From the description of the battle: "The consolidated detachment of the 81st SMR, formed from the units that remained outside the" station "ring, managed to gain a foothold at the intersection of Bohdan Khmelnitsky and Mayakovsky streets. ."1
- tank commander
- driver-mechanic [?] Private TB 6 Guards. TP Evgeny Germanovich Efimov (military unit 71432) 2
- gunner
From the memoirs of Efimov's mother EG: "According to colleagues who accompanied my son Yevgeny Germanovich Efimov to the burial place, my son died in Grozny on Mayakovsky Street on the night of January 31-1, 1995. A grenade launcher hit the side armor, under the turret. The tank caught fire. Zhenya, shell-shocked or wounded, but already burning, crawled out of the burning car onto the armor, where he was shot from small arms. His crew remained in the tank. "
I believe that the tank was at the checkpoint and was hit, and according to version 4 of Vladislav Belogrud, the tank was part of the convoy.
Column formation
Commander of RS obs 90 TD Captain S. Spiridonov: “On the morning of January 1, a new convoy was formed. It was led by the political commander Lieutenant Colonel Stankevich. This convoy consisted of vehicles with ammunition and fuel to take out the remaining equipment.<...>And on the first day, when we went, we were greeted at the very beginning. True, the Chechens did not burn the fuel trucks, they wanted to seize them. They were shooting at armored vehicles. The killed fuel tanker drivers were replaced by warrant officers and took them out from under the shelling. "5
Not entirely clear moment: 81 mega rifle regiments were attached to 200 paratroopers6, presumably from the 104 airborne division. There is information that on January 1 they were transferred from the airport to the city7, but there is no information about their participation in hostilities yet.
According to Vladislav Belogrud's version8, the column consisted of "70 soldiers and four officers."
BMP No. 435
- BMP commander senior lieutenant Igor Vladimirovich Bodnya
- gunner-operator private Igor Sergeevich Komissarkin (from military unit 738749)
Guards Major A. Fomin: "On January 1, the consolidated detachment of the regiment entered Grozny to support the units entrenched in the city center. The convoy had vehicles with ammunition, fuel, and vehicles for transporting the wounded. The BMP-2 # 435 crew was tasked with providing the passage of the column, covering it with their fire.<...>As soon as the lead vehicle entered Ordzhonikidze Square, the convoy of the regiment's consolidated detachment was fired upon. She was taken into a "fire bag", knocking cars in the "head" and "tail" of the column. It was decided to step back. BMP-2 # 435 took an advantageous firing position and began to cover the retreat of the column with its fire. Having brought down all the firepower on the militants, the crew waited for the last vehicle in the convoy to pass. The ammunition load was used up. The enemy immediately concentrated fire on the BMP. After several hits, the crew began to get out of the car. Private I.S. Komissarkin was seriously wounded and his comrades dragged him out. They continued to fight from personal weapons from the ground, but the forces were unequal ...
Their bodies were found by colleagues not far from the burned-out car. The crew of BMP-2 # 435 fulfilled their military duty to the end as befits real men, soldiers. "11
Return to the checkpoint
From the description of the battle: “For two days, his group, being in a semi-encirclement, staying in a bare place - an open and wide intersection of two main city streets, held this strategically important area and constantly attacked the enemy. (he had 9 of them), organized the "binding" of the fire of the attached mortars in the most threatening areas. When organizing the defense of the line, even non-standard measures were taken. So, in order to protect the BMP from the fire of enemy grenade launchers, the lieutenant colonel ordered ... yards of steel gates and cover them with combat vehicles on the sides and in front. "Know-how" on Stankevich was successful: the RPG shot "slipped" on the sheet of metal without touching the car. People after the bloody New Year's Eve gradually began to come to their senses. fighters who had escaped from the encirclement gradually pulled together. "12
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1 D. Semyonov, the 81st regiment completed its mission in Grozny!
2 Unknown soldier of the Caucasian War. M., 1997.S. 82.
3 Remember and bow down. Ekaterinburg, 2000.S. 158.
4 Belogrud V. Tanks in the battles for Grozny. Part 1 // Front-line illustration. 2007. No. 9. P. 42.
5 Galaktionov V. How it was // Samara newspaper. 2000.11 January. (
Time carries away from us the events of 13 years ago. New Year's assault on Grozny. The soldiers who found themselves at the forefront of the fighting were labeled almost "lambs thrown to the slaughter." The names of the units that suffered the greatest losses also became common nouns: the 131st brigade, the 81st regiment ...
Meanwhile, in those first days of the Grozny operation, the servicemen displayed unparalleled courage. The divisions that entered that "formidable" in every sense of the city, stood to the end, to death.
Chechen "abscess"
On November 30, 1994, the President signed a decree "On measures to restore constitutional legality and law and order on the territory of the Chechen Republic." It was decided to cut the Chechen "abscess" by force.
To carry out the operation, a Joint Group of Forces was created, including the forces and assets of various ministries and departments.
Igor Stankevich (January 1995, Grozny)
In early December 1994, the regiment commander, Colonel Yaroslavtsev, and I arrived on business at the headquarters of our 2nd Army, recalls Igor Stankevich, the former deputy commander of the 81st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment, who was awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation for the January battles in Grozny. - In the midst of the meeting at the chief of staff of the association, General Krotov, the bell rang. Some of the high-ranking military leaders called. “That's right,” the general replied to the subscriber to one of his questions, “I have the commander and deputy of the 81st regiment. I will bring the information to them right away. "
After the general hung up, he asked everyone present to come out. In a tete-a-tete situation, it was announced to us that the regiment would soon receive a combat mission, that "we need to prepare." Application region - North Caucasus. All the rest is later.
OUR REFERENCE. The 81st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment - the successor to the 210th Rifle Regiment - was formed in 1939. He began his combat biography at Khalkhin Gol. During the Great Patriotic War he took part in the defense of Moscow, liberated Oryol, Lvov, and the cities of Eastern Europe from the Nazis. 30 servicemen of the regiment became Heroes of the Soviet Union. On the military banner of the unit there are five orders - two of the Red Banner, Suvorov, Kutuzov, Bogdan Khmelnitsky. After the war, he was stationed on the territory of the GDR. Currently it is part of the 27th Guards Motorized Rifle Division of the Volga-Ural Military District, is part of the constant combat readiness.
In mid-1993, the 81st regiment, which was then part of the 90th Panzer Division of the 2nd Army, was withdrawn from the Western Group of Forces and deployed 40 kilometers from Samara, in the village of Chernorechye. Both the regiment, the division, and the army became part of the Volga Military District. Not a single soldier remained in the regiment at the time of arrival at the new deployment site. Many officers and warrant officers were also "confused" with the conclusion. Most of the issues, primarily organizational, had to be addressed by the remaining small backbone of the regiment.
By the fall of 1994, the 81st was staffed with the so-called mobile forces. Then the Armed Forces just started to create such units. It was assumed that at the first command they could be deployed to any region of the country to solve various tasks - from eliminating the consequences of natural disasters to repelling attacks by bandit formations (the word "terrorism" was not yet in use at that time).
With the granting of a special status to the regiment, combat training noticeably intensified in it, and manning issues began to be dealt with more effectively. The officers began to allocate the first apartments in a residential town in Chernorechye built at the expense of the FRG authorities. In the same 94th year, the regiment successfully passed the check of the Ministry of Defense. The 81st, for the first time after all the troubles associated with the withdrawal and settlement in a new place, showed that he had become a full-fledged part of the Russian army, combat-ready, capable of performing any tasks.
True, this inspection did the regiment a disservice.
A number of well trained servicemen were eager to serve in hot spots, in the same peacekeeping forces. Trained specialists were taken there with pleasure. As a result, about two hundred servicemen were transferred from the regiment in a short period. Moreover, the most popular specialties are driver mechanics, gunners, snipers.
In 1981, it was believed that this was not a problem, the vacancies that had formed could be filled, new people were trained ...
Echelons to the Caucasus
The 81st motorized rifle regiment of PrivO, which was to go to war in December 94th, was quickly staffed with servicemen from 48 parts of the district. For all fees - a week. I also had to select commanders. A third of the officers of the primary level were "biennial", had only military departments of civilian universities behind them.
On December 14, military equipment began to be loaded onto the trains (in total, the regiment was transferred to Mozdok in five echelons). The mood of the people was not depressed. On the contrary, many were sure that it would be a short business trip, that they would be able to return by the New Year holidays.
Due to the lack of time, classes with the personnel were organized even on the train, along the route of the echelons. The material part, the order of aiming, the combat manual, especially the sections concerning military operations in the city, were studied.
Another week was given to the regiment to prepare already upon arrival in Mozdok. Shooting, alignment of units. And now, years later, it is clear: the regiment was not ready for combat. There was a shortage of personnel, primarily in motorized rifle units.
About two hundred paratroopers were assigned to the regiment as a replenishment. The same young, unfired soldiers. I had to learn to fight under enemy fire ...
The enemy was not conditional ...
At the time of the start of the storming of Grozny, about 14,000 federal troops were concentrated around the Chechen capital. The city, blocked from the north-east, north, north-west and west, was ready to enter 164 tanks, 305 infantry fighting vehicles, 250 armored personnel carriers, 114 BMD. Fire support was provided by 208 guns and mortars.
In military equipment, the feds had an obvious superiority. However, in the personnel, the advantage was not even up to two to one. The classical theory of battle requires an advantage of the attackers about three times, and taking into account the urban development, this figure should be even higher.
And what did Dudayev have at that time? According to data that later fell into the hands of our security officials, the number of the Chechen army reached 15 thousand people in regular troops and up to 30-40 thousand armed militias. Regular army units of Chechnya consisted of a tank regiment, a mountain rifle brigade, an artillery regiment, an anti-aircraft artillery regiment, a Muslim fighter regiment, and 2 training aviation regiments. The republic had its own special-purpose units - the National Guard (about 2,000 people), a separate special-purpose regiment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, a regiment of the border and customs service of the State Security Department, as well as personal security detachments of the leaders of Chechnya.
