Special Forces Operations in Chechnya: The Forgotten Battle of Sernovodsk. Special Forces of the GRU in Chechnya

The first Chechen year 1994, which could have become the beginning of a new stage in the construction of Russia, ended on a tragic note. An attempt to restore order in Chechnya led to a bloody war. But why did such an experienced politician like Yeltsin suddenly get involved in the Chechen war?

During the period of hostilities in the Caucasus, little was known about the operations of the Russian special forces. Only the facts of punctures that happened to the Russian special forces during the Chechen campaign became public knowledge.

The first major setback occurred on January 7th. On this day, a special forces detachment of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) from the 22nd special forces brigade was surrounded. The militants ended up in captivity 48 people, plus the Chechens seized the latest types of silent weapons. Such as the previously classified Vintorez sniper rifle. In the evening, January 24, a tragedy occurred with the battalion, with the 16th separate special forces brigade. In an instant, as a result of the explosion of a three-story building, 45 people were buried alive under the rubble, another 28 scouts were concussed and wounded.

Everything else is shrouded in mystery. Although the special forces took an active part in the storming of Grozny and in other operations of this war. At the end of February, at the airport in the city of Mineralnye Vody, I talked with an officer from Chechnya, who had a special forces patch on his sleeve. A young, strong-looking guy with a bandaged head was badly shell-shocked and pondered for a long time what was said to him. Also, for a long time, he uttered response phrases, stammering strongly and drawing out words. How little he looked like the iron Rambo or other heroes of Western action movies, thanks to which the civilian man in the street has developed a far from reality image of an omnipotent superman.

What are civilians? During the fighting in Grozny, some military men advocated the capture of the Chechen capital exclusively by special forces units. In fact, he was proposing to entrust the intelligence officers with the functions of conventional combined-arms units. Which in itself is stupidity. Spetsnaz can do a lot, but not everything. Moreover, it is mostly yesterday's schoolchildren who serve in it, and not professional soldiers like the American "green berets" and rangers. But the "green berets" were pierced and mistaken many times, remember at least October 1993, Somalia. In two days, 18 Yankees from the special forces were killed there.

My interlocutor, who introduced himself as Konstantin, fought in Chechnya, in a special forces battalion of the GRU. He agreed to talk about some of the events that he had witnessed and participated in.

Before Chechnya, Konstantin served for almost a year in the Samara special forces brigade, which was withdrawn from Germany. Our fellow countryman was a squad leader in a special operations company. What is a special event? Mining, ambushes, all kinds of sabotage on enemy territory, the capture of prisoners. I had a chance to jump with a parachute.

In total, Kostya made 6 jumps. Is it a lot or a little? Given the lack of funding for combat training, just right. Much attention has been paid to maintaining sufficient physical fitness. Every Saturday, marches were made for 10 kilometers. Every day, the soldiers ran at a distance of 3-5 kilometers. Lessons were conducted in hand-to-hand combat and much more, which can be useful in combat conditions. It helped Konstantin that he went in for sports before being drafted into the army. Although, according to Kostya, hand-to-hand fighting was taught rather superficially, and the classes were mainly focused, such as the silent removal of the sentry. There was fire training twice a week - shooting from small arms.

Konstantin believes that the level of knowledge he received was sufficient. In any case, it exceeded the training of soldiers of motorized rifle troops many times over. Many motorized riflemen to Chechnya did not hold a machine gun in their hands.

The 33rd special forces battalion was being formed in Yekaterinburg. Kostya and several other guys from Mordovia were transferred there. The guys did not know exactly where they would be sent, but they guessed that it would be a hot spot - Georgia or Chechnya. Moreover, the events in the latter began to develop with catastrophic rapidity. At the new duty station, the emphasis was placed on mine-blasting training, the skills of orientation on the ground were improved. Survival courses were held.

In mid-January, a battalion of two hundred soldiers was deployed to Chechnya. They were accommodated in the Severny area, in the building of some kind of hostel. The first time they went to battle was on January 23rd. The front line at that time passed along the Sunzha River. And a group of 10 people went to the area of ​​the Dudayev Palace. The streets were under fire. Before reaching the place, they dismounted, and a little later ran towards the institute building. Bullets swarmed overhead. We safely reached the building and sat there for two days - adjusting the artillery fire. And they returned back without loss.

