"I would have solved everything there in two hours with one parachute regiment."Former Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev on how Grozny should have been taken
The storming of Grozny is a painful scar on the history of Russia. An event that cannot be forgotten and which one does not want to talk about. It is a shame in front of those who died in hell while the whole country was having fun, celebrating the New Year. The storming of Grozny is indignation against politicians and military leaders who threw untrained young guys to death. The storming of Grozny is the history of Russia, which should be remembered in order to never again make such monstrous and criminal mistakes.
Relations between Chechnya and the rest of Russia have historically been difficult. In the 20th century, Stalin added oil to an already flammable situation, who deported the Chechen people to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Later, the Chechens were allowed to return to their homeland, but the sediment remained. When the USSR began to fall apart, Chechnya tried to secede, but Moscow did not give Chechnya such a right. Nobody in the world has recognized Chechnya as an independent state. However, in fact, since 1992, Chechnya has only formally depended on Moscow. State power in Chechnya was also formal. The country was ruled by bandit clans that did business on hostage-taking, drug trafficking, slave trade, oil theft. Ethnic cleansing with the murder of non-Chechens took place on the territory of Chechnya. Back in 1991, all military units were looted, and the weapons were distributed among the bandits.
Photo: RIA Novosti
Until 1994, Chechnya's relations with Moscow were complex, but mutually beneficial. But by the end of the year, something went wrong, and on November 30, 1994, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree "On measures to restore constitutionality and law and order on the territory of the Chechen Republic"... In early December, Russian air strikes destroyed all aircraft at Chechen airfields. On December 11, 1994, the first ground groups entered the territory of Chechnya. The main goal was the capture of Grozny, where the main forces of the separatists were located.
“According to estimates, in order to successfully storm Grozny, the military had to be at least 60 thousand people. Some commanders understood this, tried to prevent the assault. Alexei Kirilin, platoon commander of the communications battalion of the 131st brigade, recalls:“ Kulikovsky built our platoon and said that will ask the Minister of Defense for at least a month to prepare the assault. "What Grachev said is unknown. But the very next morning, Kulikovsky gave the order to move towards the city."The decision to storm Grozny was made on December 26, 1994 at the Security Council of the Russian Federation. It was assumed that 4 groups of federal troops would enter the city from four directions: "North" (under the command of Major General K. Pulikovsky), "North-East" (under the command of Lieutenant General L. Rokhlin), "West" (under the command of Major General V. Petruk), "Vostok" (under the command of Major General N. Staskov). It was planned to enter the city and capture the Presidential Palace, the railway station, government buildings and other important objects in the city center. It was assumed that, among other things, due to the surprise of the assault, Dudaev's group in the center of the city would be surrounded and neutralized. Minimal combat clashes and losses were expected.
The grouping of federal troops included more than 15,000 soldiers, about 200 tanks, more than 500 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, about 200 guns and mortars. There were 3,500 soldiers and 50 tanks in reserve.
Up to 10,000 militants opposed federal troops. The Chechens and mercenaries were armed with tanks, artillery, anti-tank systems, and anti-aircraft missiles. But, despite the presence of quite serious weapons, the main advantage of the militants was their excellent knowledge of the city and high mobility. There were perfectly trained grenade launchers and snipers.
“My company was the first to leave the battalion. 4 !!! reserved seats were allocated for a company of 32 people. 20 PKT and NSVT machine guns, small arms, boxes with small arms ammunition (23,000 rounds, 100 F-1 grenades, 10 AKSU-74, a box with pistols, signal flares, smoke) We were exhausted to the limit, therefore, when the command came from the commander of the 1st MRB (to whom we were assigned), Perepelkin's sub-unit, to allocate personnel for loading shields from the tent of the command post The 90 TD did not wake the fighters, the officers of my company, led by me, loaded them in. On December 15, in the morning, the train set off to restore the constitutional order to Chechnya.Most of all, I was depressed by the poor training of personnel, but in the infantry it was even worse, infantry fighting vehicles were staffed only by crews, but how to fight in a city without infantry? There were many questions: including about the absence of explosive plates in the KDZ boxes (explosive reactive armor boxes). There were also such bosses who answered me, why do you need plates in the KDZ, on a tank, and so 45 tons of armor (criminal negligence or perhaps Russian). The explosive plates were brought in late at night, before the march to Grozny, but we never received them.
During refueling, a reserve lieutenant colonel (leaving Grozny) approached us and said that a T-80 tank with ammunition had burned down 15 km away from us. If I'm not mistaken, the Leningradsky tank. The reason, according to him, is that the fire occurred due to the removed ceramic filter from the heating system of the tank. "
Memories of Igor Vechkanov "New Year's Carousel" (Storming Grozny)
Why the date of December 31 was chosen for the assault, there is no official explanation. Apparently, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev wanted to make, on the one hand, an unpleasant New Year's surprise for the Chechens, and on the other, a birthday present (January 1) to himself.
“The task was set - by the holiday, by the New Year, to seize and solve the problem with the Chechen Republic. That is, to seize the Presidential Palace. palace, will receive the title "Hero of Russia." This encouraged the commanders, but divided the team spirit - everyone dreamed of a rank. Now Grachev had no doubts about the success of the operation. "“When approaching the bridge, they began to shoot us from large-caliber machine guns, sniper fighters were clearly working. two armored vehicles, a tank and a kosheemka (command and control vehicle) were blown up. There was a complete mess in communication. For the most part no one could imagine who was talking to whom. The landing company, closing the column, did not pass. They cut off and shot - everyone. How then they said that the Chechens and mercenaries finished off the wounded paratroopers with shots in the head, and our column did not even know about it. Only a warrant officer and a soldier survived ...We entered Grozny and immediately came under heavy fire - from almost all places, from all high-rise buildings, from all fortifications. As soon as we entered the city, the column slowed down. During this hour, we knocked out five tanks, six armored personnel carriers. The Chechens had a buried - one tower visible - a T-72 tank, which destroyed the entire vanguard of the column. The column was snaking through the city, leaving the militants in its rear, destroying only what was destroyed. It was here, starting to suffer significant losses, that the Eastern group rushed under the dense fire of the militants. Only one thing sounded on our air: "Two-hundredth, two-hundredth, two-hundredth" ... You pass by the armored personnel carriers of motorized riflemen, and there are only corpses on them and inside. All killed ...