Serious forces were represented by the formations of the so-called "confederation of the peoples of the Caucasus" - battalions "Borz" and "Warriors of the righteous caliphs" Aslan Maskhadov, battalion "Abd-el-Kader" Shamil Basayev, detachment "Party of Islamic Renaissance" Salman Raduev, detachment "Islamic community" Khattaba. In addition, more than five thousand mercenaries from 14 states fought on the side of Dudaev.
According to documents seized in 1995, Dudayev, in addition to regular forces, had at least 300 thousand (!) Reservists. The law “On Defense of the Chechen Republic” adopted in the region of December 24, 1991 introduced compulsory military service for all male citizens from 19 to 26 years old. Naturally, the service took place in Chechnya, in local paramilitaries. A system of regular collection of storerooms was in place: during the period 1991-1994, six full-fledged mobilization exercises were held. Parts of the Chechen army were even replenished with deserters: on the basis of Dudaev's decree No. 29 of February 17, 1992, Chechen military personnel who voluntarily left military units on the territory of the USSR and expressed a desire to serve in the Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic were rehabilitated, and the criminal cases initiated against them were terminated.
Another Dudayev's decree No. 2 of November 8, 1991 established a Ministry of War in Chechnya. All military formations on the territory of the republic passed to him, along with equipment and weapons. According to operational data, at the end of 1994, Chechnya had 2 launchers of operational-tactical missiles, 111 L-39 and 149 L-29 aircraft (training, but converted into light attack aircraft), 5 MiG-17 and MiG-15 fighters, 6 aircraft An-2, 243 air missiles, 7 thousand air shells.
The Chechen "ground forces" were armed with 42 T-72 and T-62 tanks, 34 infantry fighting vehicles, 30 armored personnel carriers and armored personnel carriers, 18 Grad MLRS and more than 1000 rounds for them, 139 artillery systems, including 30 122-mm D-ZO howitzers and 24 thousand shells for them. Dudayev's formations had 5 stationary and 88 portable air defense systems, as well as 25 anti-aircraft installations of various types, 590 anti-tank weapons, almost 50 thousand small arms and 150 thousand grenades.
For the defense of Grozny, the Chechen command created three defensive lines. The inner one had a radius of 1 to 1.5 km around the presidential palace. The defense here was based on the created solid nodes of resistance around the palace using capital stone structures. The lower and upper floors of the buildings were adapted for firing small arms and anti-tank weapons. Along the Ordzhonikidze, Pobeda and Pervomayskaya avenues, prepared positions were created for firing artillery and direct-fire tanks.
The middle line was located at a distance of up to 1 km from the boundaries of the inner line in the northwestern part of the city and up to 5 km in its southwestern and southeastern parts. The basis of this line was the strongholds at the beginning of the Staropromyslovskoye Highway, resistance nodes at the bridges over the Sunzha River, in the Minutka microdistrict, on Saykhanov Street. Oil fields, oil refineries named after Lenin and Sheripov, as well as a chemical plant were prepared for the explosion or arson.
The outer border ran mainly along the outskirts of the city and consisted of strong points on the highways Grozny-Mozdok, Dolinsky-Katayama-Tashkala, strong points Neftyanka, Khankala and Staraya Sunzha in the east and Chernorechye in the south of the city.
"Virtual" topography
The troops practically did not have clear data about the enemy at the beginning of the assault, and there was also no reliable intelligence and intelligence information. There were no maps either. The deputy regiment commander had a hand-drawn diagram of where he was supposed to go approximately with his units. Later, the map still appeared: it was removed from our killed captain-tanker.
Anatoly Kvashnin set the tasks for the commander of the groupings for actions in the city a few days before the assault. The main task fell to the 81st regiment, which was supposed to operate as part of the "North" grouping under the command of Major General Konstantin Pulikovsky.
The regiment, which partly concentrated on the southern slopes of the Tersk ridge, and partly (with one battalion) was located in the area of a dairy farm 5 km north of Alkhan-Churtsky, two tasks were determined: the nearest and the next. The nearest one was to occupy the airport "Severny" by 10 o'clock in the morning on December 31. The next one - by 16 o'clock, capture the intersection of Khmelnitsky and Mayakovsky streets.
The outbreak of hostilities on December 31 was supposed to be a factor of surprise. That is why the convoys of federals were able to reach the center of the city almost without hindrance, and not, as it was stated later, fell into a prepared trap of bandits who intended to drag our convoys into a kind of "fire bag". Only by the end of the day, the militants were able to organize resistance. The Dudayevites concentrated all their efforts on the units that found themselves in the center of the city. It was these troops that suffered the greatest losses ...
Surroundings, breakthrough ...
The chronology of the last day of 1994 has been restored today, not only by the hour - by the minute. At 7 o'clock in the morning on December 31, the advance detachment of the 81st regiment, which included a reconnaissance company, attacked the Severny airport. With the advance detachment was the chief of staff of the 81st Lieutenant Colonel Semyon Burlakov. By 9 o'clock, his group completed the immediate task, seizing the airport and clearing two bridges across the Nefyanka River on the way to the city.
Following the advance detachment, the column was moved by the 1st MSB of Lieutenant Colonel Eduard Perepelkin. To the west, through the Rodina state farm, was the 2nd mdb. Combat vehicles moved in columns: tanks were in front, self-propelled anti-aircraft guns were on the flanks.
From the airport "Severny" the 81st SME went to Khmelnitsky Street. At 9:17 am the motorized riflemen met the first enemy forces here: an ambush from a detachment of Dudayevites with an attached tank, an armored personnel carrier and two Urals. The reconnaissance company entered the battle. The militants managed to knock out a tank and one of the "Urals", however, the scouts also lost one BMP and several wounded. The regiment commander, Colonel Yaroslavtsev, decided to delay reconnaissance to the main forces and temporarily stop the advance.
Then the advance resumed. By 11.00 the columns of the 81st regiment reached Mayakovsky Street. Ahead of the previously approved schedule was almost 5 hours. Yaroslavtsev reported this to the command and received an order to move to blockade the presidential palace, to the city center. The regiment began its advance towards Dzerzhinsky Square. By 12.30, the forward units were already near the station, and the group's headquarters confirmed the earlier order given to surround the presidential palace. At 13.00 the main forces of the regiment passed the station and along Ordzhonikidze Street rushed to the complex of government buildings.
But the Dudayevites gradually came to their senses. From their side, the most powerful fire resistance began. A fierce battle broke out at the palace. Here, the leading aircraft controller, Captain Kiryanov, covered the regiment commander with himself. Colonel Yaroslavtsev was wounded and transferred command to the chief of staff of the regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Burlakov.
At 16.10 the chief of staff received confirmation of the task to blockade the palace. But the motorized riflemen faced the most severe fire resistance. Dudayev's grenade launchers, dispersed among the buildings in the city center, began to shoot our combat vehicles literally point-blank. The regiment's columns began to gradually split into separate groups. By 17 o'clock, Lieutenant Colonel Burlakov was also wounded, about a hundred soldiers and sergeants were already out of action. The intensity of the fire effect can be judged by at least one fact: only from 18.30 to 18.40, that is, in just 10 minutes, the militants knocked out 3 tanks of the 81st regiment at once!
The units of the 81st mechanized infantry brigade and the 131st motorized rifle brigade that broke into the city were surrounded. The Dudayevites unleashed a storm of fire on them. The soldiers, under the cover of the BMP, took up a perimeter defense. The bulk of the personnel and equipment was concentrated in the forecourt, in the station itself and in the surrounding buildings. The 1st mdb of the 81st regiment was located in the station building, the 2nd mdb - in the goods yard of the station.
The 1st MSR under the command of Captain Bezrutsky occupied the building of the road administration. The infantry fighting vehicles of the company were displayed in the courtyard, at the gates and on the exit tracks to the railroad bed. At dusk, the enemy's onslaught intensified. Losses have increased especially in the equipment, which was very tight, sometimes literally caterpillar to caterpillar. The initiative passed into the hands of the enemy.
The relative calm came only at 23.00. At night, the skirmishes continued, and in the morning the commander of the 131st Omsb Brigade, Colonel Savin, requested permission from the higher command to leave the station. A breakthrough was approved to the Lenin Park, where the units of the 693rd SME of the "West" group defended. At 15:00 on January 1, the remnants of the units of the 131st Omsb Brigade and the 81st SME began to break through from the railway station and the freight station. Under the incessant fire of the Dudayevites, the columns suffered losses and gradually disintegrated.
28 people from the 1st MRR of the 81st MRR broke through in three infantry fighting vehicles along the railway. Having reached the House of Press, the motorized riflemen got lost in the dark unfamiliar streets and were ambushed by the militants. As a result, two BMPs were hit. Only one vehicle, commanded by Captain Arkhangelov, made it to the location of the federal troops.
... As of today it is known that only a small part of the people left the encirclement from the units of the 81st mechanized infantry brigade and the 131st motorized rifle brigade, which were at the forefront of the main attack. The personnel lost commanders, equipment (in just one day, December 31, the 81st regiment lost 13 tanks and 7 infantry fighting vehicles), scattered around the city and went out to their own on their own - one by one or in small groups. According to official data, as of January 10, 1995, the 81st MRP lost 63 servicemen in Grozny killed, 75 missing, 135 wounded ...
Let the mother of the enemy cry first
The consolidated detachment of the 81st SME, formed from the units that remained outside the "station" ring, managed to gain a foothold at the intersection of Bohdan Khmelnitsky and Mayakovsky streets. The command of the detachment was assumed by the deputy commander of the regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Igor Stankevich. For two days, his group, being in a semi-encirclement, staying in fact on a bare and shot through place - the intersection of two main city streets, held this strategically important area.
Stankevich competently placed 9 infantry fighting vehicles, organized the "binding" of the fire of the attached mortarmen in the most threatening areas. When organizing the defense, non-standard measures were taken. Steel gates were removed from the surrounding Grozny courtyards and they covered the combat vehicles on the sides and in front. The "know-how" turned out to be successful: the RPG shot "slipped" over the sheet of metal without touching the car. After the bloody New Year's Eve, people gradually began to come to their senses. The detachment gradually pulled together the fighters who had escaped from the encirclement. We set ourselves up as best we could, organized rest during the break between enemy attacks.
