Khankala in Chechnya is a Russian military base located seven kilometers from the capital of Grozny. But there is also the Khankala station, through which trains go to Moscow, Volgograd and other cities of Russia.
Location
The city of Khankala in Chechnya is a western suburb of Grozny, located in the North Caucasus, in the very center of the republic. Lies on the left bank of the Argun River and on the right bank of the Sunzha River.
Unlike, for example, the Krasnodar Territory, this region of Chechnya is not protected by mountains, so the climate here is much more severe. Winters are frosty, and summers are hot, dry, as rainfall is irregular.
Khankala village
It was erected with an airfield in 1949, and a residential town for military families was built with it. It was located next to the station, at which there was a small village. Today there is also the Khankala station and the Khankala military town.
There is still a railway station in the village. The movement of trains is carried out with the help of diesel locomotives, since it is not electrified, due to the dismantling of the contact network during hostilities.
The word "khankala" is translated into Russian as "watchtower". Before the hostilities, it was a suburban rural area of the city of Grozny. Currently, about 7,900 people live in the village, more than 83% of them are Russian military and railway station workers. As a matter of fact, only a few houses remain from the former settlement.
Khankala military base in Chechnya
Khankala is considered the quietest place in all of Chechnya, due to the location of the main base of Russian troops in the country. This is the most guarded facility, surrounded by several rows of barbed wire, minefields, and periodically located checkpoints along the perimeter of the territory. Even in previous years, the militants did not approach it, preferring to fire from afar.
Strategic military facilities are located here: the joint headquarters of the North Caucasus Military District, the FSB service, a hospital, and other federal bodies. The base was created in 2000 in connection with the tragic events in Chechnya. Khankala, besides glorious pages in history, has sad ones.
In September 2001, militants shot down a MI-8 helicopter here, killing 2 generals and 8 officers. In August 2002, an MI-26 helicopter carrying 154 people was shot down in the Khankala region during the landing approach. Only 30 servicemen managed to survive. In September 1995 in Khankala, Chechnya, an MI-8 helicopter with wounded on board was shot down, one of them died.
Military airfield
During the Soviet era, the airfield of the USSR Ministry of Defense was located on the territory of Khankala. Subsequently, it was transferred to the Stavropol Flight School and was used as a training school. On it was a regiment of L-29 training aircraft. In the first Chechen war, they were captured by D. Dudaev's militants, who wanted to convert them into combat ones, but did not have time. They were at the Khankala airfield in Chechnya. Photo attached.
Currently, the airfield belongs to the Russian Ministry of Defense. It is a modern and powerful strategic facility equipped with modern instruments and devices. An Orthodox chapel was erected here, built by builders from Ulyanovsk.
Prehistory of the Chechen conflict
In 1991, Ichkeria was proclaimed, President D. Dudayev pursued a policy of separating the CRI from Russia, which did not recognize it. The military operation was carried out in the border areas and on the territory. It had the definition of an operation to maintain constitutional order. In everyday life, hostilities were called the first Chechen war.
For this war, a characteristic feature was the huge casualties among the Russian population, since it was at this time that ethnic cleansing was carried out against persons of non-Chechen nationalities: Russians, Armenians, Jews, Greeks, Tatars and others. The overwhelming majority of the victims were Russians.
Economic and political prerequisites
The situation inside Russia and Chechnya was very unfavorable. The power of the presidents was growing. In Chechnya, this led to confrontation between the clans and an open confrontation and strengthening of the anti-Dudaev positions. It was also necessary to improve relations and establish constitutional order due to the circumstances that for the transit of Caspian oil it was necessary to lay an oil pipeline through the territory of Chechnya. Dudayev did not go to negotiations. Nobody could give guarantees for the safety of oil.
Fights for Khankala
In accordance with the decree of the President of Russia B. Yeltsin, on December 11, 1994, units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Defense of Russia entered the territory of Chechnya. Three days later, namely on December 14, missile and bomb strikes were carried out on the three existing Khankala and Kalinovskaya, where about 250 aircraft of various classes and purposes were concentrated, ranging from civilians to agricultural ones.
The battle for Khankala took place from December 24 to 29. As a result, the take-off field, garden houses and the border of the Grozny-Argun road were occupied. In 2000, a Russian military base was created anew on the territory of Khankala.
Chechnya, Khankala - Itum-Kalinsky District
August 2001
The minutes of the meeting between the colonel and one of the brigade's best officers was as short as always: a question, half mat and an equally "colorful" answer. In war, pretentious and cumbersome phrases are not used. The main thing is the essence! Straight as the horizon and as clear as the alphabet for first graders. And in the vestment of this essence, variations can be used - it's like the tongue is suspended.
