before they were discovered by the reconnaissance patrol of the 6th company, then it was impossible not to hear the sounds of the battle of the 3rd rifle regiment. Therefore, it became possible for the command of the 6th company to dump logistical equipment from the personnel, group the platoon and prepare for battle. The final conclusion can be made only when the time indicators are finally determined.
3. "... making the wrong decisions about changing the time of occupying altitude 776.0, determining the firing positions of the artillery battalion and the deployment of the regiment's reserves."
From the memoirs of the former chief of intelligence of the regiment S. Baran.
« January 2000, the militants in Grozny were defeated, Basayev was seriously wounded. It seemed to us then that the active phase of the conduct of hostilities was ending. Nobody thought that one of the most important battles of the Chechen war was still ahead, and that we would take the most direct part in this battle.
The second battalion of our regiment, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Mark Yevtyukhin, performed the task of blocking the village of Vedeno and the surrounding area, guiding the columns and protecting the perimeter of the base area. The first battalion performed more active tasks: it guarded a group of troops near Khankala, went to combat operations in Grozny, blocked the gorges of the Hulkhulau and Elistanzhi rivers, and controlled the vicinity of the village of Elistanzhi. "
That is, in less than a month, 104 PDP did not participate in active hostilities.
“On February 26, the commander of the Eastern Group of Forces (S. Makarov, author's note) was given the task of reaching heights 705.6 (Isty-Kord, author's note) by February 29, 626.0, and 787.0, which is a little southeast n.p. Ulus-Kert, and prevent the breakthrough of militants of illegal armed formations (IAF) in the direction of the settlements of Selmentauzen, Elistanzhi, Makhkety, Kirov-Yurt.
On the morning of February 27, the self-propelled artillery division, part of the reconnaissance company and the forward command post of the regiment with security and support units were redeployed to the opposite side of the settlement. Makhetes. The forward command post (PPU) of the regiment, headed by the regiment commander, Colonel Melentyev, included the main operational staff of the command post - the deputy chief of staff, chief of artillery, chief of communications, chief of reconnaissance. "
The direction of preventing the breakthrough of S. Baran's militants is indicated incorrectly. The first point should be at least in the area of the leading edge.
And this is definitely n. the village of Ulus-Kert.
26.02. the regiment commander decides to carry out the assigned task by forces of 1 pdb. To do this, 1st and 3rd brigade had to cross the river and occupy company strongpoints (1st company of the town of Isty-Kord, level Midulkhan; 3rd company - 666.0).
But at 2.00 on 27.02 the regiment commander changes his mind: 1 company in full strength takes up defense at level. Midulkhan, the task of occupying a strong point on Ista-Korda is assigned to the 6th company. Why did this happen? Hard to say. A strange decision. A company from another battalion appears in the center of the 1 pdb battle order. From a management point of view, this is inexplicable. 1 battalion does not come under the control of the company. Who will control it? The commander of the 2nd battalion? But his KNP is on the outskirts of Selmentausen. Regiment commander? Then it is not clear. One thing is clear: the initial decision of the regiment commander in relation to the 1st company (strongholds of Ista-Kord, level Midulkhan) is not a lifting task for the company. But the first company to order to take up the defense on the town of Isty - Kord in full force, 6 company in ur. Midulkhan (as the least prepared) would be the most balanced.
PTGr 104 PDP consisted of about 800 people, according to various sources. By the standards of the North Caucasus Military District, this is just a battalion tactical group of the 2000 model. Therefore, the tasks of the 104th PDP had to be set by the group based on the real capabilities of the regiment, and not because of the loud name - PTGr.
A short digression. It will be about the leadership style of the group's command at that time.
Before the storming of Grozny, the grouping command demanded that the commanders of units and formations take their time, weigh their decision and, most importantly, protect people. Even the timing of the task was often determined by the performers themselves. During the storming of Grozny, and especially after that, the command quickly forgot about it. Perhaps this is correct for units that had combat experience, but not in the case of 104 RAP.
Since February, the command of the grouping, when blocking the regiments, indicated the specific coordinates of the strong points. And the front of the checkpoints set up by the battalion was impressive: 10 km, 20 km. Loved Troshev, Bulgakov, Bakhin to block the terrain. They did not reckon with the capabilities of units and subunits, the organization of communications and the allocation of reserves. The regiment commander will still answer for everything. And after the battle, 6 companies in 2002 stretched out commandant tactical groups in the mountainous part of Chechnya, armed only with small arms and armored personnel carriers, understaffed, for tens of kilometers.
Therefore, I have every reason to believe that the location of the companies was determined not by the commander of the 104th infantry regiment, but by the higher-ranking commander.