Neither December 31, nor January 1, nor in the following days, the 81st regiment left the city, remained on the front line and continued to participate in hostilities. The battles in Grozny were fought by Igor Stankevich's detachment, as well as the 4th motorized rifle company of Captain Yarovitsky, which was located in the hospital complex.
For the first two days, there were virtually no other organized forces in the center of Grozny. There was another small group from General Rokhlin's headquarters, it kept close. If the bandits knew this for sure, they would certainly have abandoned all their reserves to crush a handful of daredevils. The bandits would have destroyed them in the same way as those units that were in the ring of fire near the station.
But the detachment was not going to surrender to the mercy of the enemy. The surrounding courtyards were promptly cleared, and possible positions of enemy grenade launchers were eliminated. Here the motorized riflemen began to discover the cruel truth about what the city they entered was in reality.
So, in the brick fences and walls of most houses at the intersection of Khmelnitsky-Mayakovsky, equipped openings were found, near which shots for grenade launchers were stored. In the courtyards there were carefully prepared bottles with Molotov cocktails - an incendiary mixture. And in one of the garages, dozens of empty crates from grenade launchers were found: here, apparently, was one of the supply points.
Already on January 3, checkpoints began to be set up along Lermontov Street in cooperation with the special forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The posts allowed at least to slip along Lermontov Street, otherwise everything would be shot on the move.
The regiment survived. He survived in spite of those who tried to destroy him in Grozny. He rose from the ashes in spite of those who at that time "buried" in absentia both him and other Russian units that found themselves in the epicenter of the Grozny battles.
For almost the whole of January, the 81st Regiment, “shot” and “torn apart” by evil tongues, took part in the battles for Grozny. And again, very few people know about this. It was the tankers of the 81st who provided support to the marines storming Dudayev's palace. It was the infantry of the regiment that seized the Krasny Molot plant, which the Dudayevites turned from a peaceful Soviet enterprise into a full-scale weapons production. The engineering units of the unit cleared mines across the Sunzha bridge, through which fresh forces were then drawn into the city. Units of the 81st took part in the assault on the Press House, which was one of the strongholds of the separatist resistance.
I pay tribute to all comrades with whom we fought in those days, - says Igor Stankevich. - These are the units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which were led by General Vorobyov, who later died heroically in Grozny. These are detachments of internal troops and special forces groups of the GRU. These are the employees of the special services, about whose work, probably, even today it is impossible to say much. Courageous, heroic people, brilliant professionals that any country would be proud of. And I am proud to have been with them on that front line.
Heroes become
The author of these lines in the first days of January had a chance to visit the belligerent Grozny, just in the location of the 81st regiment, which had just relocated to the territory of the cannery, having fortified a checkpoint at the Khmelnitsky-Mayakovsky intersection. The journalistic notebook is dotted with entries: the names of people who heroically showed themselves in battles, numerous examples of courage and courage. For these soldiers and officers, it was just a job. None of them dared to call what happened on December 31 a tragedy.
Here are just some of the facts:
“... Senior Warrant Officer Grigory Kirichenko. Under enemy fire, he made several trips to the epicenter of the battle, taking out the wounded soldiers in the compartments of the BMP, at the levers of which he sat himself, to the evacuation center. " (Later awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation).
"... Senior Lieutenant Seldar Mamedorazov (" non-combat "chief of the club) broke through on one of the infantry fighting vehicles into the battle area, took out several wounded servicemen."
“... Major of the medical service Oleg Pastushenko. In battle, he helped the personnel. "
“... The commander of a tank battalion, Major Yuri Zakhryapin. He acted heroically in battle, personally hitting the enemy's firing points. "
And the names of the soldiers, officers, meetings with whom then, on that Grozny front line, remained at least a record in a field notebook. As a maximum - a memory for life. Major of the medical service Vladimir Sinkevich, Sergey Danilov, Viktor Minaev, Vyacheslav Antonov, captains Alexander Fomin, Vladimir Nazarenko, Igor Voznyuk, Lieutenant Vitaly Afanasyev, warrant officers of the medical service Lydia Andryukhina, Lyudmila Spivakova, junior sergeant Alexander Litvinov, privates Alik Salikhanov, privates Alik Salikhanov Vladimirov, Andrey Savchenko ... Where are you now, those young front-line soldiers of the 90s, soldiers and officers of the heroic, glorified regiment? Warriors scorched in battles, but not burnt to ashes, but surviving all deaths in this hellish flame in spite of the 81st Guards? ..
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With the kind permission of the authors, I publish the article in my journal. For the first time the article was published in the newspaper "Zavtra", in N5 for 2010. Despite the long time since its publication, the article has not lost its factual value, and, against the background of the works of other authors on the same topic, it looks more than worthy. Illustrative material added by me.THE SECRET OF THE DEATH OF THE MAYKOP BRIGADE
15 years ago ended the "New Year's assault" of Grozny. And in these battles, the Russian army suffered the greatest losses since the end of the Great Patriotic War. One of the mysteries of these battles was the dramatic fate of the 131st motorized rifle brigade, stationed in Maykop before this war. In this article we will try to deal with the myths that have developed around these events. We will try, based on facts, to present our version of the actions of the "North" grouping and about 2 days of fighting: December 31, 1994 - January 1, 1995, the most difficult two days in the modern history of the Russian army.
THE MAIN OBJECTIVE OF THE STORM- The seizure of the "Dudayev's Presidential Palace" (the former Republican Committee of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic) went to the "North" group. The general command of the "North" group was carried out by Major General K.B. Pulikovsky. The number of personnel of the units is not for certain clear, most likely, it differs from the official in a smaller direction, but since there is no other data at the moment, we will take the official data from the site "chechnya.genstab.ru" as a basis. In total, the group consisted of 4097 people, 82 tanks, 211 infantry fighting vehicles (BMP), 64 guns and mortars. The group included the 131st separate motorized rifle brigade (OMSBr), the 81st guards motorized rifle regiment (GvMSP) and the 276th GvMSP, as well as attached and auxiliary units and units of the Internal Troops. The consolidated detachment of the 131st brigade under the command of Colonel I. Savin consisted of 1,469 personnel, 42 BMP-2, 26 T-72A tanks and 16 artillery pieces. The 81st regiment under the command of Colonel A. Yaroslavtsev numbered 1331 people (including 157 officers, it is characteristic that 66 officers in the platoon-company link and had only the military department of a civilian university behind them), 96 infantry fighting vehicles, 31 tanks (T-80BV and several T-80B) and 24 artillery pieces (self-propelled guns "Carnation"). The 276th regiment under the command of Colonel A. Bunin numbered 1297 people, 73 BMP-1, 31 tanks (T-72B1) and 24 artillery pieces (it must be said that 120 BMPs were attributed to the brigade at one time, but the refutation of this is below).
Hero of Russia (posthumously) Colonel I.A. Savin.
131st brigade - 1 battalion on the southern slopes of the Tersk ridge in the area 3 km north of Sadovoe, 2 battalions concentrated in the MTF area 5 km north of Alkhan-Churtsky;
81st regiment - from 27.12.94, 3 km south of the lane. Well with the main forces, since the morning of December 28, 1994, 1.5 km north of Grozny;
276th regiment - on the northern slopes of the Tersk ridge.
No less than 400 people entered Grozny from the 276th regiment, 426 people entered the city from the 81st regiment, including a tank battalion. From the brigade - 446, including the "help column".
On December 30, at a meeting, the units received orders. The brigade is to move on the morning of the 31st to the area of the old airfield and take up defensive positions there. The 81st regiment had its primary task by 16-00 to occupy the Mayakovsky-Khmelnitsky intersection, the subsequent task was to block the building of the Republican Committee and occupy the station. The 276th regiment was supposed to take up positions on the approaches to Sadovoye on the 31st until further instructions.
The entry of troops into the city scheduled for the 31st was unexpected for everyone, because not all parts have been replenished with people yet, not all have really done the alignment.
Be that as it may, but on the morning of the 31st, the units began to move. The Khmelnitsky-Mayakovsky intersection was already occupied by 11 a.m., the second battalion could not pass through the Rodina state farm due to the dense fire of the militants and was ordered by General Pulikovsky to turn back and began to perform the subsequent task, which was done after the artillery had processed the houses of the Ippodromny microdistrict, from where dense fire of militants. At the same time
The 131st brigade completed the task and took up positions on the outskirts of the city, moved on to equipping the defense area. But suddenly she took off and went with one battalion to the station, and the second to the market. The regiment reached the pl. Ordzhonikidze, where a "traffic jam" was formed, leaving one company for cover. But soon the commander of the regiment, Colonel Yaroslavtsev, ordered the chief of staff of the regiment Burlakov to bring everything that could be pulled out to the station. While the regiment was walking towards Ordzhonikidze Square, the vehicles of the 131st brigade began to overtake them. As a result, both the regiment and the brigade came to the station almost simultaneously, where the regiment occupied the freight station, and the first battalion of the brigade - the station, the second rolled back to the freight station after being attacked by militants. After taking over the defense, the brigade and the regiment at the station were attacked. The attacks continued until the very exit of the units from the station. Some of the equipment was burned, some were damaged, but they fought while there was ammunition. Losses at this point were small. But the situation deteriorated sharply because other units did not fulfill their tasks.
Lieutenant General L.Ya. Rokhlin, February 1995
The units of Lieutenant General Lev Rokhlin that came out to the hospital were very few in number, tk. part of the forces were forced to leave at checkpoints along the route of movement, the Internal Troops did not approach. On New Year's Eve, one battalion of the 276th regiment began to replace the 33rd regiment at checkpoints. The assembled column reached. But having lost a lot of equipment, she was able to go only to the freight station. It became clear: the 131st brigade and the 81st regiment needed to leave the city, but the brigade's exit turned out to be unsuccessful: the convoy was ambushed at the motor depot. Two BMPs were lost, most of the wounded died with them, the brigade commander died, when the main part of the regiment left, the battalion commander Perepyolkin and the commander of the third company Prokhorenko were killed. Total losses at the end of January 2 were:
In the 131st brigade, 142 people were lost alone, how many were wounded, missing - there is no exact data (according to other sources, 167 people died, including the brigade commander Colonel A. Savin, deputy brigade commanders for armament and educational work, in addition, 60 soldiers and sergeants were killed, 72 people were missing). Those. out of 446 people who entered the city, 289, or 65%, remained in the ranks;
In the 81st regiment (possibly for the entire period of hostilities): 134 killed, 160 wounded, 56 missing, according to the report of the chief of staff of the regiment Burlakov, 56 people were killed (including 8 officers), 146 were wounded (of which 31 officer, 6 warrant officers), 28 people went missing (of which 2 officers), 87 people were sick (of which 8 officers and 3 warrant officers) - these data are more accurate. According to official figures, as of January 10, the regiment lost 63 servicemen killed, 75 missing, 135 wounded;
In the 276th regiment: at least 42 people were killed, at least 2 of them were missing, there is no data on the wounded.