Again the most serious fighting broke out in mid-February, when the storming of the Minutka Square began. The group that Konstantin was in during this operation was in serious trouble for the first time. It happened at one of the checkpoints. At night, two special forces groups were stationed on the front line. We took refuge behind a brick wall. The tension of the last days affected, and the commandos relaxed - they lost their vigilance: they began to talk, someone even lit a cigarette. As Konstantin confessed, the area was not monitored at all.

We heard that a large group of people was moving in their direction. From the post they were shouted: “Stop! Password!" In response, silence. And the sound of the translators of fire being removed from the fuses. At the repeated shout of the soldiers from the post, they shouted in response: "Allah akbar!" and they opened fire on the commandos. Our men lay down and began to shoot back. The fighter who yelled "Allahu Akbar" was the first to receive a bullet. It was shot by a Russian sniper with a rifle with a night sight. One of the officers initially demanded a ceasefire. Another reconnaissance group was supposed to return from the mission, and it could come under fire. Of course, no one listened to him. Someone even sent them away in their hearts.

The shootout lasted twenty minutes. Some of the militants tried to attack ours by entering a nearby house. The special forces threw several grenades into its windows, loud moans of the wounded were heard, they were finished off with a couple more grenades. In total, the Chechens lost about a dozen killed. The special forces have losses - two seriously wounded. One guy was hit in the chest by three bullets, miraculously not hitting the heart. In another, a bullet, entering the head behind the ear, flew out in the coccyx. The guys were bandaged, injected with parmedol so that they would not die of painful shock. The wounded were left under the cover of one group, and Kostya's unit went on a mission. In the morning it was reported that the guys had been safely evacuated. Later it became known that they were operated on in the hospital, nothing threatens their lives.

Their group suffered the most serious losses later, when the Chechen capital was liberated. The army was leading an offensive towards Gudermes. A group in an armored vehicle went on reconnaissance - to the rear of the Chechen bandits. Their task was to penetrate as deeply as possible behind the front line. Moving forward, from time to time they stopped and contacted the command. The commanders ordered them to move on. Having driven out onto one of the hills, they saw that a ZIL truck with cows in the back was driving. The Chechens sitting in the cockpit tried to make their legs. One was killed, the other was caught. The plan quickly matured. The group included a 27-year-old contract soldier, an Armenian by nationality. Putting on a sweatshirt over his uniform, he sat down in the booth with the Chechens. Other commandos plunged into the back, and the APC followed. The road twisted and the armored personnel carrier fell behind.

After a while, their ZIL was stopped by militants. There were three of them. The Chechen grenade launcher took aim at the car. The second militant was armed with a submachine gun, the third held a machine gun at the ready. The officer sitting in the back said that he would hit the Chechens with a grenade launcher. Another soldier had to open fire from a machine gun. Others are required to leave the truck as soon as possible.

The officer jumped up and fired at the militants from a disposable "Fly" grenade launcher. But the jet stream of incandescent gases touched the ear of the soldier in the back, who was supposed to cover everyone with automatic fire. The stunned soldier, having risen, began to irregularly "water" the area from his "Kalashnikov". A contract soldier sitting in the cab killed another Chechen. Only three of them managed to jump out of the car. Then heavy fire was opened on the truck, and all the remaining - 7 people - were injured of varying severity. The survivors began to pull out the seriously wounded. The slightly wounded also helped each other. At this time, an armored personnel carrier that came to the rescue jumped out from behind the rock and began to hit the militants' positions with a large-caliber machine gun. Moments later, the APC was hit by an RPG. The gunner, who was sitting behind the machine gun, was also wounded; the driver saved him. Everyone hid behind the armored personnel carrier's armor.

Another group hurried to their aid. In the beginning, the guys tried to bypass the Chechens from the rear, but they also ran into fire and were forced to follow the same road as the previous group, in which Konstantin was. The battle flared up hot. The Chechen bandits, realizing that they were dealing with insignificant forces of the Russian troops, stretched out in a chain and went on the attack. The situation was becoming critical, especially since the commandos began to run out of ammunition. The approaching armored personnel carrier took the wrecked car in tow, and the commandos began to retreat, hiding behind armored personnel carriers. There was a continuous roar from the bullets hitting the sides. We drove up the hill. One of the officers tried to help the driver get out onto the road. The bullet hit the senior lieutenant in the head, and he fell dead in front of the shocked fellow soldiers. Another soldier suddenly gasped for air. Bloody foam appeared on the lips. The guy groaned: "I was hurt." They tried to help him, but it was too late, he died.