Well, since everything is assembled, let's get down to business. Two days ago, the reconnaissance spotted the advance of the remnants of Ruslan Chilayev's gang right here along the gorge, - unfolding the map, the brigade commander pointed his finger at the blue snake that marked the river at the bottom of the deep gorge. - You will select ten people for the operation; The "turntable" will transfer the group to the base of the Itum-Kalinsky frontier detachment, from there on two armored vehicles you will move to the southeast.
Is the intelligence fresh? - clarified the major of the special forces.
The freshest. There are not many bandits, according to the intelligence report - about five or six; they are running out of food and ammunition, and they also have wounded. Therefore, they have nowhere to go - they need to look here.
He outlined a circle on the map, raised his finger significantly and, slowly lowering it, poked it into the very center of an uncomplicated figure - into a tiny village on a gentle slope of the ridge.
Is the task the same?
There can be no other. That's it, Arkady - half an hour to get ready and go! Communication on the second channel. Good luck…
The day turned out to be bright and cloudless. A light breeze was felt on the peaks, and in the lowlands and gorges the air was still.
Seventy kilometers from Khankala to the base of the border detachment, which was located south-west of the large village of Itum-Kale, the transport "eight" covered in twenty minutes. Not far from three concrete platforms, armored vehicles were already waiting - followed by a shaking descent along the serpentine to the gorge, which was replaced by a calm ride along the flat bank of the Argun to the bridge over the floodplain. This path did not take much time - it took much longer to get to the area indicated by the brigade commander: first along the same river, but in the opposite direction, then along a country road that climbed smoothly up. Having crossed over a wooded ridge, the bumpy road swirled along the southern slope ...
Dense vegetation covered only the northern slopes of the spurs, and it was always more dangerous to move along them. Here, at best, the shrubbery was green or some small trees stuck out. Of course, if you wish, a land mine can be buried anywhere - even in the Kuban steppe or in the African desert. I buried it, hid behind a hillock or dune and wait for the right case. But this is how a Russian person is arranged: if there is no direct threat visible for three miles around, then there is no need to worry.
The armored vehicle engines hummed with tension; eight pairs of huge wheels lifted clouds of whitish and flour-fine dust into the air. Major Serebrov positioned himself near the tower of the first car and held an unfolded map in his lap. All the way from Khankala, he examined the folds of the terrain indicated on the paper - first in the cockpit of the "turntable", now sitting on the hot armor ...
The task set by the brigade commander was not new or overly complicated. All that was required was to imperceptibly approach the desired area at a distance of two or three kilometers, disperse, surround it and thoroughly comb it. Comb so that no dog has time to slip out.
The area was known, and now the trick was to choose the right point from which the group, having split up, would disperse in different directions. The point should be at the optimal distance from the area of the forthcoming work: not too close, otherwise the maneuver will lose stealth; but not ten miles away, so as not to litter the airwaves with unnecessary commands, coordinating the movements of subordinates.
Several years ago, Serebrov took part in a large army operation carried out in the local area, and now looking at the map, he saw not only scanty designations, but also represented the area "in nartur". A long elongated ridge creeping from the southeast to Itum-Kale, here and there crossed out by falling folds; a primer snake between scattered small villages; below there is a cold and fast tributary of the Argun. Opposite is the wooded slope of the neighboring, higher ridge. The center of the designated area was the last aul - tiny and forgotten by God. And not far from its eastern outskirts lived an old cemetery with a dilapidated stone house. The major chose these ruins as the starting point of the operation ...
Chechnya, September 2001. At Khankala, the main military base of the federal forces, a large-scale audit of funds received by the republic since the beginning of the second Chechen campaign is underway. The check is carried out by a commission of the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.
Officers - Major General Anatoly Pozdnyakov, Major General Pavel Varfolomeev, Colonel Igor Abramov, Colonel Vladimir Talayev, Colonel Igor Khakhalkin, Colonel Yuri Makhov, Colonel Sergei Toryanin, Colonel Igor Tribunov, Colonel Vladimir Smolennikov and Lieutenant Colonel Nikolay Lyubim regularly fly the combined military grouping from Khankala to Grozny and back.
All funds received by the republic (both the military budget of the group and the budget of the Chechen government) pass through the field banks of military units. The most effective way to detect waste is to do a cross-check. That is, to compare the financial documents received at Khankala with the financial statements kept by the government. Thus, the inspectors from the General Staff actually check not only the military, but also the leadership of the republic.
It is very close from Khankala to the complex of government buildings in Grozny. But Grozny in 2001 is dangerous for ground movement. The military and senior civilians prefer the "air taxi". Dozens of helicopters fly over the city every day. A specialized helipad No. 104 was even built near the government complex. However, these measures are justified by statistics: during the period of active hostilities in the Grozny region, not a single aircraft was shot down.
Little is known about the work of the commission. Without exception, all members of the commission flew away on a business trip without informing their loved ones what exactly they would be doing. The wives of some of the officers did not know at all that their husbands were in Chechnya. But even information from open sources allows us to conclude: many did not like the work of the General Staff commission.