S. Baran: “I remember well: when Melentyev was given the task of transferring the 6th company to the left bank of the Abazulgol River, he tried for a long time to explain that the regiment was not capable of the task, that all strongholds and blocks remain on the right bank, all units were involved, and in the event of a critical situation, he will not have a reserve for timely assistance. Melentiev then said: "You cannot stand with two feet on different banks of the river," but then they did not listen to his opinion. "
Quite interesting words of the chief of intelligence: “when Melentyev set the task for the transfer of the 6th company to the left bank of the Abazulgol river ".
Who could set the task to S. Melentyev? Only the commander. We need to think about it, the commander sets the task for the regiment commander to transfer the company. How! And the regiment commander unsuccessfully tries to explain that this is not feasible.
Shamanov: «…
it was necessary to indicate to the paratroopers the area beyond which they could not advance. "
Yes, not a zone, Comrade Shamanov, but a line beyond which it was impossible to advance.
That is, Shamanov indirectly confirms that the command of the grouping incorrectly determined the locations of company strongholds for 104 RAP while blocking Ulus-Kert. The grouping command did not take into account the real combat capabilities of the PTGr.
Further. S. Baran: “Also, the territory on the right bank of the river was in the control zone of the tactical grouping of the 7th Airborne Division, specifically the 108th parachute regiment, whose fighters were stationed several kilometers from the battlefield, on the Dargenduk ridge. Why our company was sent to carry out a task in the area of responsibility of another regiment remains a mystery to me. "
Really weird. So it begs to assume that the dividing line between 104 and 108 RAP passed along the Abazulgol River. And the blog about the 6th company confirms this. Quite a handy reference point for the parts.
It is necessary to pay attention to the strong point of 1 pdr. It is located strictly to the west of KP 108 RAP. It is not in "its" place. The group commander can change the dividing line between units. But then the chief of the regiment's intelligence would know about it! After all, he should conduct reconnaissance in his area of responsibility! That is why there are no demarcation lines on the "canonical" battle map of 6 PDR. Someone edited the battle scheme. But this is clearly not a puncture by the division's political officer.
Now on the use of artillery. Support for 3 PRDs, as well as 6 PRDs, of the ADN regiment was carried out at the maximum range. But pay attention to the neighbor on the left-108 RAP. The same picture. ADN 108 PDP maintains 2 PDB at maximum range. Why is that? Are both regiment commanders wrong? Let everyone make their own conclusions.
After the decision was made to occupy the strongpoint by the 6th company, for reliable artillery support, it was possible to change the firing positions of the adn, assigning them to the northeastern outskirts of Selmentauzen. And for this it would be required to move the strong point of 5 pdr to cover the ad. During February 28, the time allowed within the deadline for the regiment's mission (by February 29). Why this has not been done yet I cannot say.
S. Baran indicates the deadline for the task: To 02.29. The preposition "K" is very important. If by 29.02.-the deadline is no later than 23.59. 28.02. The 6th company moved forward to occupy the strong point on 29.02. Until the exact time of the task is announced, talk about making the wrong decisions about changing the time of occupying altitude 776.0 prematurely.
And the last thing. By the location of reserves. After the decision was made by the regiment commander, two platoons of the 4th infantry brigade, a reconnaissance company, remained in the "dry" remnant of the subunits. The reconnaissance company cannot be used as a reserve. This is a combat support unit. Two platoons of 4 infantry brigades were most likely used to cover the battalion, guard the command post and rear units, and escort the columns. Nobody removed the issues of protection in the conditions of the CTO when the forces were scarce. This is not a classic war. And the problem has not yet been resolved. The regiment commander had no other way out.
Preliminary conclusion.
On February 26, after receiving a combat order from the commander of the eastern grouping, Colonel S. Melentyev, within a few hours, makes a decision to blockade the area by forces of 1 pdb, 5 pdr 2 pdb. Reserve - 2 pdb (without company). At 2.00 on 27.02, he changes his decision in relation to the strong point 1 PDR, decides to occupy the strong point on Ista-Korda 6 PDR. Gives the necessary orders to the units. The regiment has no reserves.
“… Making the wrong decisions about changing the time of taking the height 776.0”.
Ornate wording of the prosecutor's office. The decision of the regiment commander was to be approved by the superior commander. This is the law. And this imposes a certain responsibility on the commander for the decision of the subordinate. And in the decision of the regiment commander, the time for the occupation of the 6th company of the strong point was indicated. But there is no information on this moment. Having received the time data, it would then be possible to talk about this statement of the prosecutor's office.
Why did the units of the regiment go beyond the border of the demarcation line with 108 RAP? The same answer is not present.
As a result: what happened. The company entered the battle without taking up defensive positions; the regiment commander had no reserves. ADN fired at maximum range.