Due to the lack of communication, a third reconnaissance group ran into the same ambush half an hour later. These guys were lucky - they had no losses.

According to Konstantin, the army in Chechnya was not allowed to really fight. If it were not for the constant "ceasefires" made on orders from Moscow, the Chechen campaign would have been completed in two months.

My interlocutor honestly admitted that the army special forces were jealous of the riot policemen, the way they were equipped. The army did not have such equipment. But the fighters had to do many details of the uniform themselves, often picking up a thread and a needle. The spetsnaz soldier believes that the infantry carried the brunt of the fighting. The Marines fought well. Kostya disdainfully treats the internal troops.

Konstantin has a good opinion of most of the officers who served with him. Many of them went through Afghanistan and these people were on an equal footing with the soldiers. We ate, in fact, with them from the same pot. Equally shared with their subordinates all the hardships and hardships. They did not hide behind the backs of their subordinates. There was high discipline in the battalion. As for alcohol, it was not too abused there. The commanders said: “Guys, don't drink. If you really want to, come and sit together, but remember that at any moment we can go to the fighting, and the head must be fresh. "

Returning home, Kostya quickly moved away from what he saw there, although for the first weeks he had nightmares, and he often woke up at night.

In the Chechen conflict of 1994-1996, Russian special forces took part from the moment troops entered Chechnya - in consolidated and separate detachments. At first, special forces were used only for reconnaissance purposes.

Having started to work independently, the special forces began to use their inherent tactics, primarily ambush actions. With the deployment of hostilities in Dagestan against the armed formations of the Wahhabis, Chechen and international terrorists, the special forces provided the troops with intelligence, opening the defensive structures and positions of the militants.

In Chechnya, the special forces met with their old friends in Afghanistan - Arab, Pakistani and Turkish mercenaries and instructors who used methods of sabotage and terrorist war against the federal forces.

Veterans of the special forces recognized many of them by their handwriting, the choice of places for ambushes, the specifics of mining, radio communication, avoiding pursuit, and the like.

Most of the uninvited guests, among them prominent field commanders and mercenaries, fell ingloriously from the bullets and grenades of the army special forces.

According to official, objective data, the GRU special forces operate in Chechnya ten times more efficiently than other units. In terms of combat training and the fulfillment of assigned tasks, the GRU special forces are in first place.

In the Chechen conflict, Russian special forces took an active part. Consolidated and separate detachments operated from the brigades of the Moscow, Siberian, North Caucasian, Ural, Trans-Baikal and Far Eastern military districts.

By the spring of 1995, the detachments from Chechnya were withdrawn, with the exception of a separate special-purpose detachment of the North Caucasus Military District, which fought until the end of hostilities and returned to the point of permanent deployment in the fall of 1996.

Unfortunately, special purpose units, especially at the initial stage of hostilities, were used as reconnaissance units of units and formations of the Ground Forces.

This was a consequence of the low level of training of the personnel of the regular intelligence units of these units. For the same reason, especially during the storming of Grozny, special forces soldiers were included in the assault groups. This led to unnecessary losses. 1995 can be considered the most tragic year for the entire history of special forces, both the USSR and Russia.

So, at the beginning of January 1995, a group of the special-purpose detachment of the 22nd brigade was taken prisoner. As a result of a tragic accident in Grozny, there was an explosion of a building where a special-purpose detachment of the 16th brigade of the Moscow military district was located.

However, in the future, the special forces began to act using its inherent tactics. The most common tactic was ambush.

Often, special-purpose groups worked with intelligence information from the military counterintelligence agencies, the FSB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The field commanders who moved at night in high-mobility vehicles with small guards were killed from ambushes.

In May 1995, special forces units of the North Caucasian Military District brigade took part in the hostage rescue operation in Budennovsk.

They did not storm the hospital, but controlled the outskirts of the city, and subsequently accompanied a convoy with militants and hostages. In January 1996, one of the brigade's detachments took part in an operation to free the hostages in the village of Pervomayskoye.

At the initial stage of the operation, a group of forty-seven people undertook a diversionary maneuver in order to draw back the main forces of the militants.

At the final stage, the detachment inflicted tangible losses on the breakthrough group of Raduev, despite the multiple numerical superiority of the militants. For this battle, five special forces officers were awarded the title of Hero of Russia, one of them posthumously.

This period is also characterized by the fact that the 173rd separate detachment, which operated in Chechnya, was again equipped with military equipment, which made it possible to increase the firepower and mobility of the special forces who supported the activities of the reconnaissance groups.