We again left Grozny in a column. We walked like a snake. I do not know where, what the command was. Nobody set tasks. We were just circling around Grozny. We came out on January 1st. There was some kind of chaotic gathering of desperate people. "
From an essay by military reporter Vitaly Noskov
Photo: RIA NovostiThe station building was poorly adapted for defense. On the night of 31st to 1st, around midnight, it was decided to leave the station and leave Grozny. The wounded Colonel Savin and 80 soldiers of the Maykop brigade tried to break out of the encirclement on several infantry fighting vehicles. At one o'clock in the morning, contact with them was lost. Almost all the personnel of this group were destroyed. While trying to unblock the 131st Brigade and the 81st Regiment, other units suffered heavy losses.
“There was still no information about the 81st regiment and the 131st brigade. And soon a company of the 81st regiment broke through to the 8th corps. , suppressed, having lost their commanders, the fighters looked terrible. Only 200 paratroopers, who were transferred to the regiment at the last moment, escaped a sad fate. They simply did not have time to catch up with the regiment and join it. Replenishment was supposed to take on the march ...It was night, - says Rokhlin, - the situation remained incomprehensible. Complete confusion in management. When they learned about the situation of the 131st brigade, my reconnaissance battalion tried to break through to it, but lost a lot of people. The railway station, where the brigade's units took up defensive positions, was about two kilometers, crammed with militants.
Antipov A. V. "Lev Rokhlin: The Life and Death of a General"
“The first vehicle had a brigade commander, the wounded were in the landing, and all the infantry who could walk, all sat on the armor. The Czechs took us with their bare hands, as they say. Of the entire BMP, only I and one lieutenant colonel from Krasnodar from the headquarters of the 58th Army (on May 27, 1995, Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Ivanovich Zryadny was shot in the village of Kharsenoy on the orders of Ruslan Gelayev) survived. The rest were finished off. "Astashkin N. "Chechnya: the feat of a soldier"
During the New Year's assault, only the "North" grouping lost about 50 tanks, 150 infantry fighting vehicles, 7 "Tungusoks". Out of 446 soldiers of the 131st Maykop brigade who entered the city, more than 150 people were killed. Of the 426 soldiers of the 81st motorized rifle regiment, more than 130 were killed. The exact numbers of casualties during New Year's Eve are unknown. Including because January 1 was followed by several more weeks of fighting for Grozny. The entire city was taken only in March 1995. The number of Russian servicemen who died on New Year's Eve alone is estimated at a thousand people.
"The defeat was complete. The command was in shock."General Lev Rokhlin
Photo: Kommersant“For a long time, our own people beat us. In general, in this war, shooting at friendly people because of the confusion and inconsistency has become so commonplace that you are no longer surprised. Commanders say that every second person killed in this war is killed by his own ...The battalion with which we are experiencing the fire is going to reinforce the regiment, which is pouring fire on us now. While the battalion commander establishes a "sound connection" with the regiment (that is, he yells that we are our own). Finally, everything becomes clear and the battalion runs into the ruins occupied by a rifle regiment.
Battalion - loudly said. A little more than one and a half hundred people remained from him in two weeks of fighting. The battalion lost thirty people in killed alone. But it still counts as "nothing". Even fewer remained of those who were driven to Grozny on New Year's Eve.
From the motorized rifle regiment, which arrived from Samara, there were only a few officers and a little more than a dozen soldiers. On the ninth day, Captain Yevgeny Surnin came out to the location of our troops and with him six soldiers - all that was left of the rifle battalion.
From a tank company on Ordzhonikidze Street, only two privates survived - Muscovite Andrei Vinogradov and Igor Kulikov from Lobnya.
It was a crime and madness to drive into a city filled with militants and weapons of a column of troops.
For two days of New Year's battles, we suffered enormous losses - more than a thousand killed and missing.
Even the airborne troops - the elite of the army - were the only truly combat-ready units in this war, in the three weeks of fighting before the New Year, twenty-six people were killed, and in two days on January 1–2 more than eighty.
One can talk endlessly about the tragedy of the infantry.
Units of the Marine Corps were hastily replenished before the sailors left the ships. They were not even given a week to prepare. The battalions were thrown into battle despite the fact that almost every fourth sailor picked up a machine gun three days ago ...
The combined regiment of the Transcaucasian district arrived at the corps headquarters near the city hospital. A company commander of one of the battalions asked ingenuously: "Where can you shoot weapons here, everything new from the warehouses, not shot?"
A few hours later, this battalion was already put into action ...
In general, the word "consolidated" is the most common word in the grouping. It masks the degree of collapse to which the troops have reached. Consolidated means typed from "pine forest". There are no full-fledged units and formations left in the Russian army, and therefore everything that can be collected is hastily collected for the war.
A consolidated regiment is assembled from the division. And even in consolidated form, this regiment is barely manned by sixty percent ...