The losses of equipment were:
The 131st brigade lost, according to A. Sapronov, 15 tanks and 47 infantry fighting vehicles, military journalist Viktor Litovkin calls other figures: "20 tanks out of 26 were lost, 18 out of 120 infantry fighting vehicles were evacuated from Grozny, all 6 Tungusoks were destroyed";
81st regiment - 23 tanks, 32 - BMP-2, 4 - armored personnel carriers, 2 tractors - 2, 1 "Tunguska" 1 MTLB;
276th regiment - at least 15 BMP-1, at least 5 T-72B1 tanks.
MULTIPLE VERSIONS RELEASED what happened with the 131st brigade and the 81st regiment, the versions were both official and journalistic, but mostly with a negative, defamatory shade of the personnel of the units. Here are some of them: “The brigade missed the required turn and went to the station, where, without reconnaissance, it became columns along the streets”, “The columns stood along the streets and froze. stood and seemed to be waiting, when, finally, the "Chechs" would come to their senses and begin to burn it. movement, without security, and that part of the soldiers and officers wandering around the neighborhood in search of working shops (New Year is on the nose!). And then Maskhadov ordered to collect all the grenade launchers who were in the city and pull them to the station, "the brigade entered the city under "steam", "Savin died in captivity, he was shot," "everyone was drunk," and so on.
Let's try to deal with these myths and tell how everything was in reality.
Initially, General Lev Rokhlin was assigned the role of commander of the forces entering the city. This is how Lev Yakovlevich himself describes it (a quote from the book "The Life and Death of a General"): "Before the storming of the city," says Rokhlin, "I decided to clarify my tasks. Based on the positions we occupied, I believed that the Eastern grouping, to command it was proposed that I should be headed by another general. And it would be expedient to appoint me to command the Northern group. On this topic I had a conversation with Kvashnin. He appointed General Staskov to command the Eastern group. “And who will command the Northern group?” I ask. Kvashnin replies: “I am ... We will deploy the forward command post in Tolstoy-Yurt. You know what a powerful group it is: T-80 tanks, BMP-3. (There were almost no such people in the troops then.) "-" What is my task? "- I ask." Go to the palace, occupy it, and we will approach. " He said that the city is not attacked with tanks. "This task was removed from me. But I insist:" What is my task? "-" You will be in reserve, "they answer. - You will cover the left flank of the main grouping. "And they appointed a route of movement." After this conversation with Rokhlin, Kvashnin began to give orders to the units directly. So, the 81st regiment was given the task of blocking the Reskom, while the tasks were brought to the units at the very last moment.
Colonel-General Anatoly Kvashnin's secrecy was a separate line, apparently, it was some kind of "know-how" of Kvashnin, everything was hidden, and the task was posed directly along the movement of the units, the trouble is that in this case the units acted independently, separately, prepared for one thing, but were forced to do something completely different. Inconsistency, lack of coherence is another distinguishing feature of this operation. It seems that the whole operation was built on the certainty that there would be no resistance. This only suggests that the leadership of the operation was divorced from reality.
Until December 30, the commanders of units and battalions did not know about their routes or missions in the city. No documents were worked out. Until the last moment, officers of the 81st regiment believed that the task of the day was the intersection of Mayakovsky-Khmelnitsky. Before entering the regiment into the city, its command asked how long it takes to bring it into combat readiness? The command reported: at least two weeks and the replenishment of people, tk. the regiment is now a "bare armor". To solve the problem with the lack of people, the 81st regiment was promised 196 reinforcements for the BMP landing, as well as 2 regiments of the Internal Troops to clean up the quarters passed by the regiment.
After a meeting on December 30, Colonel-General Kvashnin ordered an officer to be sent for replenishment, but due to bad weather it was not possible to deliver people on time. Then it was proposed to take two battalions of the Internal Troops as a landing, the chief of the regiment Martynychev was sent after them, but the command of the Internal Troops did not give up the battalions. That is why it turned out that the 81st regiment went to the city of Grozny with "bare armor", having at best 2 people in the BMP landing force, and often not at all!
At the same time, the regiment received a strange order: one battalion had to, bypassing Rescom, go to the station, and then behind its back the second battalion had to blockade Rescom, that is, without securing the occupation of one line, it was necessary to go to the next, which contradicts the charter, methods ... In fact, this separated the first battalion from the main forces of the regiment. For what the station was needed, one can only guess - apparently, this is also part of the "know-how".
Colonel A. Yaroslavtsev, December 1994
The regiment commander Yaroslavtsev recalls these days in this way: "I ... worked with the battalion commanders, we did not have time to outline, of course, it should be, not only to the company, you need to go down to the platoon to show where to get what. But due to the fact that like this - go ahead, come on, the first battalion ... take the station and surround it, seize it, and the second battalion move forward and surround Dudaev's palace ... they didn't describe where and what, the battalion commander himself made a decision on where to send, according to the situation. ... The immediate task was to reach the intersection ... Mayakovsky-Khmelnitsky, then further to one - the station, to the other - Dudaev's palace ... but it was not signed in detail, because there was no time, nothing, but in theory each platoon needs to paint where it should roughly stand, where to get out, until what time and what to do. As far as I understood, the commanders thought so: with bare armor and surround, stand, point the barrels there, and partially, for example, if there is no one there, by infantry, report that he is surrounded ... And then they will say - we will tighten some about there a negotiating group, or there are scouts, and they will go forward!
We could still suppress a small center of resistance, but with organized mass resistance, they began to crush us. At the same time, in the 81st motorized rifle regiment, out of 56 platoon commanders, 49 were graduates of civilian universities, called up for two years. There is no need to talk about the level of their training. Many died in Grozny, sharing the fate of their soldiers. "
Hero of Russia R.M. Klupov, 2014
Assistant Chief of Intelligence of the 131st Brigade Major Rustem Klupov: “I didn’t know where we were going, I didn’t know our task. I learned that we were going to the station at the intersection where we met with the 81st regiment, Savin me on the radio directed, maybe he was afraid that they would wiretap us, since he had a closed channel, and I did not have a closed channel. 14:00). There is already an incomplete battalion of the 81st regiment under the command of S. Burlakov. "
Parts of the brigade accurately went to the railway station and the freight station, so Troshev G.'s conclusions that "the combined detachment of the brigade slipped through the required intersection, got lost and eventually went to the railway station" (see G. Troshev, "My War" ) are unfounded. In fact, Colonel Savin fulfilled the command's task exactly. 3 MSR has become a front to the piece of iron, is dispersed and takes up defensive positions. There was only 1 BMP on the platform. The rest are next to the platform, but hidden either behind stalls or behind buildings. That is, there can be no talk about leaving somehow carelessly. They covered the equipment as best they could, but there is virtually nowhere to hide it.
I would like to say a separate word about the instructions received by the units before leaving for the city. Units were forbidden to occupy buildings, except for administrative buildings, to break benches, trash cans, etc., to check documents from people they met with weapons, to confiscate weapons, to shoot only as a last resort. What the command was counting on was clear, blind confidence in the absence of resistance from the militants. They were not taught anything by the storming of Grozny by the opposition on November 26.
Station area. Photo taken on January 20-26, 1995.
Station building. Photo taken on January 20-26, 1995.
ALL PARTS MANAGEMENT was conducted by the "come on, come on" method. The commanders who ruled from afar did not know how the situation in the city was developing. To force the troops to go forward, they blamed the commanders: "everyone has already reached the center of the city and is about to take the palace, and you are marking time ...". As the commander of the 81st regiment, Colonel Alexander Yaroslavtsev, testified later, to his inquiry regarding the position of his neighbor to the left, the 129th regiment of the Leningrad Military District, he received the answer that the regiment was already on Mayakovsky Street. “This is the pace,” the colonel thought then (Krasnaya Zvezda, 01/25/1995). It never occurred to him that this was far from the case ... Moreover, the closest neighbor on the left of the 81st regiment was consolidated detachment 8 corps, and not the 129th regiment, which was advancing from the Khankala region. Although it is on the left, it is very far. Judging by the map, this regiment could have ended up on Mayakovsky Street only after passing the city center and past the presidential palace. Therefore, it is unclear: either the command of the group did not look at the map at all and did not understand what Colonel Yaroslavtsev was asking about, or the commander of the 81st regiment himself did not know who his closest neighbor was, or, perhaps, the journalists who interviewed Yaroslavtsev , got it all mixed up?
In any case, this suggests that no one really imagined the picture of what was happening, and the interaction was established in such a way that it misled not only the participants in the battles, but also those who later undertook to study their course ... ".
A lack of understanding of the situation leads to the fact that on the morning of January 1, two orders that exclude each other are issued one by one at once:
"7.15 - combat order of OGV No. ... 1.00h. 1.01.95. Map. 50 thousand edition. 1985.
The commander ordered:
3/276 MRR by 3:00 today to move to the area where 1/33 MRR is located (square on Kruglova street), where to transfer the commander of the operational group 8 AK to operational subordination.
Subdivisions of the 131st motorized rifle brigade, 1/81 of the MRP from the occupied areas to organize close fire and tactical interaction between themselves and the units of the consolidated detachment of the 19th mechanized infantry division, as they enter the area of the loading area of the Grozny station. Replenishment of material resources to carry out from the imported stocks and the consolidated detachment.