Began recruiting the warring special-purpose units with contract servicemen. The educational level of intelligence officers at that time was quite high. People with higher and secondary technical education were attracted by high and regular cash payments.

Today, another Russian man in the street, discouraged by information about the regular sorties of Chechen fighters, may get the impression that the domestic special services are often losing the armed confrontation with the separatists. However, this is not the case. The "VPK" editorial office publishes an interview with Captain N (for quite understandable reasons, we do not indicate his last name) - an officer of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces. This is an attempt to acquaint readers with the intellectual and moral character of the employees of the GRU spetsnaz units, who are confronting extremists in the mountains of the North Caucasus.

In Chechnya, the GRU special forces can only rely on their own forces.
Photo by Petr Ilyushkin

- At the present time on the territory of Chechnya there are subdivisions of different power departments: the Ministry of Defense, the FSB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the GUIN, the Ministry of Justice: Which of them, in your opinion, are fighting against illegal armed groups most effectively? And what part of all the work done falls to the share of the GRU special forces?

It depends on what is considered effective: the number of killed militants or the information obtained. Personally, I liked the words of the President of the Russian Federation that up to 80% of combat missions in Chechnya today are performed by the GRU special forces. I will not say the same, but about half of the work is done by the GRU special forces, because no one else goes to the mountains. I know this one hundred percent. As for who works and how, we have more than once suffered from the illiterate actions of the military commandant's offices: we came under their mortar and artillery fire, although every time they had information on which area in the mountains it was forbidden to shoot when ours worked in this place. group. I still don't know if they did it from evil or not? The special forces of the Internal Troops are serious, physically well-trained guys, they perform their tasks quite well.

- What, in your opinion, is the number of militants in Chechnya today? Do they count in hundreds or thousands?

Thousands. Residents of some villages who plow during the day and take up arms at night, of course, are also militants. But I believe that at the moment it is in the composition of the armed formations - 2-3 thousand people. These are those who are constantly fighting, and not hiding under the guise of a civilian population. I myself saw several bases, which were designed for about 300 people, I personally observed a detachment of militants of about 150 people through binoculars. I believe that about a few thousand people today are members of the armed formations that are constantly fighting. With the onset of winter, very many of them, as a rule, descend from the mountains either to villages, or to Georgia, they leave for Dagestan, because in winter smoke will be visible and huge reserves of food are needed, which need to be regularly brought up and replenished, and this is dangerous - groups ours constantly walk along some mountain paths. They also fight, climb mountains, but much less. And in the spring they come back, which is why in the spring and summer there are so many skirmishes with them on the Georgian border.

- Which bandits in the Chechen mountains do you most often come across: local residents or foreign mercenaries?

There are very few Chechens, that is, ideological, who are fighting on their own land. Yes, there are shepherds with radio stations, women with explosives, and even teenage children who well remember how his brother (father) was killed by "Russian dogs" and are eager to take revenge. And the cases when such a child takes a machine gun and shoots in the back are not at all isolated. But mostly mercenaries of various nationalities are fighting there now. This can be seen from intelligence information, interrogations of prisoners, examinations of corpses.

- I have heard that Shamil Basayev is hiding exclusively in the Vedeno region, so to speak, in his ancestral domain, since his way to other districts is "barred" - they say, there are his "bloodlines". But if so, why hasn't he been caught yet?

Because - I know this for sure - they literally take our weapons away: "don't go there today," "don't shoot there today."

- Have you personally ever had such information that in some place there is one hundred percent of the leader of the militants? And if so, why not adjust artillery fire in this place, for example? Then to collect at least pieces of meat?

Yes, there was such information that he was there, but I myself did not see him, which means I had no right to direct artillery to this village. Because then I myself would have been jailed, like Comrade Budanov. He is a vivid example, so I would not like to repeat his fate:

- By the way, how do your colleagues assess the proceedings against Colonel Budanov?

Everyone regrets that he was made extreme. They just showed that "we, too, are fighting" with our "bad" ones. But I know exactly how much work this man did in Chechnya as the commander of his regiment.

- Is it true that our "specialists" try not to let any of the bandits out of the mountains alive, because they know in advance that they will be released later?