I will cite here one commentary on Shamanov's speech.“I misunderstood again: did they leave this zone themselves? So they took it and went for a walk to this cursed height? Is it okay that they were sent there by order of the regiment commander, Mr. Melentiev? The one who was later transferred with a promotion to Ulyanovsk (apparently, for fucking services to the fatherland). And who two years later was overtaken by fate, having presented a heart attack (sometimes fate restores justice, it's a pity not as often as we would like. "
I did not aim to justify the regiment commander. The commander is responsible for everything. Defeat is always an orphan. And he answered for these events with his life. Colonel S. Melentyev was a man of honor and conscience. And it is dishonorable to blame all the mistakes on him. There are many questions to the command of the eastern group.
My opinion is not the ultimate truth.
The 104 Red Banner Guards Airborne Assault Regiment, an Airborne Division, in other words, military unit 32515, is stationed in the village of Cheryokha, not far from Pskov. The unit performs combat missions, destroys and captures the enemy from the air, deprives him of ground weapons, cover, and destroys his defenses. Also, this regiment acts as a rapid reaction force.
History
The regiment was formed in January 1948 as part of the units of the 76th, 104th and 346th Guards Airborne Divisions. For excellent combat training in 1976, the regiment became the Red Banner, and from 1979 to 1989, all personnel and officers fought in Afghanistan. In February 1978, the regiment mastered new weapons and was awarded the Order of the Red Banner for its valiant use. From 1994 to 1995, the 104 Red Banner Regiment (Airborne Division) was part of the 76th Division, and therefore actively participated in the First Chechen War, and in 1999 and 2009 it carried out an anti-terrorist mission in the North Caucasus.
In early 2003, the regiment was partially transferred to a contract basis, at the same time the reconstruction of military unit 32515 began. Regiment 104, Airborne Division, received reconstructed old and erected new living quarters and facilities on its territory, thanks to this work, living and material conditions of service have become much better. The barracks took on a cockpit appearance with hallways, showers and wardrobes for personal belongings, a gym and a recreation room. Both officers and soldiers of Regiment 104 (Airborne Division) eat in a common dining room, located separately. The food is the same for everyone, they eat together. Civilians work in the canteen, cleaning the territory and barracks.
Preparation
All fighters of such a famous unit as the Pskov Airborne Division, 104 regiment especially, devote a lot of time to airborne and general physical training at any time of the year. Mandatory events for the landing: improving camouflage skills, crossing fire and water barriers and, of course, parachute jumping. First, training takes place with the help of an airborne complex on the territory of a military unit, then it is the turn of a five-meter tower. If everything is assimilated correctly, then the fighters, manned by groups of ten, make three jumps from planes: first from the AN, then from the IL.
Irregular relations and hazing in this unit have never been present. Now this would not be possible, if only because recruits, old-timers and contract soldiers live separately and are extremely busy with their own business. The Pskov Airborne Division, 104 Regiment, recruits take the oath on Saturdays at ten in the morning, rarely, due to circumstances beyond the control of the commanders, it can be postponed an hour back or forward. After taking the oath, servicemen receive a leave of absence until 20.00. By the way, on holidays, fighters also receive leave. On the Monday following the swearing-in, the command assigns new fighters to companies.
For relatives
Of course, parents, relatives and friends are bored and worried about the health and pastime of those who are just starting to serve in the army. The command warns relatives that their beloved sons, grandchildren, brothers and best friends, having entered the service in regiment 104 (Pskov Airborne Division), cannot be constantly in touch.
Mobile phones are allowed to be used only for one hour before lights out, the rest of the time the commander keeps the gadgets and gives them to the soldier only as a last resort, and after he signs in a special journal. Field exercises in the unit take place all year round, regardless of the weather, sometimes trips last up to two months. The soldiers are famous for their military training, and without constant exercises, the 104th regiment of the 76th division (Pskov) of the Airborne Forces would not have won such fame.
Useful information
March 1st
The whole country remembered the day of the great feat of the soldiers of the sixth company of the second battalion of the one hundred and fourth paratrooper regiment of the seventy-sixth Pskov airborne division. Year 2000. Since the beginning of February, after the fall of Grozny, the largest group of militants retreated to the Shatoisky region, where it was blocked. After air and artillery barrage, the battle for Shata followed. The militants nevertheless broke through in two large groups: Ruslan Gelayev to the northwest to the village of Komsomolskoye, and Khattab to the northeast through Ulus-Kert, where the main battle took place.