By 6.00 today, take over the 74th Omsb Brigade of the 28th AK of the Siberian Military District in the area of the Grozny airfield and then use it to carry out combat missions in the northern and northwestern directions.
In the morning today, after the transfer of the occupied borders of the 503th MRR to the 19th MRD, to carry out the forces of the 131st brigade, part of the forces of the 81st MRR, to disarm or destroy the bandit formations in the area of the railway station, the presidential palace, the intersection of Griboyedov Street and Pobeda Avenue. and 81 SMEs to seize the president's palace.
"1.01.95., Resolution (to the head of the operational department of the corps, room 81 MRP, 206 MRR; 131 Omsb brigade).
Follow the order.
81 SMRs block the area near the palace.
131 omsbr, after concentrating at the station, advance to the north to the area of the palace on the street. Komsomolskaya, 74 omsbr go to pl. Friendship of peoples on Mayakovskogo street and block the intersection of street Griboyedov - Victory Avenue, part of the forces, on Mayakovsky street. Divisions of the 131st omsbr operate in a northern direction on the street. Chernyshevsky to the palace.
Pulikovsky ".
These documents are very clear evidence of the dramatic conditions in which the command of the 131st brigade and the 81st regiment found themselves, how difficult it was to make decisions in these circumstances, and under what psychological pressure they acted.
Separately, I would like to talk about intelligence:
Kompolka Yaroslavtsev: “When Kvashnin set the task for us, he sent us to the GRU colonel to get information about the enemy, but he did not say anything specific. Everything is general. There, north-west of Grozny, south-west of Grozny, there is a group of so many. I tell him, wait, which north-west, southeast, I’m drawing a route for you, Bogdan Khmelnitsky, so I’m walking along it, tell me what I can meet there. He answers me, here, according to our data, there are sandbags in windows, here the strong point may or may not. He did not even know whether the streets were blocked there or not, so they gave me these fools (UR-77 "Meteorite") so that I would blow up the barricades, but nothing was blocked there In short, there was no intelligence, neither in the number, nor in the location of the militants. "
Maps were rare, no one saw the plans of the city at all. For example, Vadim Shibkov, a warrant officer of the 131st brigade, recalls this: “There was a map, but a scale of 1: 50,000 and old, from the 70s, it is impossible to correct it and aim in the city, because of this the brigade's artillery was beating not very accurate. " The company-platoon link did not have topographic plans for Grozny. The battalion commanders had maps on a scale of 1: 50,000. The same was true for the 131st brigade and the 276th regiment.
Because of the maps in Sadovoe, the 276th regiment suffered losses. On the map, the bridge where they had to stop looked large, in fact, no one even noticed this bridge, it was so small, and the BRD moved further, stopping at the next one. Reminiscent of the one on the map, the bridge came under fire.
While the regiment was marching towards Reskoye and the railway station, the 131st brigade had to take positions on the outskirts of the city, two kilometers east of Sadovaya, in order to ensure the passage to the city of Grozny for other troops, which was exactly done by 11 o'clock in the morning. There was practically no resistance, only intelligence destroyed the forward patrol of the militants. At 12 o'clock in the afternoon, Lieutenant-General K.B. Pulikovsky, who commanded the Sever grouping at that time, on the radio gave the order for the brigade to enter Grozny. the battalions received this order from Colonel Durnev, who arrived directly at the location of the battalions. At the same time, the brigade did not receive written military and graphic documents with an order to enter the city of Grozny. After passing along Mayakovsky Street, the corps headquarters unexpectedly gave the brigade an order to take the railway station, which was not originally planned at all.
Who gave the order to the brigade to go to the station?
Lev Rokhlin reports (based on the book "The Life and Death of a General"): "Pulikovsky says that he did not give the command to the 131st Brigade to seize the station. The forward command post of the Northern group was never deployed. They were commanded directly from Mozdok. Therefore, find out who gave the command, it's hard ... I know that, unlike me, Pulikovsky did not know until the last moment whether he would command anything at all in this operation, because Kvashnin himself declared himself to be the commander of everything and everyone. give the necessary orders. Everything was decided by Kvashnin. "
Retired Lieutenant General K.B. Pulikovsky, 2014.
In the "Workbook of the operational group of the command center of the 8th Guards. AK" the words of the corps commander are recorded: "Gen. Shevtsov at 16 o'clock had to assign them (the brigade and the regiment) a task so that they would give the position of the troops around the palace." The general did not receive any information. Three years later, on December 28, 1997, Mikhail Leontyev, the host of the "Actually" program of the TV-Center TV channel, will blame General Leonty Shevtsov for the death of the 131st brigade, who, according to the journalist, gave her the same unfortunate order - go to the railway station ... So Pulikovsky's words in the film "Operation Untitled" that "I don't know how the brigade ended up at the station" are most likely true.
From the same book ("The Life and Death of a General"):
FROM THE "WORKBOOK OF THE OPERATIVE GROUP OF THE CENTER OF COMBAT CONTROL OF THE 8th Guards. AK":
2 MSB 81 MSR - around the palace.
1 msb ... (inaudible).
131st Omsb Brigade - two battalions takes up defensive positions near the railway. station ".
This is the last record of the position of these units on the first day of the assault.
The 131st brigade had no mission, says Rokhlin. - She was in reserve. Who ordered her to seize the railway station - one can only guess.
The shots taken by the militants from the film by A. Sladkov "Operation Untitled".
So who set the tasks and directly developed this "operation"?
IN THE FILM "NEW YEAR'S NIGHT OF THE 81ST SHELF" regiment commander Alexander Yaroslavtsev claimed that Kvashnin personally set the task for him, "drew and erased the arrows." We find confirmation of this in the above excerpt from the book:
Rokhlin: Who will command the Northern (group)?
Kvashnin: I ... "
Later, Kvashnin and Shevtsov would recede into the shadows, leaving Pulikovsky to deal with everything. Kvashnin will generally be called a "representative of the General Staff," no written orders given to him were found and he did not bear any responsibility for these events. However, like all the other participants in this story.
FROM THE LETTER OF THE PROSECUTOR GENERAL OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION Y. I. SKURATOV TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE DUMA G. N. SELEZNEV No. 1-GP-7-97 dated 15.01.1997:
"In accordance with the Decree of the State Duma of December 25, 1996 No. 971-11 GD" On Consideration of the Circumstances and Causes of Mass Deaths of Servicemen of the Russian Federation on the Territory of the Chechen Republic in the Period from December 9, 1994 to September 1, 1996 and Measures to Strengthen the Defense country and state security "I inform: ... the circumstances of the death of the personnel of the 131st separate motorized rifle brigade (military unit 09332), which stormed the city of Grozny on December 31, 1994 - January 1, 1995, are being checked, during which 25 officers and warrant officers were killed , 60 soldiers and sergeants, while 72 servicemen of the brigade are missing.
From the explanations of the participants in these events, the documents seized during the check, it follows that at the end of December 1994 in the city of Mozdok, the high command of the RF Ministry of Defense set a common task to liberate the city of Grozny. The specific task of bringing troops into the city, routes of movement and interaction was set by Colonel-General A.V. Kvashnin (at that time - a representative of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation).
The 131st brigade was tasked with concentrating two kilometers east of Sadovaya by December 27, 1994, in order to provide passage to the city of Grozny for other troops. Subsequently, the brigade occupied the line along the Nefyanka River and stayed on it until 11:00 on December 31, after which Lieutenant General Pulikovsky KB, who commanded the Sever grouping at that time, gave the order to enter Grozny by radio. The brigade did not receive any written combat or graphic documents. After passing along Mayakovsky Street, the corps headquarters ordered the brigade to take the railway station, which was not originally planned.
Having captured the station, the brigade got into a dense ring of fire of illegal armed formations and suffered significant losses in manpower and equipment.
As can be seen from the materials of the check, the issues of thorough preparation of the operation should have been solved by Pulikovsky, but this was not done in full, which was one of the reasons for the death of a large number of personnel of the 131st brigade.
In the actions of Pulikovsky, signs of corpus delicti under Art. 260-1 at item "in" of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, namely - the official's negligence towards the service, which entailed grave consequences.
However, a criminal case cannot be initiated, since the State Duma on April 19, 1995 declared an amnesty in connection with the 50th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, and the offense committed by Pulikovsky fell under its influence. "
I would like to end the article with an excerpt from the very book "The Life and Death of a General":
“The plan of operation developed by Grachev and Kvashnin actually became a plan for the death of troops,” says General Rokhlin. “Today I can confidently assert that it was not substantiated by any operational-tactical calculations. Such a plan has a well-defined name - an adventure. considering that hundreds of people died as a result of its implementation, it is a criminal gamble ... "
Full version - on the site
The Russian army, as a military formation inheriting the traditions of the Soviet Army, has many heroes, both among people and among entire units. One of these units is the 81st Motorized Rifle Regiment (MSR), called Petrakuvsky. The full name of the regiment consists of a listing of many military awards, which are real evidence of its valor and glory, and it looks like this - the 81st Guards Petrakuvsky twice Red Banner Orders of Suvorov, Kutuzov and Bogdan Khmelnitsky motorized rifle regiment.
The history of the Petrakuvsky regiment can be divided into several stages, which, smoothly flowing into one another, stretch back to our days. In this article we will try to consider the regiment's combat path, focusing on the last heroic and at the same time inglorious battle, which is still fresh in people's memory - the storming of Grozny in the first Chechen campaign of 1994-95.
BEGINNING: THE PRE-WAR YEARS
The time before World War II was a period of high-profile political transformations in Europe, saber rattling by two European predators - Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Whatever it was, either the Union was preparing for aggression, or was preparing to repel aggression from other countries (read Germany), but in any case, the army was urgently reorganized. This reorganization affected both the equipping of existing units with new types of weapons, and the creation of new units, formations and even armies.
Against the background of such a process in the army, the 81st Petrakuvsky motorized rifle regiment was created. True, at the time of its creation, it had a different serial number. It was the 210th Infantry Regiment as part of the 82nd Division. The regiment was formed in the late spring of 1939, the place of registration of the regiment was the Ural Military District. This year for the Soviet Union was characterized by military operations in Manchuria, therefore, the 81st Petrakuvsky regiment (we will call it by that more familiar name) was hastily transferred to Khalkhin Gol, together with its native 82nd rifle division.