On September 10, at a meeting in Khankala, the head of the commission, Major General Anatoly Pozdnyakov, proposed reducing the number of checkpoints and checkpoints in lowland Chechnya and at the same time increasing the number of ambushes, patrols and secrets in the mountainous regions of the republic. Such a proposal did not arouse enthusiasm among the military, although it was dictated even by primitive logic: according to statistics, the federal forces suffered the greatest losses at checkpoints. On the other hand, checkpoints were not only a target for the militants, but also a source of income for the feds - levies were levied on almost every car and passenger. This practice was ubiquitous and indestructible. However, General Pozdnyakov gave an ultimatum promise that he would return to Moscow, prepare all the necessary documents within a week and sign them with his leader, Chief of the General Staff of the RF Ministry of Defense, General of the Army Anatoly Kvashnin.
Three hours before the tragedy
On the morning of September 17, Colonel Yuri Makhov, a member of the commission, deputy chief of the 4th department of the logistics headquarters of the Armed Forces, phoned home. Makhov told his wife that the trip was over and he would be home tomorrow.
The members of the commission completed their work in the government of Chechnya with a short meeting with the leadership of the republic. At 12.06, a Mi-8 helicopter with tail number 33 landed on site 104, took on board members of the commission and boxes with documents. At 12.07 he took off and flew towards Khankala at an altitude of 150-200 meters. The entire flight takes about 10 minutes ...
From the "Act of Investigation of the Aviation Accident" dated October 17, 2001: “Clarification of the task of transporting a group of generals and officers from site No. 104 (Grozny) to the Khankala airfield to the crew of Captain VN Mineev. was carried out at 9.00 am on September 17 ... At 12.06 the crew landed at site No. 104, and at 12.07 with a group on board it took off from the site, which was reported at the AA OGV checkpoint. After the report, the crew did not get in touch.
<…>At 12.20 a report was received from the operational officer on the crash on the eastern outskirts of Grozny near the railway track of the Mi-8 helicopter. Raised on command PSO group ( search and rescue squad. - EAT. ) at 12.43 discovered the crash site of the helicopter. After landing next to the burning helicopter, the PSO crew confirmed that the helicopter with tail number 33 was on fire, there were no living crew members and passengers, and employees of the Prosecutor's Office of the Chechen Republic and the commandant's office of the Oktyabrsky District were working at the crash site. Due to a strong fire, the bodies of the dead were not able to be evacuated by means of the PSO.
<…>According to the testimony of eyewitnesses,<…>a shot (launch) at the helicopter was fired from the area of Grozny, which caused the first explosion on board. The helicopter caught fire in the air and began to descend into the wasteland of the eastern outskirts of the city. The burning fuel spilling onto the ground lit a tree on the street. Nursery. At an altitude of 15-20 meters and at a distance of 70-100 meters from the place where the helicopter crashed, a second explosion occurred (presumably an additional fuel tank exploded), and the uncontrolled helicopter fell to the ground, collapsed and burned down. The crew tried to the last opportunity to turn the collapsing helicopter away from residential buildings, which saved dozens of civilians from death, did not use the means of rescue, fighting for the lives of passengers ... "
One very important conclusion follows from the "Investigation Act": few people knew about the task assigned to the crew of the helicopter with tail number 33. The crew itself received the task to deliver the General Staff commission from Grozny to Khankala 3.5 hours before departure. I repeat: dozens of helicopters fly over Grozny every day. During the hostilities over the city, not a single car was lost. But it was on September 17, and it was the very plane on which the generals and colonels of the General Staff flew that became the target. The fact that this is far from an accidental goal is evidenced by another fact recorded in the materials of the criminal case.
Crossfire to kill
The Mi-8 helicopter was fired at from two points from two MANPADS complexes *.
The report of the commander of the helicopter of the aviation of the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, Captain Semenov, unambiguously testifies that "Two strong trails of medium density bluish color, presumably from rockets, one of which ended in a ball of fire ..."
Detailed testimony was given by the police sergeant Chernikov and the senior police sergeant Cherepanov. They saw exactly how the helicopter was shot down with the General Staff commission, described in detail and precisely determined the place from which the rocket was launched. This is a building on Sapernaya Street, 750 meters from checkpoint No. 26, over which a helicopter carrying a General Staff commission actually flew. This is the most important point.