Federal troops consisted of one company of Regiment 104 (Airborne Division) - 6 company, heroically killed, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel of the Guard Mark Nikolaevich Evtyukhin, fifteen soldiers from the 4th company of the same regiment under the command of Major of the Guard Alexander Vasilyevich Dostalov and the 1st company of the 1st battalion of that the same regiment commanded by Major of the Guard Sergei Ivanovich Baran. There were more than two and a half thousand militants: the groups of Idris, Abu Valid, Shamil Basayev and Khattab.
Mount Isty-Kord
On February 28, the commander of the 104th regiment, Colonel Sergei Yuryevich Melentyev, who briefly outlived his sixth company, ordered to occupy the Ista-Kord hill, which dominated the area. The sixth company, headed by Major Sergei Georgievich Molodov, advanced immediately and managed to occupy only height 776, four and a half kilometers from the designated mountain, where twelve reconnaissance paratroopers were sent.
The height designated by the commander was occupied by Chechen fighters, with whom the intelligence entered the battle, retreating to the main forces left behind. Commander Molodov entered the battle and was mortally wounded, on the same day, February 29, he died. Command took
The Brotherhood of War
But just four hours ago, Shatoy fell under the blow of federal troops. The militants fiercely broke out of the ring, not looking at the losses. Here they were met by the 6th company. Only the first and second platoons fought, since the third was destroyed by the militants on the slope. By the end of the day, the losses of the company amounted to a third of the total number of personnel. Thirty-one people - the number of paratroopers killed in the first hours of the battle when the enemy was densely surrounded.
By morning, soldiers from the fourth company, led by Alexander Vasilyevich Dostalov, broke through to them. He violated the order, leaving well-fortified lines at a nearby height, took only fifteen soldiers with him and came to the rescue. Comrades from the first company of the first battalion also hurried to their aid. They crossed the Abazulgol River, were ambushed there and entrenched themselves on the bank. Only on the third of March, the first company was able to break through to the position. All this time, the battle did not cease everywhere.
Argun gorge
The night of March 1, 2000, claimed the lives of eighty-four paratroopers who did not let the Chechen bandits pass. The death of the sixth company was the worst and the largest in the Second Chechen War. In Cheryokha, at home, at his native checkpoint, a stone reminds of this date, on which is carved: "From here the sixth company left for immortality." The last words of Lieutenant Colonel Evtyukhin were heard by the whole world: "I am calling fire on myself!" When the militants went to break through with an avalanche, it was 6.50 am. The bandits did not even shoot: why waste bullets on twenty-six wounded paratroopers, if there are more than three hundred selected militants.
But hand-to-hand fighting nevertheless began, although the forces were unequal. The guards have done their duty. Everyone who could still hold a weapon, and even those who could not, entered the fray. Twenty-seven dead enemies fell on each of the half-dead paratroopers who remained there. The bandits lost 457 of the best militants, but they could not break through either to Selmentauzen or further to Vedeno, after which the road to Dagestan was practically open. All checkpoints were removed by high order.
Khattab may not have been lying when he announced on the radio that he bought the pass for five hundred thousand dollars, but it didn't work out. They attacked the company in waves, in a dushman style. Knowing the area well, the militants came close. And then bayonet knives, butts and just fists were used. The Pskov paratroopers held the height for twenty hours.
Only six survived. Two were saved by the commander, who covered their jump from the cliff with automatic fire. The rest of the survivors were taken by the bandits for the dead, but they were alive and after a while they crawled out to the location of their troops. A company of heroes: twenty-two soldiers were posthumously made Heroes of Russia. The streets in many cities of the country, even in Grozny, were named after eighty-four paratroopers.
104th Airborne Division (Ulyanovsk)
This unit of the USSR Airborne Forces existed until 1998 as the 104th Guards Airborne Division, founded in 1944. In June 2015, the Russian Ministry of Defense decides to recreate the famous military unit. The 104th Airborne Division consists of three regiments based on the 31st Ulyanovsk Airborne Brigade, which are deployed in Orenburg, Engels and Ulyanovsk.
Glory to the Airborne Forces
The airborne assault forces originate from August 1930, and this is the only branch of the army in the country, where every division is guards. Each of them gained its own glory in battle. Ancient Pskov is rightfully proud of its oldest military unit - the 76th Guards Red Banner Airborne Division, which heroically proved itself in all the wars in which it participated. The tragic death of the brave, courageous, staunch sixth company of the 104th regiment will never be forgotten not only in the country, but also in the world.
Ulyanovsk has its own historical pride: the personnel of the 104th Guards Airborne Division deployed there took part in the battles in Chechnya and Abkhazia, was part of the UN peacekeepers in Yugoslavia. And every resident of the city knows that the military equipment with a scorpion on board is the 104th Guards Airborne Division named after Kutuzov, transformed from an airborne brigade.