Here the Petrakuvsky regiment received its first baptism of fire, while receiving gratitude from the command. Tension in the region did not subside even after the end of hostilities, and it was decided to leave the units that fought in Manchuria in a new place. So the 81st Petrakuvsky regiment relocated from the Urals to Mongolia, to the city of Choibalsan.
START: WAR
The 81st (210th) motorized rifle regiment met the beginning of the Great Patriotic War at the place of permanent deployment in Mongolia. And only in the fall of 1941, when the situation on the Western Front was very tense, the 81st regiment, as part of its own division, received an order to go into the thick of things - into the battle for Moscow. The 81st motorized rifle regiment fought its first battle with the German invaders on October 25, 1941 in the area of the station village of Dorokhovo. The battles for Moscow were long and bloody, only in the spring of 1942 significant successes were achieved. Many units have received government awards. Among these units was the 210th Motorized Rifle Regiment, which received the right to be called the Guards Regiment for courage and heroism in the battles for Moscow. At the same time, the regiment received a new serial number, from March 18, 1942, it was called the 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment. A little later, the regiment was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.
On June 17, 1942, the 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment was reorganized into the 17th Guards Mechanized Brigade. The brigade was part of the 6th Mechanized Corps of the 4th Panzer Army. The further combat path was no less glorious than its beginning in this bloody war. The brigade took part in many landmark battles of the Great Patriotic War. The end of the war was partly found in Czechoslovakia. For special bravery in battles, the brigade was awarded the Orders of Suvorov, Kutuzov and Bogdan Khmelnitsky. And for the capture of the town of Petraków, the brigade received the title of Petraków, this happened in January 1945.
THE MATURE YEARS: POST-WAR
In the post-war period, the 17th Mechanized Brigade was again reorganized into a mechanized regiment, which received all the rights to the awards of its predecessors, and the 17th Guards Mechanized Petrakuvsky Regiment was renamed twice Red Banner Orders of Kutuzov, Suvorov and Bohdan Khmelnitsky. At some point, the regiment was even turned into a separate mechanized battalion, this happened against the background of the post-war reduction of the army.
However, with the beginning of the Cold War, the battalion was again transformed into a mechanized regiment, and in 1957 it received a modern serial number and began to bear the name 81st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment. The regiment was in the Western Group of Forces in the town of Karlhost. The 81st regiment managed to take part in the so-called liberation campaign in Czechoslovakia, it was in 1968.
Until the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 81st regiment was part of the Western Group of Forces in Germany. During this time, it was reorganized several times and transferred to new states. In 1993, the ZGV was liquidated, and the 81st regiment was withdrawn from Germany to a new deployment site, which was in the Samara region.
NEWEST STORY: BLOOD TIME
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, centrifugal forces, severing ties between the once fraternal republics, continued to tear apart the Russian Federation as well. These forces were strengthened many times over by separatist sentiments fueled from outside in some Caucasian republics. In addition, the country's leadership was worried about the rather large oil reserves in the region, as well as about oil and gas communications. All together, this initially provoked a conflict with the Chechen Republic, which later grew into a full-scale war.
Serious hostilities on the territory of Chechnya began at the end of 1994. From the first days, the 81st regiment, which was part of the NORTH group, took part in this. While participating in the disarmament of illegal military formations (as this operation was officially called), the regiment was commanded by Colonel Yaroslavtsev (who was seriously wounded during the storming of Grozny), the chief of staff was Lieutenant Colonel Burlakov (also wounded in Grozny).
The most serious and significant event for the regiment's personnel in the post-war years is the military operation called the assault on the capital of the Chechen Republic, the city of Grozny. The purpose of the operation was to capture the capital of the rebellious republic, in which the main forces were located, as well as the leadership of the self-proclaimed Ichkeria. For this task, several groups were formed, one of which included the Petrakovsky regiment. At that time, the regiment consisted of more than 1,300 personnel, 96 infantry fighting vehicles, 31 tanks and more than 20 pieces of artillery and mortars.
It is worth noting that in comparison, even with the times of 5 years ago, the regiment made a depressing impression. Many of the officers who served in Germany quit their jobs, they were replaced by graduate students of military departments. In addition, the personnel of the regiment's divisions were completely untrained. The soldiers had only records in military cards about their positions, there was no real knowledge and skills at all. Mechanics of infantry fighting vehicles and tanks had little experience in driving, the shooters practically did not perform live firing from small arms, not to mention grenade launchers and mortars. In addition, immediately before being sent to Chechnya, the most prepared and trained specialists left (transferred) the most trained and trained specialists, the lack of which subsequently cost the units dearly.
As such, there was no preparation for the introduction of troops into Chechnya, the personnel were simply loaded into a train and taken away. According to the surviving participants in those events, combat training classes were held even during the journey, right in the carriages. Upon arrival in Mozdok, the regiment received 2 days to prepare, and two days later made a march to Grozny. At that time, the 81st regiment was staffed according to the peacetime state, which was only 50% of the war state. The most important thing is that motorized rifle units were not equipped with simple infantry, there were only BMP crews. This fact was one of the main factors in the death of the regiment's units that stormed Grozny. Roughly speaking, the equipment entered the city without infantry cover, which is tantamount to death. The commanders on the ground understood this, for example, the chief of staff of the regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Burlakov, spoke about this. But no one listened to the words of the command of the units sent to Chechnya.
STORM OF THE GROZNY
The decision to storm the city was made at a meeting of the Security Council on December 26, 1994. The assault on the city was preceded by artillery preparation. 8 days before the start of the operation, artillery units began a massive shelling of Grozny. As it turned out later, this was not enough, in general, as such, preparation for the military operation was not carried out, the troops went at random.
The Petrakuvsky regiment went along with the 131st Maykop motorized rifle brigade from the northern part, as part of the NORTH group. Contrary to the original plan, according to which the troops of the Russian army were to enter the city from three sides, two groups remained in place, and only the NORTH group entered the center.
It is worth noting that the forces for the assault were clearly not enough, according to some data around Grozny, the troops of the Russian Army numbered about 14 thousand people, without even having a two-fold advantage. This was clearly not enough for an attack, and even more so in a city, and even with understaffed units. In addition, there was an acute shortage of maps and clear management. The regiment's tasks changed every few hours; many did not know where to simply move. The Chechens easily wedged themselves into the radio communications of the Russian troops, disorienting them. Even elementary reconnaissance of the enemy forces was not carried out, so the battalion and company commanders did not know who was opposing them.
The beginning of the assault on the capital of the rebellious republic was scheduled for the last day of 1994. This, according to the plan of the command of the Joint Forces, was to play into the hands of the attackers. In principle, the surprise tactic worked 100%, subsequently playing a negative role. None of the defenders of Grozny simply expected an assault on New Year's Eve. That is why the units of the 81st regiment and the 131st brigade managed to quickly reach the city center and just as quickly ... perish there.
Later, some sources began to actively promote the opinion that the Chechens themselves allowed the Russian troops to reach the city center without hindrance, luring them into a trap. However, such a statement is unlikely.
The first of the subdivisions of the Petrakovsky regiment was the advance detachment, which included a reconnaissance company, led by the chief of staff of the regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Burlakov. They had the task of seizing the airport and clearing bridges on the way to Grozny. The forward detachment coped with its task brilliantly and two motorized rifle battalions under the command of Lieutenant Colonels Perepelkin and Shilovsky entered the city after it.
The units marched in columns, there were tanks in front, the flanks of the columns covered the ZSU Tunguska. As the surviving participants in those events later said, the tanks did not even have cartridges for machine guns, which made them useless in the city.
The first clash took place at the advance detachment already at the entrance to the city, on Khmelnitsky Street. During the battle, they managed to inflict serious damage on the enemy, but they had to lose 1 BMP, and the first wounded appeared.
The divisions of the regiment were rapidly advancing towards the city center, practically meeting no resistance. Already at 12.00, after only 5 hours, the railway station was reached, which the regiment commander reported to the command. Further orders were received to advance to the palace of the government of the republic.
However, the fulfillment of this task was greatly hampered by the increased activity of the militants who came to their senses. In the area of the government palace, a fierce battle ensued, during which Colonel Yaroslavtsev (regiment commander) was wounded. The command passed to the Chief of Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Burlakov.
The swift offensive was quickly choked up by the fierce opposition of the defenders, who were firing grenade launchers at the equipment of the federal troops. Combat vehicles were knocked out one after another, the columns of the regiment's subunits were cut off from each other and dismembered into separate groups. A big obstacle was created by their own set on fire. The killed and wounded already numbered more than a hundred people, Burlakov was also among the wounded.
Only by nightfall did the divisions of the 81st regiment and the 131st brigade receive a long-awaited respite. However, immediately after the New Year, the intensity of fire from the militants increased. In agreement with the command of the NORTH group units, they left the station and began to break out of the city. The retreat was not coordinated, they broke through singly and in small groups. So there were more chances ...
From the encirclement, the advanced units of the Maykop brigade and the Petrakuvsky regiment emerged significantly thinner, with huge losses in manpower and equipment. According to official information, the regiment lost 63 people killed during the assault, in addition there were 75 missing and about 150 wounded.
In addition to two motorized rifle battalions and an advance detachment, the remaining units of the 81st regiment were also in Grozny, brought together into one group under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Stankevich. They took up defensive positions on the streets of Mayakovsky and Khmelnitsky. Competently organized defense made it possible to create an island of resistance, which fought successfully for several days. This group served as a salvation for many of the vanguard soldiers breaking through from the encirclement.
Among other things, the 81st Petrakuvsky regiment took part not only in the storming of Grozny on New Year's Eve 1994. The whole January of the new, 1995, was spent in battles for the regiment. Thanks to the dedication of the guys, Dudayev's palace, an arms factory, a press house - an important center of resistance were taken.
For several more months the regiment was on the territory of Chechnya, and only in April 1995 the part was withdrawn to the place of permanent deployment.
Today, one of the most famous regiments of our time is part of the motorized rifle brigade under the same number.