At checkpoint No. 26 there was also another witness of the attack on the helicopter - an officer of the St. Petersburg OMON, Sergei Oraev. Witness Oraev describes in great detail the launch of a rocket from ... a completely different place - from the side of the tram depot in Grozny, near the intersection of Sunzhenskaya and Stanichnaya Streets. But this is very far from checkpoint 26 and from the flight trajectory of the Mi-8. From the intersection of Sunzhenskaya and Stanichnaya, apparently, the very second rocket was fired, which, in the words of Captain Semyonov, “ended in a fireball,” or rather, self-destructed. In the table of the main characteristics of domestic MANPADS ( magazine "Soldier of Fortune", No. 11, 1999, p. 46) the maximum firing range of a missile fired from Igla MANPADS is indicated - 3300 meters. At the time of the missile launch, the Mi-8 helicopter was located more than three and a half kilometers from the tram fleet and the intersection of Sunzhenskaya and Stanichnaya streets. That is, outside the zone of destruction of this missile.
Witness Oraev testified that "while serving in the army, he was the senior gunner of MANPADS." And at the same time, the experienced MANPADS gunner Sergei Oraev DOES NOT SAY ANYTHING in his testimony that another missile was launched next to checkpoint No. 26, where he served. The one that reached the goal!
Life's worth of paper
Another equally important question: what happens at the crash site of the helicopter in the first minutes and hours?
Here is the testimony of the senior engineer-sapper Valery Solopov: “On September 17, I was at checkpoint No. 26.“ ... Additionally, I would like to inform you that when the helicopter fell, it was followed by a train of falling sheets of paper, which we later collected. The next day they gave<эти листы>in the VOVD ** of the Oktyabrsky district ".
This is an extremely interesting piece of evidence. There are other eyewitness accounts, from which the fact follows: when the helicopter was shot down, members of the General Staff commission began to throw documents overboard. They saved documents - the results of a two-week audit. Apparently, there was something very important in these papers. As a matter of fact, this is not even an assumption. This statement. Because the hunt for these documents immediately began.
Here is the testimony of Anatoly Chaikin, an employee of the Rostov City Department of Internal Affairs, Yaroslavl Region: “In September 2001< я>was on a business trip in Chechnya as the head of the criminal investigation department of the VOVD of the Oktyabrsky district of Grozny. For functional duties, he had to go to all the murders. 09/17/01 I went with the task force as a senior to the crash site of the Mi-8 helicopter.<…>Everything that was at the scene was folded into one place and recorded in the protocol, which was kept by the investigator. Along with the inspection, video filming was carried out, which was carried out by an expert. In my presence, the wreckage of a helicopter and documents were taken away. Some of the things and wreckage of the helicopter were taken by the colonel of the Armed Forces from Khankala, arguing that they are secret and are not subject to involvement in a criminal case ... "
And here is a request from Colonel Peshkhoev, First Deputy Head of the FSB Directorate for the Chechen Republic, addressed to Captain 1st Rank Maltsev (at that time - the acting head of the OU of the FSB of Russia for coordinating the counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus region).
“Dear Yuri Alexandrovich! ... From the testimony of the witnesses questioned in the case, it follows that after the helicopter crashed, ROSH *** servicemen arrived at the scene and collected and removed documents and items found at the scene of the helicopter crash. In addition, the foreman of militia ... Chernikov V.I. officers who arrived from Khankala seized a videotape recording the helicopter crash.
Based on the foregoing, I ask you to give instructions to your subordinate employees:
1. Send to our address documents and objects found at the scene of the helicopter crash, which have evidentiary value in the criminal case under investigation.
2. To establish the location of the video cassette for its subsequent attachment to the materials of the criminal case as material evidence.
3. Ensure that the ROSh servicemen, who were on September 17-18 at the site of the helicopter crash, appear at the investigative department of the FSB of Russia for the Chechen Republic for interrogation as witnesses ... "
Callsign "Typhoon"
And, finally, a mysterious report by police lieutenant Kirillov, an operative of the VOVD of the Oktyabrskiy ROVD in Grozny: “During the search operations, a woman, an FSB officer, was identified at the scene.<с документами прикрытия>major<а>militia ... which is stationed in N of the item. Khankala in the regional operational headquarters and has the call sign "Typhoon" and the name Tamara.
When talking<с ней>it was established that she was going to her cousin, who lives on the street. Parnikovoy, 1 ... I could not explain anything more, and did not give her personal data, explaining that she could give an explanation with the permission of her superiors ... "
The question arises: weren't too many nameless FSB officers from Khankala discovered by investigators of the Oktyabrskiy ROVD who arrived at the scene of the helicopter crash? In violation of the law, they collect and take away from the scene of the incident the documents thrown out by the dead officers of the General Staff from the burning helicopter. What interest did they have?
In the materials of the criminal case, only one "interested" appears in passing - a native of the military counterintelligence Yuri Maltsev, head of the special department of the FSB of Russia for coordinating the counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus region. In ROSH, he headed one of the key structures - the Operations Directorate, which was engaged in the development of all the main special operations carried out on the territory of Chechnya.
Soon after the death of the General Staff commission, Maltsev was formally withdrawn from the FSB, transferred to the post of deputy head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation and appointed head of the ROSH.