No one is simply killed, even if he is an Arab mercenary in a green bandage with a beard and a grenade launcher. If there is an opportunity to take him alive, they take him alive, interrogate him, and only then decide what to do with him next. Yes, there was a case when a "child" walked down the street, sat down with a machine gun, and when they gave him the order to stop, he pointed his weapon towards the group - and was immediately shot. So when a real danger exists, it is justifiable brutality. But outright sadists, who would just like to kill, I simply have not met. And their own officers will not pat anyone on the head for such a case.

- Are the numbers of irrecoverable losses incurred by the GRU special forces in Chechnya large?

Irrecoverable losses of our unit in 2000-2003 in each mission (6 months) amounted to approximately 10% of its number. (For 1999 - 30%.) The ratio of the dead officers to the rank and file is one to five.

- In Afghanistan, the GRU special forces had their own armored vehicles, while in Chechnya, your chiefs are forced to beg for armored personnel carriers and MTLBs from the commanders of motorized rifle units for each special operation. Is this, in your understanding, a "minus"?

Yes, according to the state, we are not entitled to armored vehicles, and this is a "minus", because we have to work in all regions, everywhere. We get there when they give something - on armored personnel carriers, on KamAZ trucks, on helicopters - and when and in general on foot. And our own armored vehicles, of course, would not hurt us: at least for the evacuation of the wounded. Because, while you order it, while it arrives, many will simply bleed out. Otherwise, there would be at least some hope.

- During the Cold War, GRU special forces brigades in various military districts were trained to work in a likely theater of operations in a certain geographic area and climatic conditions. Has this tendency been preserved today, when many of the southern military districts in Russia no longer exist? Priority is given to work in the mountains or in desert conditions and on the European plain?

Each brigade (special forces of the GRU - V.U.) has its own direction in which it will work in the event of large-scale hostilities. The European theater of warfare (like the Asian one) is also being considered. It's just that now there is Chechnya and all the brigades are working there. But our senior officers have combat experience in Afghanistan, and who are a little older - Vietnam. After all, the GRU is military intelligence, it is always and in all places where hostilities are being conducted. At the same time, our units can carry out tasks of other types of troops, as, for example, in Chechnya and the Balkans.

- And even there are successful examples of recruiting or obtaining some valuable information about the military personnel of other foreign contingents?

Of course I have. This is military-technical information that concerns models of weapons, new equipment, as well as those types of weapons and ammunition that are prohibited by international conventions. But mainly, we and NATO are just watching each other's actions.

- Who serves in the GRU special forces? Do you have conscripts in your unit?

Yes, almost everything.

- Doesn't the principle of recruitment affect the level of skills and abilities of servicemen?

No. Personal qualities and preparation affect. It is the officer's fault if the soldier is not trained.

- Is it possible to compare the GRU special forces servicemen with the servicemen of foreign elite units, like the British SAS, for example?

I met at international competitions for the special forces championship with the guys from the SAS, the US Marine Corps, Italian, German and French paratroopers. These closed competitions are held once a year in different parts of Russia. Marches are performed there, exercises for physical endurance and group coherence are performed, educational tasks are solved: ambush, raid, sabotage, parachute jumps, gathering group members after landing, as well as practicing survival skills, for example: who will boil water faster, who he will light a fire faster, equip a cache and so on. If we compare our fighters with foreign special forces, then there is a huge difference between them in the human factor and the level of technical support. We have mainly twenty-year-old guys, and they have "men" aged 30-35. And our soldiers, unlike them, are not whimsical at all, because how do they live in Chechnya? Always in tents, always in the mud, constantly not washing, not shaving, but nevertheless they carry out the tasks set. And the pampered Americans and Western Europeans are very, very dependent on support technology.

- What problems are the domestic special forces experiencing today?

The most elementary thing is that you need to train the fighters in shooting, regularly travel outside the unit to the shooting range, but no one gives money for fuel and lubricants, nor for engineering training. And one more thing: the last samples of communications, optics, and weapons are delivered to our unit.

- You were wounded in Chechnya, but you are not going to resign from the Armed Forces. Why do people like you serve in the special forces - for the sake of the idea, the loyalty of the GRU, Russia?

Well, about Russia, of course, everyone has their own concept, but as for loyalty to the special forces, the spirit of the special forces - they serve for this. Not for the money that the state began to pay during the second Chechen war. They serve precisely for themselves, the main thing is the work itself. I really like my job.

- Do you really care where you can be sent next time?

I don't care where to fight. If my commanders decide something, I'm not going to discuss their orders. Whether it will be one of the CIS countries, Chechnya, Africa is absolutely unimportant. I work in the interests of the state.

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