The events of the New Year's assault on Grozny are drifting further and further away from us. The soldiers who found themselves at the forefront of the fighting were labeled almost "lambs thrown to the slaughter." The names of the units that suffered the greatest losses also became common nouns: the 81st regiment ...
Meanwhile, in those first days of the Grozny operation, the servicemen displayed unparalleled courage. The divisions that entered that "formidable" in every sense of the city, stood to the end, to death.
Chechen "abscess"
On November 30, 1994, the President signed a decree "On measures to restore constitutional legality and law and order on the territory of the Chechen Republic." It was decided to cut the Chechen "abscess" by force. To carry out the operation, a Joint Group of Forces was created, including the forces and assets of various ministries and departments.
- In early December 1994, the regiment commander, Colonel Yaroslavtsev, and I arrived on official business at the headquarters of our 2nd Army, recalls Igor Stankevich, the former deputy commander of the 81st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment, who was awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation for the January battles in Grozny ... - In the midst of the meeting at the chief of staff of the association, General Krotov, the bell rang. Some of the high-ranking military leaders called. “That's right,” the general replied to the subscriber to one of his questions, “I have the commander and deputy of the 81st regiment. I will bring the information to them right away. "
After the general hung up, he asked everyone present to come out. In a tete-a-tete situation, it was announced to us that the regiment would soon receive a combat mission, that "we need to prepare." Application region - North Caucasus. All the rest is later.
REFERENCE: The 81st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment - the successor to the 210th Rifle Regiment - was formed in 1939. He began his combat biography at Khalkhin Gol. During the Great Patriotic War he took part in the defense of Moscow, liberated Oryol, Lvov, and the cities of Eastern Europe from the Nazis. 30 servicemen of the regiment became Heroes of the Soviet Union. On the military banner of the unit there are five orders - two of the Red Banner, Suvorov, Kutuzov, Bogdan Khmelnitsky. After the war, he was stationed on the territory of the GDR. Currently it is part of the 27th Guards Motorized Rifle Division of the Volga-Ural Military District, is part of the constant combat readiness.
In mid-1993, the 81st regiment, which was then part of the 90th Panzer Division of the 2nd Army, was withdrawn from the Western Group of Forces and deployed 40 kilometers from Samara, in the village of Chernorechye. Both the regiment, the division, and the army became part of the Volga Military District. Not a single soldier remained in the regiment at the time of arrival at the new deployment site. Many officers and warrant officers were also "confused" with the conclusion. Most of the issues, primarily organizational, had to be addressed by the remaining small backbone of the regiment.
By the fall of 1994, the 81st was staffed with the so-called mobile forces. Then the Armed Forces just started to create such units. It was assumed that at the first command they could be deployed to any region of the country to solve various tasks - from eliminating the consequences of natural disasters to repelling attacks by bandit formations (the word "terrorism" was not yet in use at that time).
With the granting of a special status to the regiment, combat training noticeably intensified in it, and manning issues began to be dealt with more effectively. The officers began to allocate the first apartments in a residential town in Chernorechye built at the expense of the FRG authorities.
In the same 94th year, the regiment successfully passed the check of the Ministry of Defense. The 81st, for the first time after all the troubles associated with the withdrawal and settlement in a new place, showed that he had become a full-fledged part of the Russian army, combat-ready, capable of performing any tasks. True, this inspection did the regiment a disservice.
A number of well trained servicemen were eager to serve in hot spots, in the same peacekeeping forces. Trained specialists were taken there with pleasure. As a result, about two hundred servicemen were transferred from the regiment in a short period. Moreover, the most popular specialties are driver mechanics, gunners, snipers.
In 1981, it was believed that this was not a problem, the vacancies that had formed could be filled, new people were trained ...
Echelons to the Caucasus
The 81st motorized rifle regiment of PrivO, which was to go to war in December 94th, was quickly staffed with servicemen from 48 parts of the district. For all fees - a week. I also had to select commanders. A third of the officers of the primary level were "biennial", had only military departments of civilian universities behind them.
On December 14, military equipment began to be loaded onto the trains (in total, the regiment was transferred to Mozdok in five echelons). The mood of the people was not depressed. On the contrary, many were sure that it would be a short business trip, that they would be able to return by the New Year holidays.
Due to the lack of time, classes with the personnel were organized even on the train, along the route of the echelons. The material part of the weapon, the order of aiming, the combat manual, especially the sections relating to military operations in the city, were studied.
Another week was given to the regiment to prepare already upon arrival in Mozdok. Shooting, alignment of units. And now, years later, it is clear: the regiment was not ready for combat. There was a shortage of personnel, primarily in motorized rifle units.
About two hundred paratroopers were assigned to the regiment as a replenishment. The same young, unfired soldiers. I had to learn to fight under enemy fire ...
The enemy was not conditional ...
At the time of the start of the storming of Grozny, about 14,000 federal troops were concentrated around the Chechen capital. The city, blocked from the north-east, north, north-west and west, was ready to enter 164 tanks, 305 infantry fighting vehicles, 250 armored personnel carriers, 114 BMD. Fire support was provided by 208 guns and mortars.
In military equipment, the feds had an obvious superiority. However, in the personnel, the advantage was not even up to two to one. The classical theory of battle requires an advantage of the attackers about three times, and taking into account the urban development, this figure should be even higher.
And what did you have at that moment? According to data that later fell into the hands of our security officials, the number of the Chechen army reached 15 thousand people in regular troops and up to 30-40 thousand armed militias. Regular army units of Chechnya consisted of a tank regiment, a mountain rifle brigade, an artillery regiment, an anti-aircraft artillery regiment, a Muslim fighter regiment, and 2 training aviation regiments. The republic had its own special-purpose units - the National Guard (about 2,000 people), a separate special-purpose regiment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, a regiment of the border and customs service of the State Security Department, as well as personal security detachments of the leaders of Chechnya.
Serious forces were represented by the formations of the so-called "Confederation of the Peoples of the Caucasus" - the Borz and Warriors of the Righteous Caliph battalions, the Abd-el-Kader battalion, the Islamic Renaissance Party detachment, and the Islamic Community detachment. In addition, more than five thousand mercenaries from 14 states fought on the side of Dudaev.
According to documents seized in 1995, Dudayev, in addition to regular forces, had at least 300 thousand (!) Reservists. The law “On Defense of the Chechen Republic” adopted in the region of December 24, 1991 introduced compulsory military service for all male citizens from 19 to 26 years old. Naturally, the service took place in Chechnya, in local paramilitaries. A system of regular collection of storerooms was in place: during the period 1991-1994, six full-fledged mobilization exercises were held.
Parts of the Chechen army were even replenished with deserters: on the basis of Dudaev's decree No. 29 of February 17, 1992, Chechen military personnel who voluntarily left military units on the territory of the USSR and expressed a desire to serve in the Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic were rehabilitated, and the criminal cases initiated against them were terminated.
Another Dudayev's decree No. 2 of November 8, 1991 established a Ministry of War in Chechnya. All military formations on the territory of the republic passed to him, along with equipment and weapons. According to operational data, at the end of 1994, Chechnya had 2 launchers of operational-tactical missiles, 111 L-39 and 149 L-29 aircraft (training, but converted into light attack aircraft), 5 MiG-17 and MiG-15 fighters, 6 aircraft An-2, 243 air missiles, 7 thousand air shells.
The Chechen "ground forces" were armed with 42 T-72 and T-62 tanks, 34 infantry fighting vehicles, 30 armored personnel carriers and armored personnel carriers, 18 Grad MLRS and more than 1000 rounds for them, 139 artillery systems, including 30 122-mm D-ZO howitzers and 24 thousand shells for them. Dudayev's formations had 5 stationary and 88 portable air defense systems, as well as 25 anti-aircraft installations of various types, 590 anti-tank weapons, almost 50 thousand small arms and 150 thousand grenades.
For the defense of Grozny, the Chechen command created three defensive lines. The inner one had a radius of 1 to 1.5 km around the presidential palace. The defense here was based on the created solid nodes of resistance around the palace using capital stone structures. The lower and upper floors of the buildings were adapted for firing small arms and anti-tank weapons. Along the Ordzhonikidze, Pobeda and Pervomayskaya avenues, prepared positions were created for firing artillery and direct-fire tanks.
The middle line was located at a distance of up to 1 km from the boundaries of the inner line in the northwestern part of the city and up to 5 km in its southwestern and southeastern parts. The basis of this line was the strongholds at the beginning of the Staropromyslovskoye Highway, resistance nodes at the bridges over the Sunzha River, in the Minutka microdistrict, on Saykhanov Street. Oil fields, oil refineries named after Lenin and Sheripov, as well as a chemical plant were prepared for the explosion or arson.
The outer border ran mainly along the outskirts of the city and consisted of strong points on the highways Grozny-Mozdok, Dolinsky-Katayama-Tashkala, strong points Neftyanka, Khankala and Staraya Sunzha in the east and Chernorechye in the south of the city.
"Virtual" topography
The troops practically did not have clear data about the enemy at the beginning of the assault, and there was also no reliable intelligence and intelligence information. There were no maps either. The deputy regiment commander had a hand-drawn diagram of where he was supposed to go approximately with his units. Later, the map still appeared: it was removed from our killed captain-tanker.
Anatoly Kvashnin set the tasks for the commander of the groupings for actions in the city a few days before the assault. The main task fell to the 81st regiment, which was supposed to operate as part of the "North" grouping under the command of Major General Konstantin Pulikovsky.
The regiment, which partly concentrated on the southern slopes of the Tersk ridge, and partly (with one battalion) was located in the area of a dairy farm 5 km north of Alkhan-Churtsky, two tasks were determined: the nearest and the next. The nearest one was to occupy the airport "Severny" by 10 o'clock in the morning on December 31. The next one - by 16 o'clock, capture the intersection of Khmelnitsky and Mayakovsky streets.
The outbreak of hostilities on December 31 was supposed to be a factor of surprise. That is why the convoys of federals were able to reach the center of the city almost without hindrance, and not, as it was stated later, fell into a prepared trap of bandits who intended to drag our convoys into a kind of "fire bag". Only by the end of the day, the militants were able to organize resistance. The Dudayevites concentrated all their efforts on the units that found themselves in the center of the city. It was these troops that suffered the greatest losses ...