Here is his answer to the request of his colleague Peshkhoev, the deputy head of the FSB for Chechnya, whom Maltsev clearly ignores, writing directly to the head of the FSB for Chechnya, Sergei Babkin:
“In connection with your request, I answer that ... ROSH employees did not take part in the investigation of the causes of the disaster. All items seized from the helicopter crash site were sent to the prosecutor's office of the Chechen Republic. "
But in the materials of the investigation, the documents of the General Staff commission do not appear at all. It is also not reflected anywhere that any documents were transferred to the prosecutor's office. So why did the employees of ROSH "light up", hastily taking away valuable material evidence from the helicopter crash site?
To answer this question, it is worth recalling who exactly was checked by the General Staff commission. And she checked the regional operational headquarters.
A quick consequence
An important point. Despite the death of a high-ranking commission of the General Staff (two generals, seven colonels, one lieutenant colonel!), The criminal case is being investigated at a very low level - only by the Prosecutor's Office of Grozny. But just then, at the first (always the most important) stage of the investigation, the employees of the Grozny prosecutor's office, as the most disinterested persons, "dug up" all the important facts. It only remained to compare them. At this stage, the top realized it. And the case was transferred "under investigation" to the FSB for the Chechen Republic. Since that moment, almost no investigative action has been carried out. Four months later, on December 17, 2001, the investigation was suddenly suspended due to the impossibility of establishing the identity of the criminals.
And only in May 2002, the investigation into the death of the General Staff commission was again instituted under pressure from the prosecutor's office of Chechnya (the department for supervision of the FSB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs). Here is the wording: “The investigation of the case was conducted in violation of Art. 20 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR on a comprehensive, complete and objective study of all the circumstances of the committed act. "
However, this decision does not say anything about the fact that some interrogations and very important material evidence disappeared from the materials of the investigation. The main version is not questioned - that the helicopter with the General Staff commission was allegedly knocked out by a rocket from the side of the Grozny tram fleet. All references to the fact that there were two missiles and that a completely different missile hit the helicopter with the General Staff commission, the one that was shot from MANPADS near checkpoint No. 26, was removed from the case. It was this moment that was accidentally filmed by police sergeant Chernikov. The fact that such a cassette was and that it was confiscated from Chernikov by representatives of the ROSH is known only from a request from the deputy head of the FSB for Chechnya. There is no other mention of this cassette in the case. As, however, and most tapes.
... The second time, the investigation was closed even faster. A month later, on June 18, 2002, the case on the death of the General Staff commission was again suspended with a stunning wording: "Unidentified persons fired on a Mi-8 helicopter from an UNINSTALLED weapon ..."
By the wreckage of the side of a downed helicopter, by the smallest particles of a rocket projectile, which, as a rule, have special marks with numbers (nameplate), one can determine not only the type of weapon, but also to which party the anti-aircraft complex belonged, from which military unit it was " gone". The Ministry of Defense has a special expert institution that makes such examinations. The problem is that the investigators did not need any expertise. They were faced with a more difficult task - how to make a "hangman" out of a criminal case.
The resurrection of the "hanging"
One and a half years the case is in a frozen state. No attempts are made to identify "unidentified persons" who destroyed the General Staff commission. And suddenly in January 2003 in ORB-2 **** ( terrible place of torture. - EAT.) allegedly four Chechens confess and confess that they have committed many, many terrorist acts. Including knocked out on September 17, 2001, a helicopter with officers of the General Staff.
The investigation and the court were quick for reprisals. Three Chechens - Shamsudin Salavatov, Sultan Matsiev, Dokku Dzhantemirov - were sentenced to life imprisonment. The fourth, Viskhan Khabibulatov, received 13 years in a strict regime colony. But none of them fired at the helicopter with the General Staff commission. This is recorded in the case file in an anecdotal manner. First, under torture, they beat out testimony from Matsiev that it was he who knocked out the Mi-8 by firing from MANPADS from the roof of a three-storey building from the side of the tram park. All this procedurally formalized, went to the scene of the crime, checked the testimony on the spot, filled out the protocol, on which the attesting witnesses signed. And then a witness was discovered who identified Matsiev one hundred percent. At the time of the shelling of the helicopter, she was just pouring gasoline into his car on the other side of the city. They had to beat out new testimony from Matsiev that he himself did not shoot at the helicopter, but was in a gang, and the investigation was misled.
Real assassination attempt on virtual assassins
The history of the war in Chechnya is rich in crimes without punishment. But the tragedy with the General Staff commission is not just a high-profile crime. It was a challenge to the entire army system. Nevertheless, there were no statements that the investigation was taken under high control (as is often the case). This story has a monstrously primitive outcome: the destruction of the largest commission of the General Staff was "hanged" on the Chechens who came to hand. No one publicly objected. Even the relatives of the killed officers of the General Staff remained silent, although some of them closely followed the investigation and participated in the trials.