Almost two weeks after the first assault, the units corrected the mistakes and miscalculations of the generals. In these bloody battles, the losses of the Russian troops reached forty people killed per day ... "
There are many reasons for the defeat of the federal forces during the New Year assault. As usual, there was no normal intelligence. The command had no idea what they would have to face in the city. There was no clear plan of action. The tasks were set in the course of promotion and were constantly changing. The commanders in charge of the troops from Mozdok had a poor idea of the situation. The command constantly urged on, demanding to go forward. The divisions acted inconsistently. The attacking groups had no idea where the other units of the federal forces were. There were many episodes of friendly fire. There were cases of attacks on their own Russian aircraft. The state of technology was bad. The electronic systems of many machines did not work. The personnel were very poorly trained. There were no normal maps of the city. The units were poorly oriented on the terrain. With the beginning of the fighting, confusion began on the air. Due to the lack of a secure connection, militants constantly intervened on the air and introduced additional confusion. There were many commanders from among the graduates of civilian universities. More than half of the rank and file consisted of soldiers who only came from training units.
“The Chechens opened fire on my tank with cannons. The stabilizer, the MZ (loading mechanism) failed, the R-173P receiver flew off, damaging the pallet catcher. It was necessary to urgently change the firing position. But after another hit in the tank, it stalled.Having started the tank with the help of "snot" (external launch wires), put the pillers in place, got out of the control compartment, explaining to the mechanic Sasha Averyanov how to operate the tank in case of this malfunction. The crew of tank N189 was covering us at the moment. Having taken the place of the commander, he got in touch with the mechanic, but did not have time to drive off. Another shot from the PTS hit the upper boxes of the ERA in front of the mechanic's TNPO viewing devices. The tank stalled, smoke went up in the fighting compartment, a flame appeared. After waiting for the Chechen machine gunners to process the open hatches, they left the fighting compartment.
Having opened the hatch of the mechanic with the tank commander, they saw that we could not help Sasha Averyanov. The cumulative jet, having turned the empty KDZ, passed through the mines of the TNPO, hitting the mechanic's head.
If there was a 4S20 product in the KDZ, everything would be different. Why did the tanks go to the city with empty CDZs? The answer is simple - maybe Russian and the fear of the command to argue with the top leadership, as well as betrayal, which was all too often. The senior mechanic-driver of the company Sergeant Alexander Averyanov is a blessed memory of him. A classy specialist, a mechanic from God, who repeatedly saved a tank and a crew from enemy vehicle fire. "
Memories of Igor Vechkanov "New Year's Carousel" (Storming Grozny)
Photo: RIA NovostiIn early January, the command of the actions of the Russian armed forces in Grozny passed to Lev Rokhlin, who from the very beginning entered the city not in columns, as in a parade, but advanced, methodically destroying the enemy with the support of artillery and multiple launch rocket systems. It was thanks to artillery and the transition to classic street fighting schemes that the city was eventually taken. By the second half of January, the troops, at the cost of their own blood, had learned how to fight in the city. The Chechen war was just beginning ...
The events of the New Year's storming of Grozny are impressively described in the films "60 hours of the Maykop brigade", "Cursed and Forgotten", "Undeclared War". The atmosphere of events is well shown in the film by Alexander Nevzorov "Purgatory".
A quarter of a century later, the events of New Year's hell begin to dissolve in the fog of memory. The 90s are over. People no longer really understand why to spoil their mood, remembering the soldiers who died in battles while the rest of the country was eating salads and watching TV. But try for a few seconds to remember the young guys who disappeared into the hell of the night because of the stupidity of the country's leadership and the army command. In Russia there is such a tradition - between wars to praise their feats of arms and military prowess. And when the next war comes - to re-learn to fight at the cost of your own blood. And only the memory of such events as the New Year's storming of Grozny will one day teach not to get involved in such a massacre.
Happy New Year alive. Memory of the dead.
The post was prepared by Alex Kulmanov
On the morning of December 11, by order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Russian troops crossed the official border of Chechnya and moved in three directions towards Grozny. This is how the operation to restore constitutional order in Chechnya began.
Preparing for the assault
On December 12, 1994, the holiday of the Constitution of the Russian Federation was celebrated, and on this day it was announced that the war had begun. A hasty transfer of troops to Mozdok, a town in North Ossetia-Alania, began. Confusion, carelessness, and vanity - this is how one could characterize the regrouping of troops. Every half hour, one plane after another landed, and a re-formation was going on right on the runway. The regiments are divided into marching battalions and companies. The hurriedly assembled parts had one question - what to do next? The task was unclear. With whom and how to fight?