Surroundings, breakthrough ...
The chronology of the last day of 1994 has been restored today, not only by the hour - by the minute. At 7 o'clock in the morning on December 31, the advance detachment of the 81st regiment, which included a reconnaissance company, attacked the Severny airport. With the advance detachment was the chief of staff of the 81st Lieutenant Colonel Semyon Burlakov. By 9 o'clock, his group completed the immediate task, seizing the airport and clearing two bridges across the Nefyanka River on the way to the city.
Following the advance detachment, the column was moved by the 1st MSB of Lieutenant Colonel Eduard Perepelkin. To the west, through the Rodina state farm, was the 2nd mdb. Combat vehicles moved in columns: tanks were in front, self-propelled anti-aircraft guns were on the flanks.
From the airport "Severny" the 81st SME went to Khmelnitsky Street. At 9:17 am the motorized riflemen met the first enemy forces here: an ambush from a detachment of Dudayevites with an attached tank, an armored personnel carrier and two Urals. The reconnaissance company entered the battle. The militants managed to knock out a tank and one of the "Urals", however, the scouts also lost one BMP and several wounded. The regiment commander, Colonel Yaroslavtsev, decided to delay reconnaissance to the main forces and temporarily stop the advance.
Then the advance resumed. By 11.00 the columns of the 81st regiment reached Mayakovsky Street. Ahead of the previously approved schedule was almost 5 hours. Yaroslavtsev reported this to the command and received an order to move to blockade the presidential palace, to the city center. The regiment began its advance towards Dzerzhinsky Square.
By 12.30, the forward units were already near the station, and the group's headquarters confirmed the earlier order given to surround the presidential palace. At 13.00 the main forces of the regiment passed the station and along Ordzhonikidze Street rushed to the complex of government buildings.
But the Dudayevites gradually came to their senses. From their side, the most powerful fire resistance began. A fierce battle broke out at the palace. Here, the leading aircraft controller, Captain Kiryanov, covered the regiment commander with himself. Colonel Yaroslavtsev was wounded and transferred command to the chief of staff of the regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Burlakov.
At 16.10 the chief of staff received confirmation of the task to blockade the palace. But the motorized riflemen faced the most severe fire resistance. Dudayev's grenade launchers, dispersed among the buildings in the city center, began to shoot our combat vehicles literally point-blank. The regiment's columns began to gradually split into separate groups. By 17 o'clock, Lieutenant Colonel Burlakov was also wounded, about a hundred soldiers and sergeants were already out of action.
The intensity of the fire effect can be judged by at least one fact: only from 18.30 to 18.40, that is, in just 10 minutes, the militants knocked out 3 tanks of the 81st regiment at once!
The units of the 81st mechanized infantry brigade and the 131st motorized rifle brigade that broke into the city were surrounded. The Dudayevites unleashed a storm of fire on them. The soldiers, under the cover of the BMP, took up a perimeter defense. The bulk of the personnel and equipment was concentrated in the forecourt, in the station itself and in the surrounding buildings. The 1st mdb of the 81st regiment was located in the station building, the 2nd mdb - in the goods yard of the station.
The 1st MSR under the command of Captain Bezrutsky occupied the building of the road administration. The infantry fighting vehicles of the company were displayed in the courtyard, at the gates and on the exit tracks to the railroad bed. At dusk, the enemy's onslaught intensified. Losses have increased especially in the equipment, which was very tight, sometimes literally caterpillar to caterpillar. The initiative passed into the hands of the enemy.
The relative calm came only at 23.00. At night, the skirmishes continued, and in the morning the commander of the 131st Omsb Brigade, Colonel Savin, requested permission from the higher command to leave the station. A breakthrough was approved to the Lenin Park, where the units of the 693rd SME of the "West" group defended. At 15:00 on January 1, the remnants of the units of the 131st Omsb Brigade and the 81st SME began to break through from the railway station and the freight station. Under the incessant fire of the Dudayevites, the columns suffered losses and gradually disintegrated.
28 people from the 1st MRR of the 81st MRR broke through in three infantry fighting vehicles along the railway. Having reached the House of Press, the motorized riflemen got lost in the dark unfamiliar streets and were ambushed by the militants. As a result, two BMPs were hit. Only one vehicle, commanded by Captain Arkhangelov, made it to the location of the federal troops.
... As of today it is known that only a small part of the people left the encirclement from the units of the 81st mechanized infantry brigade and the 131st motorized rifle brigade, which were at the forefront of the main attack. The personnel lost commanders, equipment (in just one day on December 31, the 81st regiment lost 13 tanks and 7 infantry fighting vehicles), scattered around the city and went out to their own on their own - one by one or in small groups. According to official data as of January 10, 1995, the 81st MRP lost 63 servicemen in Grozny killed, 75 missing, 135 wounded ...
Let the mother of the enemy cry first
The consolidated detachment of the 81st SMR, formed from the units that remained outside the "station" ring, managed to gain a foothold at the intersection of Bohdan Khmelnitsky and Mayakovsky streets. The command of the detachment was assumed by the deputy commander of the regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Igor Stankevich. For two days his group, being in a semi-encirclement, remaining virtually on a bare and shot through place - the intersection of two main city streets, held this strategically important area.
Stankevich competently placed 9 infantry fighting vehicles, organized the "binding" of the fire of the attached mortarmen in the most threatening areas. When organizing the defense, non-standard measures were taken. Steel gates were removed from the surrounding Grozny courtyards and they covered the combat vehicles on the sides and in front. The "know-how" turned out to be successful: the RPG shot "slipped" over the sheet of metal without touching the car. After the bloody New Year's Eve, people gradually began to come to their senses. The detachment gradually pulled together the fighters who had escaped from the encirclement. We set ourselves up as best we could, organized rest during the break between enemy attacks.
Neither December 31, nor January 1, nor in the following days, the 81st regiment left the city, remained on the front line and continued to participate in hostilities. The battles in Grozny were fought by Igor Stankevich's detachment, as well as the 4th motorized rifle company of Captain Yarovitsky, which was located in the hospital complex.
For the first two days, there were virtually no other organized forces in the center of Grozny. There was another small group from General Rokhlin's headquarters, it kept close. If the bandits knew this for sure, they would certainly have abandoned all their reserves to crush a handful of daredevils. The bandits would have destroyed them in the same way as those units that were in the ring of fire near the station.
But the detachment was not going to surrender to the mercy of the enemy. The surrounding courtyards were promptly cleared, and possible positions of enemy grenade launchers were eliminated. Here the motorized riflemen began to discover the cruel truth about what the city they entered was in reality.
So, in the brick fences and walls of most houses at the intersection of Khmelnitsky-Mayakovsky, equipped openings were found, near which shots for grenade launchers were stored. In the courtyards there were carefully prepared bottles with Molotov cocktails - an incendiary mixture. And in one of the garages, dozens of empty crates from grenade launchers were found: here, apparently, was one of the supply points.
Already on January 3, checkpoints began to be set up along Lermontov Street in cooperation with the special forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The posts allowed at least to slip along Lermontov Street, otherwise everything would be shot on the move.
The regiment survived. He survived in spite of those who tried to destroy him in Grozny. He rose from the ashes in spite of those who at that time "buried" in absentia both him and other Russian units that found themselves in the epicenter of the Grozny battles.
For almost the whole of January, the 81st Regiment, “shot” and “torn apart” by evil tongues, took part in the battles for Grozny. And again, very few people know about this.
It was the tankers of the 81st who provided support to the marines storming. It was the infantry of the regiment that seized the Krasny Molot plant, which the Dudayevites turned from a peaceful Soviet enterprise into a full-scale weapons production. The engineering units of the unit cleared mines across the Sunzha bridge, through which fresh forces were then drawn into the city. Units of the 81st took part in the assault on the Press House, which was one of the strongholds of the separatist resistance.
“I pay tribute to all comrades in arms with whom we fought together in those days,” says Igor Stankevich. - These are the units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which were led by General Vorobyov, who later died heroically in Grozny. These are detachments of internal troops and special forces groups of the GRU. These are the employees of the special services, about whose work, probably, even today it is impossible to say much. Courageous, heroic people, brilliant professionals that any country would be proud of. And I am proud to have been with them on that front line.
Heroes become
The author of these lines in the first days of January had a chance to visit the belligerent Grozny, just in the location of the 81st regiment, which had just relocated to the territory of the cannery, having fortified a checkpoint at the Khmelnitsky-Mayakovsky intersection. The journalistic notebook is dotted with entries: the names of people who heroically showed themselves in battles, numerous examples of courage and courage. For these soldiers and officers, it was just a job. None of them dared to call what happened on December 31 a tragedy.
Here are just some of the facts:
“... Senior Warrant Officer Grigory Kirichenko. Under enemy fire, he made several trips to the epicenter of the battle, taking out the wounded soldiers in the compartments of the BMP, at the levers of which he sat himself, to the evacuation center. " (Later awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation).
"... Senior Lieutenant Seldar Mamedorazov (" non-combat "chief of the club) broke through on one of the infantry fighting vehicles into the battle area, took out several wounded servicemen."
“... Major of the medical service Oleg Pastushenko. In battle, he helped the personnel. "
“... The commander of a tank battalion, Major Yuri Zakhryapin. He acted heroically in battle, personally hitting the enemy's firing points. "
And the names of the soldiers, officers, meetings with whom then, on that Grozny front line, remained at least a record in a field notebook. As a maximum - a memory for life. Major of the medical service Vladimir Sinkevich, Sergey Danilov, Viktor Minaev, Vyacheslav Antonov, captains Alexander Fomin, Vladimir Nazarenko, Igor Voznyuk, Lieutenant Vitaly Afanasyev, warrant officers of the medical service Lydia Andryukhina, Lyudmila Spivakova, junior sergeant Alexander Litvinov, privates Alik Salikhanov Vladimirov, Andrey Savchenko ...
Where are you now, those young front-line soldiers of the 90s, soldiers and officers of the heroic, glorified regiment? Warriors scorched in battles, but not burnt to ashes, but surviving all deaths in this hellish flame in spite of the 81st Guards? ..