Only the defendants resisted. Their lawyers did a great job for the investigators and asked the right questions. In this loud and mysterious case, there is nothing definite, only questions that in themselves clarify a lot. Namely: who had a motive to eliminate the commission, who had the necessary information and means (in the literal sense of the word - MANPADS complexes), who was seen hiding evidence. The answer is actually clear and concise. Khankala. But Khankala is not a homogeneous concept at all, and someone, apparently, did not need the truth. The chance to fight arose after the RF Supreme Court canceled the life sentence to the Chechens and returned the case to the court for a new trial. The Supreme Court suddenly broke the whole scheme and "saw" a really huge number of procedural violations and just factual inconsistencies in the Ichkeria Air Defense case. But at this stage, the Chechens Salavatov, Dzhantemirov, Matsiev and Khabibulatov, in fact, stopped fighting. Although for the first time they had chances of at least getting the sentence commuted.
At the second trial, the defendants abandoned their lawyers, who achieved the cancellation of the verdict in the Supreme Court. They hired other defenders, among whom lawyer Murad Musayev played the main role.
Musaev became famous at the trial of the murder of Anna Politkovskaya. But even before that, he was a well-known lawyer, persistent, tenacious. But where did it all go? Perhaps Murad Musaev decided not to aggravate the already unenviable position of his clients when the threat to their lives became apparent. After the car was blown up, in which the defendants were transported from the detention center in Grozny to the building of the Supreme Court of Chechnya. Three guards then died, the defendants were wounded and concussed. But after that, the process went smoothly. Soon the cruel sentence was repeated again. This summer, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation approved it.
Help "New"
The General Staff Commission became the third commission from Moscow, which they tried to destroy in Chechnya. In 2000, in one of the northern regions of Chechnya, where active hostilities had never been fought, a helicopter was shot down on which Anatoly Kvashnin, the chief of the General Staff of the Defense Ministry, was flying (he came to Chechnya to inspect the troops). True, the helicopter was fired upon after Kvashnin and his entourage left the plane. There were no casualties, but the car itself was completely burned down. In the spring of 2001, on the border of Ingushetia and Chechnya, a helicopter of the North Caucasus regional department of the Federal Border Guard Service of Russia was shot down. On board was a parliamentary commission that finished its work in Chechnya. The commander of the crew, Lieutenant Colonel Leonid Konstantinov, was wounded in the chest and neck and managed to land the helicopter. He died himself. The members of the commission were not injured, only the deputy Alexei Arbatov was cut with shrapnel in his legs.
According to the newspaper "Komsomolskaya Pravda", after the death of the General Staff commission in the fall of 2001, flight safety rules were revised: high-ranking military officials were forbidden to fly in one helicopter. However, in January 2002, an Mi-8 helicopter with a commission of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was shot down in the Shelkovsky district of Chechnya. 14 people were killed, including Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, Head of the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Southern Federal District, Lieutenant General Mikhail Rudchenko and Deputy Commander of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, Commander of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Chechnya, Major General Nikolai Goridov. At the same time, the route Mozdok - Khankala - Mozdok, passing over the village of Shelkovskaya, was considered the most "well-trodden" and safest for military helicopters.
* MANPADS - a portable anti-aircraft missile system.
** VOVD - Temporary Department of the Interior.
*** ROSH - Regional Operational Headquarters.
**** ORB - Operational Investigation Bureau.
From the description of the battle: "On December 24, 1994, the 129th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 133rd Guards Separate Tank Battalion were ordered to move from the area of the Mozdok station to the suburban area of Grozny, a settlement (airfield) of Khankala. The strike group consisted of the 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion 129th motorized rifle regiment (commander Major Yu. [Yuri Grigorievich] Saulyak on an armored personnel carrier-70 with the emblem of the peacekeeping forces - a blue circle with yellow letters MS in it) and the 1st tank company of the 133rd guards separate tank battalion of captain S. Kachkovsky on T-80BV<...>... Having made a march Mozdok-Khankala, the 1st motorized rifle battalion and the 1st tank company, destroying two cars with militants, immediately occupied the settlement of Khankala, reaching the outskirts of Grozny. Having taken up the defensive position, the 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 129th Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 1st Tank Company of the 133rd Guards Separate Tank Battalion, three hours later received an order to retreat east of the village and take up defenses at the 1.5 km line from Khankala in order to block the road Grozny-Argun. "1
From the description of the battle: “On the night of December 26, 1994, the militants launched an attack with forces up to a platoon along the Grozny-Gudermes railway embankment to guard the 1st motorized rifle battalion of the 129th motorized rifle regiment. Lieutenant D. [Dmitry Anatolyevich] Komirenko was killed and three soldiers were wounded.As a result of massive fire from tanks and armored personnel carriers, up to six militants were destroyed (two corpses remained in the trenches, the rest were taken with them during the retreat). from Grozny tanks, ZSU and cars in the direction of Khankala, where the militants carried out the engineering equipment of the positions.