Oleg Dyachenko, commander of the 1st paratrooper company, recalls that due to uncertainty, there was no unity in his unit. Some of the soldiers refused to storm Grozny, others agreed. But in the end, those who resisted also flew. Everyone secretly hoped that everything would be okay, and this was just an "act of intimidation." Gathered as for regular maneuvers. There was another problem, a psychological one. Russian troops were greeted with placards "hands off Chechnya!" Pyotr Ivanov, a senior officer of the Airborne Forces, notes that for the Russian soldier the enemy was always abroad, in the event of the Chechen operation, their own sharply became strangers. Therefore, it was difficult to make the decision to open fire on the settlement, knowing that there were civilians there. Defense Minister Pavel Grachev promised that the assault on Grozny would take no more than two hours. But only two weeks later, with battles and losses, Russian troops reached the borders of Grozny. Intelligence showed that the road to Grozny would be the road to hell. Two people, one of whom was a journalist, filmed the entire route to Grozny, which showed the location of the Dudayevites' checkpoints, the approximate number of weapons. Intelligence showed that the militants were waiting for Russian troops and preparing for battle. But subsequent orders and actions of the command showed that the information "did not reach them." A few days before the assault, the Defense Minister negotiated with General Dudayev, which led to nothing. But Pavel Grachev naively believed that Dudayev would throw out the white flag. The Dudayevites did not even think to give up, they were well prepared. In Grozny, they were preparing for defense, organized three lines of defense. [С-BLOCK] The first is around the Presidential Palace, the second is with a radius of one kilometer around the first line, and the third, with a radius of 5 kilometers. The outer border was built on the outskirts. According to intelligence, there were up to 10 thousand people from Dudayev. Weapons include heavy armored vehicles, artillery and mortars. What forced Pavel Grachev to conduct an unprepared assault? First, he gave the order to postpone the date of the assault on the Chechen capital. I got on a plane and almost flew to Moscow. "Almost" - because he left the cabin before takeoff and stayed in Mozdok. Gathered all the commanders of the groupings. Lieutenant Colonel Valery Yarko recalls: “the task was set - by the holiday, by the New Year, to seize and solve the problem with the Chechen Republic. That is, to seize the Presidential Palace. Flags were issued and on December 31 the commanders were delivered to their combat positions. " Grachev promised - which of the generals will be the first to hoist the flag over the Presidential Palace, will receive the title "Hero of Russia". This cheered the commanders, but divided the team spirit - everyone dreamed of a rank. Now Grachev had no doubts about the success of the operation. Four offensive groups were identified: "North" under the command of K. Pulikovsky, "North-East" under the command of L. Rokhlin, "West" under the command of V. Petruk, and the east under the command of N. Staskov. The number of attackers is a little more than 15 thousand people. Equipment: 200 tanks, 500 APCs and armored personnel carriers, 200 guns and mortars. It was planned to complete the operation within a few days. But according to estimates, in order to successfully storm Grozny, the military had to be at least 60 thousand people. Some commanders understood this and tried to prevent the assault. Alexei Kirilin, platoon commander of the communications battalion of the 131st brigade, recalls: "Kulikovsky built our platoon and said that he would ask the Minister of Defense for at least a month to prepare the assault." What Grachev said is unknown. But the very next morning Kulikovsky gave the order to move towards the city.
How the operation began
Tanks and infantry fighting vehicles of the "North" group entered Grozny. 2 battalions of the 131st Maykop brigade moved along the Staropromyslovsky highway. The 81st Samara Motorized Rifle Regiment was moving in parallel. The commander of the 131st brigade, Savin, was instructed to gain a foothold at the intersection of ul. Mayakovsky and Staropromyslovsky highways and ensure the approach of the rest of the group. Ignorance of the city, lack of modern detailed maps played a fatal role. Meeting no resistance, the Maikop brigade slipped through the required turn. The brigade commander Savin realized his mistake when the presidential palace appeared, and the headquarters rejoiced at the quick capture of the city. The brigade received a new order - to occupy the railway station in the city center. There was a battalion of the 81st Samara regiment. Without firing shots, the Maikop brigade reached the station and stopped.
Grozny railway station. The tragedy of the Maikop brigade
The Maikop brigade was surrounded by 2 militants' defense rings. Brigade Commander Savin realized late that the brigade was not protected from the flanks, and the Chechen mousetrap could slam shut at any moment. Other parts of the troops got bogged down in battles on the outskirts of Grozny. The battle of the 131st Maykop brigade lasted all night, and all this time brigade commander Savin asked for help to break out of the ring of militants. By morning, he realized that help would not come, loaded the wounded and killed on 2 infantry fighting vehicles and went to the breakthrough. Savin commanded the brigade until he was shot. The rest of the 131st Brigade continued to wait for help and fired back from the militants. At night, a column was formed from the reserve of the 131st brigade, but it could not break through to its own - the militants met them with a storm of fire. The 131st brigade and the 81st regiment will fight in encirclement for another week. Of the 26 tanks that entered Grozny, 20 were burned. Out of 120 BMP vehicles, 18 left the city. In the first minutes of the battle, 6 anti-aircraft complexes were destroyed - everything that had been prepared. The bodies of the deceased 131st brigade were collected for more than a month. The body of the brigade commander Savin was found only in March 1995.
Secrets of the tragic assault of '95
According to Vasily Krisanov, the head of the RAV of the 131st brigade, for a long time they determined from the brigade's lists who went to storm Grozny. This means that the individual company and battery commanders did not have time to count the people, to compile surname lists of those who were in which vehicle. Who will be responsible for the death of the Maikop brigade? They decided to blame the deceased brigade commander Savin, and this information was picked up by the Russian media. General Rokhlin says: “The rout was complete. The command was shocked. " The main concern of the command was the search for those to blame for the tragedy. Rokhlin has not received a single order since that moment. The main reasons for the failure of the New Year's storms were the lack of a clear plan and a set task. The incoherence of hostilities due to the competition for the title of "Hero of Russia" among the commanders. In addition, they did not take into account the poor material security and poor training of personnel. General Gennady Torshev gave his assessment of the operation: “According to some generals, the 'festive' assault was organized for Grachev's birthday. This information is unconfirmed, but the fact that the assault was prepared in a hurry, without realizing the situation is a fact. We didn’t even have time to come up with a name for the operation. ”The technical equipment was unreliable. Of the five hundred infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 36 were faulty. Of the 18 howitzers, 12 were faulty, and only 4 of the 18 self-propelled guns were suitable for combat. On the morning of January 1, the 693rd motorized rifle regiment from the "West" grouping tried to break through to the aid of the Maykopites. But the paratroopers were met with hurricane fire in the area of the Andreevskaya Valley. Not having passed even five hundred meters, they retreated and established themselves on the southern outskirts of the city. Although they broke through to the Central Market, they were stopped by the militants. Under the onslaught, the regiment began to withdraw, and by 18 o'clock it was surrounded near the Lenin Park. Communication with the regiment was lost. Like the Maykopites, they had to break out of the encirclement, they suffered heavy losses. They learned about the tragedy the next day, and this time Major General Petruk was found guilty. He was accused of the death of units, and removed from command. Major General Ivan Babichev took his place.