On December 26, 1994, at about 12:00, the main forces of the regiment and tank battalion, which had left Mozdok, approached the concentration area of the 1st motorized rifle battalion of the 129th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 1st Tank Company of the 133rd Guards Separate Tank Battalion. A fire broke out in one of the tanks of the 2nd tank company (commanded by Lieutenant S. Kisel) during an overnight stay and collecting lagging equipment near the settlement of Tolstoy-Yurt. "2
On the night of December 26-27, a group of 173 ooSpN worked in the direction of Khankala with the support of the Gsadn 129 MSR. As a result of reconnaissance, BM-21 Grad, ZU and BTR were found.3
From the description of the battle: “On December 27, 1994, preparations began in the units of the 129th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 133rd Guards Separate Tank Battalion to destroy the militants and take control of the settlement of Khankala and the airfield. a motorized rifle regiment wounded two soldiers and mortally - a warrant officer. One of the T-80BV tanks of the 2nd tank company, after being stuck in the ground with a barrel, fired a shot, and the barrel was torn off by an injector. The tank immediately received the nickname "Bulldog" and was transferred to a repair platoon and used like a tractor. "4
Defense in N. of the item Khankala was occupied by the battalion of Umalt Dashaev (died on 28.12.1994).
From the description of the battle: "On December 28, 1994 at 11:30 am, the forces of the 129th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 133rd Guards Separate Tank Battalion began the assault on Khankala. Support for the attack by Mi-24 helicopters was denied. 24 nevertheless appeared and made several approaches.The 1st motorized rifle battalion of the 129th motorized rifle regiment, together with the 1st tank company of the 133rd separate tank battalion, moving on the left along the Argun-Grozny road, were to capture the air town.
On the right, along the Gudermes-Grozny railway, in order to seize the railway station, the 2nd motorized rifle battalion of the 129th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment (commander Major S. Goncharuk) was advancing, the 2nd and 3rd tank companies of the 133rd Guards Separate Tank Battalion advanced on the airfield to the airplane town.
After turning into a line, the advance in battle formations began in the direction of Khankala. Each motorized rifle company was assigned a tank platoon. The first loss of the 133rd Guards Separate Tank Battalion was the T-80BV tank (board number 521), which after a dashing turn fell from a height of 15 meters into the quarry. Having stuck the gun barrel into the ground up to the driver's hatch, the vehicle turned out to be helpless; while trying to evacuate from the tank, the gunner-operator Private Y. Sidorenko died under fire, the tank commander Private I. Knyazhev and the driver-mechanic Private A. Inzhievsky received shrapnel wounds. The battle unfolded on a parallel course. A 12.7-mm NSVT machine gun and two enemy grenade launchers hit through the quarry from a distance of 400 meters, and a T-72A came out along the edge, at the same time automatic fire was opened, pressing the motorized riflemen to the ground.
Taking advantage of the confusion of the attackers, the militants concentrated the fire of the RPG and five T-72 tanks and one T-62 at the armored vehicles and KShM of the artillery battery commander. As a result of a direct hit of a shell from a T-72A tank into the KShM, Captain Basmanov and the driver were killed. A T-80BV tank (board # 517) was hit in the transmission at an intersection behind the quarry. With return fire, the commander of the 1st tank company, Captain S. Kachkovsky T-80BV (board number 510), despite three RPG hits in the turret and hull, knocked out one T-72 tank and provided fire cover for the retreating motorized riflemen from the Grozny-Argun intersection ... It was not possible to evacuate the tank (board number 517) under fire; it was necessary to destroy it when retreating. During the subsequent counterattack of the militants with the participation of two T-72A tanks, one tank of the militants was hit by fire from the T-80BV tanks of the 1st tank company of the 133rd Guards Separate Tank Battalion.
During the attack of the 2nd tank company on the runway of the Khankala airfield, the T-80BV (board number 536), having received a hit from an ATGM on the left side between the rollers, caught fire. The driver-mechanic, Private A. Shmatko, and the gunner-operator, Private S. Dulov, who were seriously wounded, managed to leave the burning tank under fire. After a short time, the ammunition detonated, taking the life of the tank commander, junior sergeant E. Gorbunov. The T-80B tank of the commander of the 3rd tank company, Lieutenant D. Zevakin, was hit in the frontal sheet in the area of the right tow hook from an RPG, fortunately for the crew, the cumulative jet, slipping through the armor, did not pierce it.
As a result of a fleeting battle, the garden areas and the airfield of the airfield were taken under the control of the 129th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 133rd Guards Separate Tank Battalion. The 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 129th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 1st Tank Company of the 133rd Guards Separate Tank Battalion were deployed along the line along the Argun-Grozny road, the 2nd Tank Company - between the road and the airfield in the garden area, 3 -I tank company - in caponiers on the airfield in front of the air town.
An airplane town with several five-story buildings remained under the control of the militants.
The losses of the 129th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment were: seven people were killed and about 13 wounded, the artillery battery commander's KShM burned down, and two BTR-70s were damaged.
Five people from the 133rd Guards Separate Tank Battalion were injured, two were killed. The 133rd Guards Separate Tank Battalion irrevocably lost four tanks (boards No. 517 and 521 from the 1st tank company and boards No. 532 and 536 from the 2nd tank company), the tank that fell into the quarry was evacuated and repaired a week later. " .5
According to official data, by December 29, the militants had captured "6 tanks, 6 guns and one armored personnel carrier" 6.
Nomination of 98 Guards. airborne
On the night of December 28-29, part of the consolidated PDB 98 airborne division went out to strengthen the eastern grouping. When performing the Mozdok-Khankala march near the settlement Petropavlovskaya, a car was blown up. 8
From the description of the explosion: "The artillery control vehicle" Rheostat ", on which Lieutenant Ptitsyn was located, drove off the track in the dark and hit a land mine like a caterpillar. The explosion threw the officer out of the car through the open landing hatch. Alexander Kozlov dragged him away from the burning “armor.” Despite the painful shock - his skull bones were broken, while they were providing first aid, Ptitsyn was conscious, even managed to understand that the cost of the driver's mistake was four wounded and two killed. "9
Warrant officer Anatoly Borisovich Smirnov and private Ivan Vitalievich Morozov were killed during the explosion. 10
From the description of the battle: "On December 29, 1994, at the location of the 129th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 133rd Guards Separate Tank Battalion, work was underway to equip personnel at the locations of units, equipment was repaired by the crews and a platoon of material support, replenished ammunition, refueled fuel. "11
Senior lieutenant of one of the intelligence units of the 98th Airborne Division (or 45th Special Forces of the Airborne Forces): "On December 29, 1994, the Eastern group consisted of two defense rings and a headquarters in the center. Tanks, other heavy equipment, and artillery approached.<...>On the night of December 30, we were again assigned an unusual task - to hold the right flank. A self-propelled anti-aircraft gun and a BMD-2 from the airborne battalion were attached to my group on one armored vehicle. When the management sets a task, it is not customary to ask again. Get the problem, but how to solve it - your problems. Before the assault on Khankala, with three units of equipment and personnel, I moved to the right flank and, like a gambler, rocking an anti-aircraft gun, BMD-2 and my armored vehicle, still somehow put them out. Even on the move, I realized what an anti-aircraft gun is: how it shoots, what is its radius. I chose a place for her. We buried the BMD-2, installed the armored vehicle. The right flank, as my deputy and I thought, we closed, providing security for possible dangerous directions. "12
Senior lieutenant of one of the reconnaissance units of the 98th Airborne Division (or 45th Special Forces of the Airborne Forces): "On December 30, our unit bypassed the taken part of Khankala, the airfield and already as part of the group stopped in front of the military town, which was close to the bridge connecting with the outskirts of Grozny."
List of victims (incomplete)
1.Commander of the 1st RV 129 MSR Lieutenant Dmitry Anatolyevich Komirenko (26.12.)
2. warrant officer 129 MRP (27.12., Mortar shelling)
3. gunner-operator of tank No. 521, private Yuri Alexandrovich Sidorenko (28.12.)
4.the commander of the tank No. 536 junior sergeant Evgeny Yurievich Gorbunov (28.12.)
5.captain from the tank unit 129 mr Oleg Viktorovich Basmanov (28.12.)
6. a driver crank sore (28.12)
7.jr. sergeant 129 MSR Alexander Valerievich Noskov (28.12., Disappeared without a trace)
8. Ensign 217 of the PDP Anatoly Borisovich Smirnov (29.12.)
9.Private 217 PDP Ivan Vitalievich Morozov (29.12.)
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2 Belogrud V. Tanks in the battles for Grozny. Part 1 // Front-line illustration. 2007. No. 9. S. 20-22.
3 Nedobezhkin V. War or playing with soldiers? // Kozlov S. et al. Special Forces of the GRU. M., 2002.S. 330-331.
4 Belogrud V. tanks in the battle for Grozny. Part 1 // Front-line illustration. 2007. No. 9. P. 22.
5 Belogrud V. tanks in the battle for Grozny. Part 1 // Front-line illustration. 2007. No. 9. S. 23-25.
6 The era of Yeltsin. M., 2001.S. 628.
7 Criminal mode. Chechnya, 1991-95 M., 1995.S. 70.
8 Rashchepkin K. And we are with you, brother, from the landing // Red Star. 2004.18 June. (