For one New Year's Eve, more than 70 soldiers and officers were taken prisoner by the Dudayevites. Valery Mychko, captain of the 81st Samara regiment, recalls: “The Chechens pulled me out of the burning car. Then, half-forgotten, I answered their questions, later I lost consciousness. I woke up from a blow to the chest - it turns out that the Chechens provided first aid. A Chechen lying next to me was already raising a knife over me. They mocked the prisoners, gouged out their eyes, cut off their ears. For intimidation, the militants handed over such prisoners to the Russian side.
Capture of the Presidential Palace, Operation Retribution
Following in the footsteps of the 131st brigade, the 276th Ural motorized rifle regiment from the North-East grouping was sent to Grozny. The regiment entered the parallel streets of Lermontov and Pervomayskaya street. The Urals people left checkpoints at every crossroads, cleaned streets and houses. As a result, the Ural regiment settled there. The losses of personnel were great, but the Urals did not leave the conquered territory. Fighters from the "West" group broke through to them, and with heavy losses took the railway station. Securing the success, they abandoned parts of the 8th Army Corps from the "North" grouping under the command of Lev Rokhlin. They took over the hospital and the cannery. Rokhlin's headquarters was organized at the cannery, and this was the first success. From this bridgehead, further advancement of the units became possible. Little remained until Dudaev's headquarters, the North, West and East groups of troops were moving towards the presidential palace. The battles were fierce, they fought for every street. The militants did not surrender, and the paratroopers requested artillery assistance. Dozens of meters remained to the target, so sometimes they hit our own. Aviation was also powerless, because the troops that entered were standing in a zigzag pattern, and it was difficult to figure out where their own and where the others were. The command reported to Moscow that the center of Grozny was blocked. In fact, the militants were preparing for the second wave of the assault, anticipating the defeat of the troops like the Maikop brigade. The trench generals were rebuilding battle tactics on the move. The new units now mirrored the structure of the militants. On January 5, a group of troops Vostok crossed the Sunzha, which divided Grozny into two parts. The troops captured strategic points and three bridges. Groups of troops West and North approached the Presidential Palace closer. At this time, the Russian military agreed with the militants on a ceasefire for 48 hours. Russian soldiers, militants, and civilians were removed from the streets. For a week and a half of fighting, both sides lost more than a thousand people, excluding the wounded and civilians. During these 48 hours, the militants were able to regroup their forces, bring up reinforcements, and replenish ammunition. The commanders and soldiers were perplexed: they had almost occupied the presidential palace, and they were receiving orders to cease fire. After the end of the moratorium, fighting intensified. On January 13, the marines of the Northern Fleet were thrown to the aid of the thinning troops. On January 14, they were entrenched in the building of the Council of Ministers of the West grouping of forces. The Rokhlins joined them, they squeezed out the militants and surrounded the Presidential Palace. On January 19, the Presidential Palace was captured. Dudayev left the building the night before so as not to be captured. On this day, the commander of the united grouping Anatoly Kvashnin from Mozdok reported to Pavel Grachev that the task had been completed. But the battles for Grozny continued until February 26. It seemed that the Chechen conflict was over. But the first Chechen war ended only two years later, in 1999 the Second Chechen war began.
On the morning of December 11, by order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Russian troops crossed the official border of Chechnya and moved in three directions towards Grozny. This is how the operation to restore constitutional order in Chechnya began.
Preparing for the assault
On December 12, 1994, the holiday of the Constitution of the Russian Federation was celebrated, and on this day it was announced that the war had begun. A hasty transfer of troops to Mozdok, a town in North Ossetia-Alania, began. Confusion, carelessness, and vanity - this is how one could characterize the regrouping of troops. Every half hour, one plane after another landed, and a re-formation was going on right on the runway. The regiments are divided into marching battalions and companies. The hurriedly assembled parts had one question - what to do next? The task was unclear. With whom and how to fight?
Oleg Dyachenko, the commander of the 1st paratrooper company, recalls that due to uncertainty, there was no unity in his unit. Some of the soldiers refused to storm Grozny, others agreed. But in the end, those who resisted also flew. Everyone secretly hoped that everything would be okay, and this was just an "act of intimidation." Gathered as for regular maneuvers.
There was another problem, a psychological one. Russian troops were greeted with placards "hands off Chechnya!" Pyotr Ivanov, a senior officer of the Airborne Forces, notes that for the Russian soldier the enemy was always abroad, in the event of the Chechen operation, their own sharply became strangers. Therefore, it was difficult to make the decision to open fire on the settlement, knowing that there were civilians there.
Defense Minister Pavel Grachev promised that the assault on Grozny would take no more than two hours. But only two weeks later, with battles and losses, Russian troops reached the borders of Grozny. Intelligence showed that the road to Grozny would be the road to hell. Two people, one of whom was a journalist, filmed the entire route to Grozny, which showed the location of the Dudayevites' checkpoints, the approximate number of weapons. Intelligence showed that the militants were waiting for Russian troops and preparing for battle. But subsequent orders and actions of the command showed that the information "did not reach them."
A few days before the assault, the Defense Minister negotiated with General Dudayev, which led to nothing. But Pavel Grachev naively believed that Dudayev would throw out the white flag. The Dudayevites did not even think to give up, they were well prepared. In Grozny, they were preparing for defense, organized three lines of defense.
The first is around the Presidential Palace, the second with a radius of one kilometer around the first line, and the third, with a radius of 5 kilometers. The outer border was built on the outskirts. According to intelligence, there were up to 10 thousand people from Dudayev. Weapons include heavy armored vehicles, artillery and mortars.
What forced Pavel Grachev to conduct an unprepared assault? First, he gave the order to postpone the date of the assault on the Chechen capital. I got on a plane and almost flew to Moscow. "Almost" - because he left the cabin before takeoff and stayed in Mozdok. Gathered all the commanders of the groupings. Lieutenant Colonel Valery Yarko recalls: “the task was set - by the holiday, by the New Year, to seize and solve the problem with the Chechen Republic. That is, to seize the Presidential Palace. Flags were issued and on December 31 the commanders were delivered to their combat positions. " Grachev promised - which of the generals will be the first to hoist the flag over the Presidential Palace, will receive the title "Hero of Russia". This encouraged the commanders, but divided the team spirit - everyone dreamed of a rank. Now Grachev had no doubts about the success of the operation.
Four offensive groups were identified: "North" under the command of K. Pulikovsky, "North-East" under the command of L. Rokhlin, "West" under the command of V. Petruk and the east under the command of N. Staskov. The number of attackers is a little more than 15 thousand people. Equipment: 200 tanks, 500 APCs and armored personnel carriers, 200 guns and mortars. It was planned to complete the operation within a few days.
But according to estimates, in order to successfully storm Grozny, the military had to be at least 60 thousand people. Some commanders understood this and tried to prevent the assault. Alexei Kirilin, platoon commander of the communications battalion of the 131st brigade, recalls: "Kulikovsky built our platoon and said that he would ask the Minister of Defense for at least a month to prepare the assault." What Grachev said is unknown. But the very next morning Kulikovsky gave the order to move towards the city.
How the operation began
Tanks and infantry fighting vehicles of the "North" group entered Grozny. 2 battalions of the 131st Maykop brigade moved along the Staropromyslovsky highway. The 81st Samara Motorized Rifle Regiment was moving in parallel. The commander of the 131st brigade, Savin, was instructed to gain a foothold at the intersection of ul. Mayakovsky and Staropromyslovsky highways and ensure the approach of the rest of the group. Ignorance of the city, lack of modern detailed maps played a fatal role. Meeting no resistance, the Maikop brigade slipped through the required turn. The brigade commander Savin realized his mistake when the presidential palace appeared, and the headquarters rejoiced at the quick capture of the city. The brigade received a new order - to occupy the railway station in the city center. There was a battalion of the 81st Samara regiment. Without firing shots, the Maikop brigade reached the station and stopped.
Grozny railway station. The tragedy of the Maikop brigade
The Maikop brigade was surrounded by 2 militants' defense rings. Brigade Commander Savin realized late that the brigade was not protected from the flanks, and the Chechen mousetrap could slam shut at any moment. Other parts of the troops got bogged down in battles on the outskirts of Grozny. The battle of the 131st Maykop brigade lasted all night, and all this time brigade commander Savin asked for help to break out of the ring of militants. By morning, he realized that help would not come, loaded the wounded and killed on 2 infantry fighting vehicles and went to the breakthrough. Savin commanded the brigade until he was shot. The rest of the 131st Brigade continued to wait for help and fired back from the militants. At night, a column was formed from the reserve of the 131st brigade, but it could not break through to its own - the militants met them with a storm of fire.
The 131st brigade and the 81st regiment will fight in encirclement for another week. Of the 26 tanks that entered Grozny, 20 were burned. Out of 120 BMP vehicles, 18 left the city. In the first minutes of the battle, 6 anti-aircraft complexes were destroyed - everything that had been prepared. The bodies of the deceased 131st brigade were collected for more than a month. The body of the brigade commander Savin was found only in March 1995.
Secrets of the tragic assault of '95
According to Vasily Krisanov, the head of the RAV of the 131st brigade, for a long time they determined from the brigade's lists who went to storm Grozny. This means that the individual company and battery commanders did not have time to count the people, to compile surname lists of those who were in which vehicle.
Who will be responsible for the death of the Maikop brigade? They decided to blame the deceased brigade commander Savin, and this information was picked up by the Russian media.
General Rokhlin says: “The rout was complete. The command was shocked. " The main concern of the command was the search for those to blame for the tragedy. Rokhlin has not received a single order since that moment.
The main reasons for the failure of the New Year's storms were the lack of a clear plan and a set task. The incoherence of hostilities due to the competition for the title of "Hero of Russia" among the commanders. In addition, they did not take into account the poor material security and poor training of personnel. General Gennady Torshev gave his assessment of the operation: “According to some generals, the 'festive' assault was organized for Grachev's birthday. This information is unconfirmed, but the fact that the assault was prepared in a hurry, without realistically assessing the situation is a fact. We didn't even have time to think of a name for the operation. "
The technical equipment was unreliable. Of the five hundred infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 36 were faulty. Of the 18 howitzers, 12 were faulty, and only 4 of the 18 self-propelled guns were suitable for combat.
On the morning of January 1, the 693rd motorized rifle regiment from the "West" grouping tried to break through to the aid of the Maykopites. But the paratroopers were met with hurricane fire in the area of the Andreevskaya Valley. Not having passed even five hundred meters, they retreated and established themselves on the southern outskirts of the city. Although they broke through to the Central Market, they were stopped by the militants. Under the onslaught, the regiment began to withdraw, and by 18 o'clock it was surrounded near the Lenin Park. Communication with the regiment was lost. Like the Maykopites, they had to break out of the encirclement, they suffered heavy losses. They learned about the tragedy the next day, and this time Major General Petruk was found guilty. He was accused of the death of units, and removed from command. Major General Ivan Babichev took his place.
Prisoners
For one New Year's Eve, more than 70 soldiers and officers were taken prisoner by the Dudayevites. Valery Mychko, captain of the 81st Samara regiment, recalls: “The Chechens pulled me out of the burning car. Then, half-forgotten, I answered their questions, later I lost consciousness. I woke up from a blow to the chest - it turns out that the Chechens provided first aid. A Chechen lying next to me was already raising a knife over me. They mocked the prisoners, gouged out their eyes, cut off their ears. For intimidation, the militants handed over such prisoners to the Russian side.
Capture of the Presidential Palace, Operation Retribution
Following in the footsteps of the 131st brigade, the 276th Ural motorized rifle regiment from the North-East grouping was sent to Grozny. The regiment entered the parallel streets of Lermontov and Pervomayskaya street. The Urals people left checkpoints at every crossroads, cleaned streets and houses. As a result, the Ural regiment settled there. The losses of personnel were great, but the Urals did not leave the conquered territory. Fighters from the "West" group broke through to them, and with heavy losses took the railway station. Securing the success, they abandoned parts of the 8th Army Corps from the "North" grouping under the command of Lev Rokhlin. They took over the hospital and the cannery. Rokhlin's headquarters was organized at the cannery, and this was the first success. From this bridgehead, further advancement of the units became possible. Little remained until Dudaev's headquarters, the North, West and East groups of troops were moving towards the presidential palace. The battles were fierce, they fought for every street. The militants did not surrender, and the paratroopers requested artillery assistance. Dozens of meters remained to the target, so sometimes they hit our own. Aviation was also powerless, because the troops that entered were standing in a zigzag pattern, and it was difficult to figure out where their own and where the others were.
The command reported to Moscow that the center of Grozny was blocked. In fact, the militants were preparing for the second wave of the assault, anticipating the defeat of the troops like the Maikop brigade. The trench generals were rebuilding battle tactics on the move. The new units now mirrored the structure of the militants.
On January 5, a group of troops Vostok crossed the Sunzha, which divided Grozny into two parts. The troops captured strategic points and three bridges. Groups of troops West and North approached the Presidential Palace closer. At this time, the Russian military agreed with the militants on a ceasefire for 48 hours. Russian soldiers, militants, and civilians were removed from the streets. For a week and a half of fighting, both sides lost more than a thousand people, excluding the wounded and civilians. During these 48 hours, the militants were able to regroup their forces, bring up reinforcements, and replenish ammunition. The commanders and soldiers were perplexed: they had almost occupied the presidential palace, and they were receiving orders to cease fire. After the end of the moratorium, fighting intensified.
On January 13, the marines of the Northern Fleet were thrown to the aid of the thinning troops. On January 14, they were entrenched in the building of the Council of Ministers of the West grouping of forces. The Rokhlins joined them, they squeezed out the militants and surrounded the Presidential Palace. On January 19, the Presidential Palace was captured. Dudayev left the building the night before so as not to be captured. On this day, the commander of the united grouping Anatoly Kvashnin from Mozdok reported to Pavel Grachev that the task had been completed. But the battles for Grozny continued until February 26.
It seemed that the Chechen conflict was over. But the first Chechen war ended only two years later, in 1999 the Second Chechen war began.
The true interpretation is the calendar numbers December 31st.
- Zodiac symbol of people born on 12/31/94 Capricorn (from December 23 to January 20).
- Eastern Calendar 1994 of the Blue Wood Dog.
- Element of the zodiac sign Capricorns born on 12/31/94 > Earth.
- A suitable planet for people who were born on the day on this date is Saturn.
- Today is week 52.
- There are 31 days in December according to the calendar.
- The length of the day on December 31 - 7 hours 06 minutes(the length of daylight hours is indicated according to the average European latitude of Moscow, Minsk, Kiev.).
- Orthodox Easter was ››› May 1st.
- According to the calendar, the season is winter.
- Gregorian calendar ›not a leap year.
- Better to wear zodiac colors for people who were born on the day December 31, 1994# ›Shiny purple and White.
- Trees suitable for the combination of the sign of the horoscope Capricorn and 1994 according to the calendar of an oriental animal # ›Magnolia and Elder.
- Stones are charms for people who have a birthday today ›Euclaz, Coral.
- Particularly favorable numbers for people born on December 31, 94 ›››› Six.
- The very best days of the week for people who were born on the same day December 31, 1994 Tuesday.
- Reliable symbols of the soul, the sign of the horoscope of Capricorns born to this number ~ cheerful and fastidious.
Characteristics of men born on December 31st.
The characteristics of a Capricorn guy include loyalty, caring, reliability, decency and truthfulness. Due to excessive isolation and self-discipline, men, according to the calendar on December 31, 1994, of birth, are very squeezed in intimate terms. It prefers not to arouse interest in itself, to keep it aside, choosing the position of the gray mouse. Despite the seeming simplicity, he will not miss the chance to take advantage of other people's shortcomings. The man according to the eastern calendar on 12/31/1994 year of birth - Blue Wood Dog, is quite practical and has a rational view of things.
He loves his job. Man by calendar as of December 31, 1994 birth, will not miss the opportunity to get a good education, then will systematically and steadily move up the career ladder. He does it pretty well, since Capricorn has the necessary perseverance, hard work and incredible patience. If love has not yet arisen on their path in life, they begin to show one of their worst qualities - a thirst for power. This person is ready to sacrifice himself for the sake of the interests of his family.
Full information about women born today, 12/31/1994, the eastern year of the animal.
These Women, born on December 31, 1994, do not like to dissolve marriages. The status of a divorcee is humiliating for them, and they will immediately rush in search of another man who will reliably cover with his shoulder. They quickly find a common language, always get off the water, respect colleagues and wards. They know how to help and listen. Reason will prevail over feelings - the representative of this horoscope sign will certainly choose a person who is self-sufficient, strong in character and necessarily financially secure. A good mother and a wonderful hostess is a Capricorn woman born on December 31, 1994.
Even with age, a woman's skin is 12/31/94. birth, continues to remain youthfully attractive. They always follow their appearance, stubbornly trying to create the image of an ideal woman. They prefer no jewelry and a minimum of makeup. Women are as fresh as a spring breeze according to the calendar on 12/31/1994. births usually look somewhat younger than their age. Family for them is a necessity for full-fledged female happiness and a sense of harmony in life. It is quite difficult for others to guess what exactly is going on in the soul of this woman, so many stop communicating with her, without starting it, she is strict and unapproachable, sometimes hard-hearted.
When I had a financial crisis, the Money Amulet helped me attract good luck. The Talisman of Good Luck activates the energy of prosperity in a person, the IMPORTANT thing is that he is tuned only to you. The amulet that helped, I ordered for official website.Famous people were born under the sign of the Capricorn horoscope:
politician Gamal Abdel Nasser, writer Jack London, politician Richard Nixon, singer Elvis Presley, Giacomo Puccini, politician Helmut Schmidt, scientist Isaac Newton, politician Anwar Sadat, politician Mao Tse-tung, scientist Louis Pasteur, writer R. Kipling, actor Gerard , politician Lyndon Johnson, politician Martin Luther King, poet Jean Moliere, Charles Louis Montesquieu, politician Benjamin Franklin, King Henry IV.
Monthly December 1994 calendar with days of the week |
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| Mon | W | Wed | NS | Fri | Sat | Sun |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | |||
| 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 |
| 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 |
| 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 |
| 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | |
The Russian military used about 250 armored vehicles. They attacked the city from four sides: northern (General Konstantin Pulikovsky), western (General Ivan Babichev), northeastern (General Lev Rokhlin) and eastern (Major General Nikolai Staskov). Heavy two-month battles ended with the capture of the city by the Russian Army.
The decision to storm Grozny was made on December 26, 1994 at a meeting of the Security Council of the Russian Federation. The plan to take the city on the night of January 1 provided for the actions of federal forces from four directions:
"North" (under the command of Major General K. Pulikovsky)
"North-East" (under the command of Lieutenant General L. Rokhlin)
"West" (under the command of Major General V. Petruk)
"East" (under the command of Major General N. Staskov)
The concept of the operation provided for: advancing from the northern, western and eastern directions, enter the city and, in cooperation with the special forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Federal Grid Company, seize the presidential palace, government buildings, the railway station, and other important objects in the city center and block the central part of Grozny and the Katayama microdistrict.
From the northern direction, two assault detachments of the "North" grouping of forces and an assault detachment of the "North-East" grouping had the task of advancing in the zone assigned to them, blocking the northern part of the city and the presidential palace from the north. From the western direction, two assault detachments of the "West" grouping of forces, advancing in the allotted strip, were supposed to capture the railway station, and then, moving in the northern direction, block the presidential palace from the south.
As a result of the actions of these groups and the blocking of the main streets, a through corridor should have been formed. In order to exclude hostilities in the western part of the city and regrouping of the enemy in the rear, the paratroopers had to blockade the Zavodskoy district and the Katayama microdistrict.
In the eastern direction, two assault detachments of the "Vostok" grouping of troops, advancing along the Gudermes - Grozny railway, then in the direction of Lenin Avenue, had the task, without setting up checkpoints, to reach the Sunzha River, seize bridges across it and, joining forces with the groupings " North "and" West ", blockade the central area of the city in the mouth of the Sunzha River.
Thus, it was assumed that as a result of the actions of the federal troops in three converging directions, the main group of D. Dudaev, located in the center of the city, would be completely surrounded. This was the main idea of the plan, designed for minimal losses of federal troops and excluding fire impact on the residential and administrative buildings of Grozny. The calculation was also based on the surprise of the assault.
In all likelihood, the plan for the capture of Grozny was based on the experience of such relatively "anemic" (in comparison with the subsequent storming of Grozny) operations to restore constitutional order, such as the introduction of troops into Alma-Ata (December 1986), Tbilisi (April 1989). ), Fergana (June 1989), Baku (January 1990), Osh (June 1990), Vilnius (January 1991), Moscow (October 1993).
Before entering the city, instructions were received in parts - it was forbidden to occupy buildings, except for administrative ones, to break benches, trash cans and other objects of housing and communal services and infrastructure. Check the documents of the people met with weapons, confiscate weapons, shoot only as a last resort. Apparently, the whole operation was based on the confidence that there would be no resistance.
The result of the New Year's storming of Grozny in 1994-1995:
According to the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, from December 31, 1994 to April 1, 1995, the UGV in Chechnya lost: 1,426 people killed; wounded - 4 630 people; prisoners - 96 people; missing - approx. 500 people.
Losses of military equipment were: destroyed - 225 units (including 62 tanks); damaged (repairable) - St. 450 units.
When you raise your New Year's glasses today, please don't forget about them! Remember, the third toast, "For those who are no longer with us!" ...
Today, for you, in memory of the New Year's assault, a small selection of photographs was prepared
The audiobook about the New Year's assault on Grozny Vyacheslav Mironov "I was in this war" can be listened to online, without registration or downloaded for free on the partner's website "
